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Abstract 
 
This article is an attempt to a thorough chronological analysis of the European Community’s 
(EC) existing law and policy in the field of international trade law since the beginning of the 
European Economic Community. It deals with the evolution of the EC’s common 
commercial policy competence through the years, starting with the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), moving on to the necessary changes brought by the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Agreement, signed in Marrakesh in 1994, until the days of the 
European Union (EU) Constitutional Treaty, with a view to enabling the EC with a coherent 
trade policy in the WTO framework. Thus, a legal analysis of EC trade policy in the pre-
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Amsterdam Treaty period, at the Treaty of Amsterdam, at the Treaty of Nice, and during the 
European Convention period, is provided, taking into account the most recent constitutional 
developments of division of competences between the EC and its Member States. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The EC has become an important actor on the international scene, and since the 1970s, its 
external relations have been growing both in number of agreements signed and in domains of 
participation.1 The European Communities have participated in an important number of 
multilateral conventions within the framework of the international or regional organizations, 
and are increasingly present in world affairs. In the context of multilateral relations, they 
have a growing role.2 The EC’s progression was not steady but was achieved in small steps, 
as we will see in the analysis of this article.   
This article begins with a legal clarification of Article 133 EC. Then, it continues with 
an analysis of the emergence of the European Economic Community (EEC) (1958-1967).  
Next is a discussion of the transfer of competence during the period of the merger of the 
three European Communities and the end of the transitional period after the formation of the 
 
1 For a policy analysis of the EC’s foreign economic policy, see Young, A.R. “The Adaptation of European 
Foreign Economic Policy: From Rome to Seattle,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 1, March 
2000, pp. 93-116; see also, Young, A.R., Holmes, P. & Rollo, J. “The European Trade Agenda After Seattle,” 
Sussex European Institute Working Paper No. 37, November 2000. 
2 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, PARTICIPATION DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENNES AUX 
ACCORDS MULTILATERAUX, Direction General I A, Introduction  (1997). 
Rafael Leal-Arcas                                                                
 4
EEC (1967-1977), as well as other legal bases used by the EC for international trade 
agreements. Opinion 1/94 of the European Court of Justice and its consequences for EC trade 
policy is explored. An analysis of the Amsterdam and Nice negotiations, the changes made to 
Article 133 EC by the Nice Treaty,3 and the confusion brought by those changes follows. 
Finally, I will conclude with an analysis of the EU Constitutional Treaty’s work on EU trade 
policy to see whether it could partly be the optimal solution to the trade-off of efficiency 
versus accountability in trade policy decision-making.4
II. What Is Article 133 EC? 
Article 133 EC (formerly Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome) is the legal basis for the 
common commercial policy.5 It allows the EC “to negotiate, conclude and implement trade 
 
3 The Treaty of Nice entered into force on February 1, 2003. It was accepted and ratified by all the Member 
States between June 7, 2001 and July 2, 2002, most of the time through Parliament. Only Ireland ratified it by 
referendum: after rejection of the Treaty by 53.87% of the voters in a first referendum on June 7, 2001, it finally 
passed on the following October 19, with 62.89% of the votes. 
4 At present, the EU is founded on four basic treaties that lay down the rules by which it has to operate. These 
treaties are big and complex, and EU leaders intend to replace them with a single, shorter, simpler document 
spelling out the EU's purposes and aims and stating clearly who does what. This new document (technically 
known as the Constitutional Treaty) will be rather similar to the constitution of a country - even though the EU 
is not, and does not aim to be, a single country. The text of this new EU Constitution was agreed in June 2004 
and signed by all the Member State governments in October 2004 in Rome. It was due to come into force in 
2006, but first it must be ratified by all the national parliaments and, in some countries, be approved by 
referendum. 
5 Article 133 EC reads: 
 
1.   The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes in 
tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of 
liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or 
subsidies. 
2.   The Commission shall submit proposals to the Council for implementing the common commercial policy. 
3.   Where agreements with one or more States or international organisations need to be negotiated, the 
Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise the Commission to open the 
necessary negotiations. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring that the agreements 
negotiated are compatible with internal Community policies and rules. 
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special committee appointed by the 
Council to assist the Commission in this task and within the framework of such directives as the Council may 
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agreements with other countries of the world.”6 EC trade activity includes trade in goods, but 
only parts of trade in services, trade in the commercial aspects of intellectual property and 
investment, which are shared with the Member States. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the 
EC is competent to negotiate and conclude international agreements on services and 
intellectual property rights but only if the EU Council so decides by unanimity, as we see in 
Article 133(5) of the Amsterdam Treaty (now Article 133 (7) of the Nice Treaty).7
As defined by Article 133 EC, “the scope of the common commercial policy […] has 
been interpreted very broadly by the Court of Justice. However, it does not cover 
international negotiations and agreements relating to services and intellectual property, two 
 
issue to it. The Commission shall report regularly to the special committee on the progress of negotiations. 
The relevant provisions of Article 300 shall apply. 
4.   In exercising the powers conferred upon it by this Article, the Council shall act by a qualified majority. 
5.   Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall also apply to the negotiation and conclusion of agreements in the fields of trade in 
services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, in so far as those agreements are not covered by 
the said paragraphs and without prejudice to paragraph 6. 
By way of derogation from paragraph 4, the Council shall act unanimously when negotiating and concluding an 
agreement in one of the fields referred to in the first subparagraph, where that agreement includes provisions for 
which unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules or where it relates to a field in which the 
Community has not yet exercised the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty by adopting internal rules. 
The Council shall act unanimously with respect to the negotiation and conclusion of a horizontal agreement 
insofar as it also concerns the preceding subparagraph or the second subparagraph of paragraph 6. 
This paragraph shall not affect the right of the Member States to maintain and conclude agreements with third 
countries or international organisations in so far as such agreements comply with Community law and other 
relevant international agreements. 
6.   An agreement may not be concluded by the Council if it includes provisions which would go beyond the 
Community's internal powers, in particular by leading to harmonisation of the laws or regulations of the 
Member States in an area for which this Treaty rules out such harmonisation. 
In this regard, by way of derogation from the first subparagraph of paragraph 5, agreements relating to trade in 
cultural and audiovisual services, educational services, and social and human health services, shall fall within 
the shared competence of the Community and its Member States. Consequently, in addition to a Community 
decision taken in accordance with the relevant provisions of Article 300, the negotiation of such agreements 
shall require the common accord of the Member States. Agreements thus negotiated shall be concluded jointly 
by the Community and the Member States. 
The negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in the field of transport shall continue to be 
governed by the provisions of Title V and Article 300. 
7.   Without prejudice to the first subparagraph of paragraph 6, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal 
from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may extend the application of paragraphs 1 
to 4 to international negotiations and agreements on intellectual property in so far as they are not covered by 
paragraph 5. 
6 http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/faqs/133.htm 
7 Cremona, M. “EC External Commercial Policy after Amsterdam: Authority and Interpretation within 
Interconnected Legal Orders,” in Weiler, J. (ed.) The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA. Towards a Common Law 
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areas being discussed within the WTO.”8 In relation to the scope of Article 113 (1-4) of the 
Treaty of Rome on the common commercial policy, it was a non-exhaustive enumeration of 
subjects covered.9 Paragraph 3 gives explicit and exclusive competence to the EC to 
negotiate and enter international trade agreements with States or international organizations. 
Years later, the Amsterdam Treaty inserted Article 133 (5) EC, which does not change the 
scope of Article 133. It nevertheless authorizes the Council, acting unanimously, to extend 
application of paragraphs 1-4 to international negotiations on services and commercial 
aspects of intellectual property. All these issues will be analyzed later in this article. 
 
III. Pre-WTO Period 
A. 1952-1958: The ECSC As A Pioneer
The powers attributed to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), specifically to its 
High Authority in the field of external relations, were limited to the economic areas covered 
by the Treaty of Paris, as well as being limited in nature. Articles 71-75 of the ECSC Treaty10 
merely grant the institutions recourse to specific interventions to avoid undesirable situations. 
Still, the founders of the ECSC paid close attention to its relations with the rest of the world, 
the Western world in particular. Jean Monnet, the first president of the ECSC High 
Authority, never considered the refusal of the UK to join the ECSC as a final “no” to the 
 
of International Trade?, Oxford University Press, 2000. 
8 See European Commission "Activities of the European Union. Summaries of Legislation. External Trade: 
Introduction" available at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r11000.htm (last visited January 18, 2004). 
9 For a legal analysis of the scope of the common commercial policy, see Koutrakos, P. EU International 
Relations Law, Hart Publishing, 2006, pp. 33-75. 
10 The ECSC was created by the Treaty of Paris, 1952. 
Rafael Leal-Arcas                                                                
 7
concept of European integration. On the contrary, he set out to establish a close working 
relationship with the UK Government and rejected any kind of distinction between members 
and non-members, who were called “third countries.”11 
During this period, there were difficult questions as to the right of the High Authority to 
receive foreign envoys.12 Days after the High Authority started its work, UK and U.S. 
diplomatic missions were accredited to the ECSC, and these were later followed by Austrian, 
Swiss, Swedish and Danish missions, among others. However, by the autumn of 1952, a 
problem arose. The UK was tabling the so-called “Edenplan”, by which the Council of 
Ministers and the Common Assembly of the ECSC would function as a kind of inner circle 
of the Committee of Ministers and the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
They had to decide which institution would be entitled to deal with the UK and with the 
Council of Europe.13 Since the Treaty did not address this issue, the ECSC turned to three 
prominent international lawyers, Maître Reuter, Professor Ophüls and Professor Rossi, who 
concluded that the High Authority would conduct the negotiations on these matters when 
they affected the institutional organization of the ECSC. 
 The invitation from the U.S. to the High Authority to visit Washington in the summer of 
1953 also contributed to the establishment of the ECSC’s international position. The then-
President of the High Authority and two of his advisers accepted the invitation, meeting with 
President Eisenhower and members of his cabinet, as well as with influential members of 
Congress. The U.S. was already supporting European efforts towards integrated policies, of 
 
11 Wellenstein, E. “Twenty-Five Years of European Community External Relations,” CMLRev 16 (1979), p. 
408. 
12 Stelios Castanos, Principes et Problèmes de Relations Internationales Européennes (1965). 
13 Werner J. Feld, The European Community in World Affairs. Economic Power and Political Influence, (1976). 
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which the ECSC was a shining example.14 During this period, the High Authority also 
negotiated the Association Agreement of 1954 with the UK, and other important 
arrangements with Austria, Switzerland15 and Sweden on various issues relating to coal and 
steel markets. 
 From there, the EC continued to increase its political efforts. The High Authority opened 
a delegation at the ambassadorial level in London after the “Association Agreement” was 
concluded with the UK, set up an Information Office in Washington and established a liaison 
office for Latin America in Santiago, Chile. 
B. 1958-1967: The Three Communities16 Working In Parallel 
B.1.- Euratom In The External Policies Of The Communities  
 
The second of the Treaties of Rome of 1957, which established the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom), played a vital role in the development of the Communities’ external 
relations. Of the three treaties setting up the European Communities, including the EEC 
Treaty, the Euratom Treaty contains the most comprehensive provisions for foreign 
relations.17 The Euratom Treaty reads: “The Community may, within the limits of its powers 
and jurisdiction, enter into obligations by concluding agreements or contracts with a third 
State, an international organization or a national of a third State.”18 
14 Werner Weidenfeld, America and Europe: Is the Break Inevitable? (1996). 
15 Agreement on the introduction of through international railway tariffs for the carriage of coal and steel 
through Swiss territory, 1957 O.J. (L 17) 223-229. 
16 Let us remember the three Communities (now only two of them remain since 2002): European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and European Economic Community 
(EEC), which then became simply European Community (EC). 
17 TEC, as amended by the TEU.  
18 See Chapter X on External Relations, Article 101, para. 1 of the Euratom Treaty. 
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Today, it is the Commission that negotiates and concludes such agreements, following 
the directives given by the Council, except those which can be implemented without the 
Council in the framework of the existing budget.  Under the EC Treaty, however, the Council 
concludes such agreements. Additional provisions address mixed agreements and limitations 
on the treaty-making power of the Member States. 
 In the early years of Euratom, a number of important agreements concerning the supply 
of enriched uranium and cooperation in the development of peaceful use of atomic energy 
were signed with the U.S. and with Canada.19 Security played an important role in the 
implementation of these agreements. The preservation of the control system at the 
Community level necessitated successful negotiations during the late 1960s and early 1970s 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)20 in Vienna and Brussels, which 
resulted in the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Ireland, the Italian Republic, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Community for 
Atomic Energy and the IAEA in application of paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article III of the Treaty 
on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.21 
The implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons required 
control arrangements that came into existence in the so-called “Verification Agreement” 
between Euratom, some of its Member States and the IAEA. It was a mixed agreement based 
 
19 Stanley Henig, External Relations of the European Community. Associations and Trade Agreements, (1971). 
Agreement between the Government of Canada and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) for 
cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, 1959 O.J. (L 60) 1165. 
20 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established as an autonomous organization on July 29, 
1957. It seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to inhibit its use for military purposes. U.S. 
President Eisenhower envisioned, in his “Atoms for Peace” speech before the UN General Assembly in 1953, 
the creation of this international body to control and develop the use of atomic energy. The IAEA has its 
headquarters in Vienna. Two "Regional Safeguards Offices" are located in Toronto and Tokyo. The IAEA has 
two liaison offices, located in New York and Geneva. In addition, it has laboratories in Seibersdorf, Vienna, 
Monaco, and Trieste. 
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on Article 102 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community.22 The 
provisions of the Euratom Treaty, as well as the main agreements concluded in the late 1950s 
on that basis, still had importance in the late 1970s for the external policy of the 
Community.23 
B.2.- The Emergence Of The EEC As A Major Negotiating Partner In World Affairs 
 
In the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty (ECSC Treaty), the idea of a common 
market is based on “harmonized” tariffs, where the tariffs of Member States may not differ 
more than the cost of transport between their territories. However, the EEC, as a customs 
union,24 had a full-fledged common tariff25 and common commercial policy,26 as well as 
provisions concerning negotiations of the common tariff and common commercial policy 
with third countries. After the transitional period, decisions on these matters are taken by the 
Council and proposed by the Commission by qualified majority, though in the beginning the 
decisions had to be unanimous.  
 What characterizes the EEC Treaty is its wide coverage of both the range of products and 
various policies, and the institutions can create new policies. Even before the merger of the 
 
21 Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European 
Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Articles III (1) 
and (4) of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, 1978 O.J. (L 51) 1. 
22 Michael Smith & Stephen Woolcock, The United States and the European Community in a Transformed 
World (1993). 
23 Id.
24 On July 1, 1968 a customs union was set in place. From that day, goods can move within the European 
Community without being taxed and are no longer subject to customs duties. A common customs tariff toward 
third countries was therefore established by the then EC’s six Member States. 
25 Article 131 EC, as amended by the TEU. 
26 Id., at Arts. 131 & 133.  
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Councils and Commissions of the three Communities in 1965,27 the world viewed the EEC as 
a general integrative undertaking, able to use political weight to solve problems.28 Euratom 
alone would not have had the strength to convey the same political message. However, the 
EEC, with Euratom as a component, had a considerable impact on world affairs.29 During 
this period, third countries gained interest in joining the EEC. Greece was the first to ask for 
an association agreement in 1961,30 with an intention of membership. Next came Turkey31 in 
1963, and then Israel.  
 There were also those who tried to neutralize what they saw as the potential negative 
effects of these new Communities on their own position. The UK and other non-EEC 
European States worked together for the creation of a free trade area32 within the framework 
 
27 The merger of the European Communities' executive bodies took place on April 8, 1965. Since then, there has 
been only one Council and a single Commission. The entry into force of the Merger Treaty was on July 1, 1967 
and Jean Rey became the first President of the “merged” Commission. 
28 THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT (Meinhard Hilf et al. eds., 1986). 
29 CHRISTOPHER PIENING, GLOBAL EUROPE: THE EUROPEAN UNION IN WORLD AFFAIRS (1997). 
30 Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and Greece, 1963 O.J. 
(L 26) 294. 
31 Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, 1964 O.J. 
(L 217) 3685, 3705. 
32 This means a group of countries that have removed barriers to trade among them –barriers such as import 
tariffs and quotas-. Several free trade areas have been established around the world: Mercosur in South 
America, NAFTA in North America, CAFTA in Central America, ASEAN in South-East Asia, and EFTA in 
Europe, for example. The European Union is also a free trade area, but it is much more than that because it is 
built on a process of economic and political integration, with joint decision-taking in many policy areas.  
Not everyone agrees with the creation of free trade areas. In North America, for instance, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was a radical experiment in rapid deregulation of trade and 
investment among the U.S, Mexico, and Canada. Since 1995, NAFTA is considered the symbol of the failed 
corporate globalization model because its results for most people in all three countries have been negative: real 
wages are lower and millions of jobs have been lost; farm income is down and farm bankruptcies are up; 
environmental and health conditions along the U.S.-Mexico boarder have declined; and a series of 
environmental and other public interest standards have been attacked under NAFTA. NAFTA’s agricultural 
provisions have been so extreme that Mexican family farmers are demanding a re-negotiation or nullification of 
the treaty, after its first phase of initial implementation led to displacement of millions of Mexican farmers. 
NAFTA represents the gold standard of corporate rights in trade and investment agreements because it includes 
hitherto unheard of corporate privileges, including investor-to-state dispute resolutions, which is the right to sue 
governments for cash compensation in closed trade tribunals over regulatory costs. This right, contained in 
NAFTA’s chapter 11 on investment, has been used by numerous multinational corporations to seek financial 
compensation for public health and safety, or environmental regulations that corporations argue amount to 
expropriation of their current or future lost profits. NAFTA chapter 11 corporate suits have resulted in the 
lifting of a Canadian ban on a toxic chemical as well as an attack on a similar California state toxic chemical 
ban, and the payout of U.S. $16 million by waste dump to be built on ecologically protected land. 
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of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC).33 This failed, and a 
smaller free trade area (European Free Trade Association [EFTA])34 came into existence. 
There were also those countries that supported the process of Community construction from 
without.35 For example, the U.S. considered the process a major contribution to the stability 
and prosperity of the world. Finally, there were those like the former U.S.S.R. that 
condemned this revival of European dynamism as detrimental to the peaceful coexistence of 
sovereign nations.36 
There are several Articles in the EEC Treaty that promote greater common action. For 
example, ex-Article 116 EEC reads: 
 
From the end of the transitional period onwards, Member States shall, in 
respect of all matters of particular interest to the common market, proceed within the 
framework of international organizations of an economic character only by common 
action. To this end, the Commission shall submit to the Council, which shall act by a 
 
33 The OEEC is the forerunner of the OECD. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) is an international organization of those developed countries that accept the principles of representative 
democracy and a free market economy. It originated in 1948 as the Organization for European Economic Co-
operation (OEEC), led by Frenchman Robert Marjolin, to help administer the Marshall Plan for the re-
construction of Europe after World War II. Later its membership was extended to non-European states, and in 
1960 it was reformed into the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. The organization 
provides a setting where governments can compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, 
identify good practice, and co-ordinate domestic and international policies. It is a forum where peer pressure 
can act as a powerful incentive to improve policy and implement "soft law" — non-binding instruments that can 
occasionally lead to binding treaties. Exchanges between OECD governments flow from information and 
analysis provided by a secretariat in Paris. The secretariat collects data, monitors trends, and analyses and 
forecasts economic developments. It also researches social changes or evolving patterns in trade, environment, 
agriculture, technology, taxation, and other areas. Over the past decade, the OECD has tackled a range of 
economic, social and environmental issues while further deepening its engagement with business, trade unions 
and other representatives of civil society. Negotiations at the OECD on taxation and transfer pricing, for 
example, have paved the way for bilateral tax treaties around the world. Among other areas, the OECD has 
taken a role in co-ordinating international action on corruption and bribery, creating the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, which came into effect in February 1999. 
34 The EFTA is an organization founded in 1960 to promote free trade in goods amongst its member states. 
There were originally seven EFTA countries: Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and 
the United Kingdom (UK). Finland joined in 1961, Iceland in 1970, and Liechtenstein in 1991. In 1973, 
Denmark and the UK left EFTA and joined the EC. They were followed by Portugal in 1986, and by Austria, 
Finland and Sweden in 1995. Today the EFTA members are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. 
35 PETER STINGELIN, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE OUTSIDERS (1973). 
36 Id.
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qualified majority, proposals concerning the scope and implementation of such 
common action. 
 During the transitional period, Member States shall consult each other for the 
purpose of concerting the action they take and adopting as far as possible a uniform 
attitude.37 
Ex-Article 116 obliges Member States to act in concert when matters of particular 
interest to the common market arise in international economic organizations. Article 300 
EC38 is a general provision concerning the procedures for negotiation and conclusion of 
 
37 The original text of Article 116 EEC was repealed by the Treaty of Maastricht. Article 116 remained “empty” 
until the Treaty of Amsterdam, which inserted a new text for Article 116 EC but also renumbered this Article as 
Article 135 EC. Therefore, the present text for Article 135 EC (ex-Article 116) is not the original Article 116 
EEC. 
38 Article 300 EC reads: 
 
1.   Where this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between the Community and one or more 
States or international organisations, the Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall 
authorise the Commission to open the necessary negotiations. The Commission shall conduct these negotiations 
in consultation with special committees appointed by the Council to assist it in this task and within the 
framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it. 
In exercising the powers conferred upon it by this paragraph, the Council shall act by a qualified majority, 
except in the cases where the first subparagraph of paragraph 2 provides that the Council shall act unanimously. 
2.   Subject to the powers vested in the Commission in this field, the signing, which may be accompanied by a 
decision on provisional application before entry into force, and the conclusion of the agreements shall be 
decided on by the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission. The Council 
shall act unanimously when the agreement covers a field for which unanimity is required for the adoption of 
internal rules and for the agreements referred to in Article 310. 
By way of derogation from the rules laid down in paragraph 3, the same procedures shall apply for a decision to 
suspend the application of an agreement, and for the purpose of establishing the positions to be adopted on 
behalf of the Community in a body set up by an agreement, when that body is called upon to adopt decisions 
having legal effects, with the exception of decisions supplementing or amending the institutional framework of 
the agreement. 
The European Parliament shall be immediately and fully informed of any decision under this paragraph 
concerning the provisional application or the suspension of agreements, or the establishment of the Community 
position in a body set up by an agreement. 
3.   The Council shall conclude agreements after consulting the European Parliament, except for the agreements 
referred to in Article 133(3), including cases where the agreement covers a field for which the procedure 
referred to in Article 251 or that referred to in Article 252 is required for the adoption of internal rules. The 
European Parliament shall deliver its opinion within a time limit which the Council may lay down according to 
the urgency of the matter. In the absence of an opinion within that time limit, the Council may act. 
By way of derogation from the previous subparagraph, agreements referred to in Article 310, other agreements 
establishing a specific institutional framework by organising cooperation procedures, agreements having 
important budgetary implications for the Community and agreements entailing amendment of an act adopted 
under the procedure referred to in Article 251 shall be concluded after the assent of the European Parliament has 
been obtained. 
The Council and the European Parliament may, in an urgent situation, agree upon a time limit for the assent. 
4.   When concluding an agreement, the Council may, by way of derogation from paragraph 2, authorise the 
Commission to approve modifications on behalf of the Community where the agreement provides for them to 
be adopted by a simplified procedure or by a body set up by the agreement; it may attach specific conditions to 
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agreements with third-countries or with international organizations, where the Commission 
acts as the negotiator and the Council as the “concluder.”39 It also opens the possibility of 
asking for a preliminary opinion from the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Ex-Article 237 
EC Treaty,40 concerning enlargement of the Community, and Article 310 EC,41 concerning 
“associations,” are both characterized by mutual rights and duties, common actions and 
special procedures.42 
Before the Treaties of Rome were ratified, the six Member States at the time (i.e., West 
Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) had to prepare for 
negotiations within the GATT framework.43 The EEC was quickly engaged in various 
negotiations, and the implementation of the transitional provisions of the Treaty required 
enormous efforts from the Institutions, which also had to deal with proposals from outside 
the EEC. Among these initiatives that arose in the following years were four applications for 
membership, three from the group that had previously formed the European Free Trade 
Association, and Ireland. This intense international activity during the first years of the EEC 
was focused on the common external tariff. Ex-Article 111 of the Treaty44 gave the 
 
such authorisation. 
5.   When the Council envisages concluding an agreement which calls for amendments to this Treaty, the 
amendments must first be adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 48 of the Treaty on 
European Union. 
6.   The European Parliament, the Council, the Commission or a Member State may obtain the opinion of the 
Court of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with the provisions of this Treaty. Where 
the opinion of the Court of Justice is adverse, the agreement may enter into force only in accordance with 
Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union. 
7.   Agreements concluded under the conditions set out in this Article shall be binding on the institutions of the 
Community and on Member States. 
39 LAWMAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (Paul Craig & Carol Harlow eds., 1998). 
40 TEC ex Article 237 (repealed), as amended by the TEU. 
41 Id., at Article 310 EC, which reads: The Community may conclude with one or more States or international 
organisations agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action 
and special procedure. 
42 THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW (Paul Craig & Grainne de Burca eds., 1999). 
43 61 Stat. A3, TIAS No. 1700, 55 UNTS 187. 
44 TEC ex-art. 111 (repealed), as amended by the TEU. 
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Community the express task of negotiating this common tariff. Concessions on future 
common customs duties of the single market also led to important offers from the U.S.45 The 
use of the EEC, rather than individual member states, facilitated reductions of trade barriers.  
 From the perspective of international economic relations, perhaps the most interesting 
arrangements made by the High Authority during its period of independent activity were the 
successful consultations with Japan on the world steel market in the early 1960s. Around 
1964, the steel market entered a difficult period, with risks of dangerous protectionist 
reactions coming from the U.S.46 During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the specific powers 
of the High Authority in the field of commercial policy were first used in practice.47 
In sum, the Community was founded to create a framework within which the economies 
of the Member States could develop beyond their national borders and to promote stability in 
the world. The preambles of the treaties of Paris and Rome give an idea of the very wide 
objectives that the founders of the EEC had in mind. The place that their creation now 
occupies in the world lays enormous responsibilities on the institutions. Without the 
constructive contributions of the EC, many world problems could simply not find an 
appropriate solution. 
 
C.- 1967-1977: The Period Of The “Merger”, The End Of The Transitional Period Of 
The EEC, And The Transitional Period After The First Enlargement
45 Wellenstein, E. “Twenty-Five Years of European Community External Relations”, 16 COMMON MKT. L. 
REV., 1979, pp. 407-423, at 413. 
46 STEPHEN WOOLCOCK, TRADING PARTNERS OR TRADING BLOWS?  MARKET ACCESS ISSUES 
IN EC-U.S. RELATIONS (1991). 
47 WILLIAM FELD, THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET AND THE WORLD (1967). 
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A brief note should be made on the evolution of the concept of “commercial policy” as used 
in Article 133 of the EC Treaty. At the time of the Treaty of Rome, the common commercial 
policy did not mean trade in services, intellectual property rights or investment; it just meant 
trade in goods. That is the explanation for the raison d’etre of the ECJ’s Opinion 1/94. 
 Article 133 EC lists several examples of commercial policy, such as tariff changes 
and liberalization,48 and national administrations have tended to illogically limit the 
application of the Article to the examples given above. However, from Article 133 EC we 
can deduce that the enumeration is not meant to be exhaustive and among the examples 
listed, there is one with the general wording “export policy.”49 In addition, there are many 
examples of commercial policy outside of those listed in Article 133 EC. The rationale of the 
common commercial policy is to form the external dimension of the creation of a common 
market, but a Community that would deprive itself of those possibilities would weaken its 
position in relation to other entities.  
The scope of “commercial policy” became relevant on various occasions during the 
1970s.50 An important case arose when a number of Western countries tried to introduce 
more discipline into export credit policies with state backing. These policies risked 
degenerating into a competition among the treasuries of different Western countries, with the 
effect of providing highly industrialized states in Eastern Europe, for example, with credits 
below the market rate. Was this, then, a matter for the Community or for Member States 
individually? The European Commission seized the occasion of a rather minor provision 
within the framework of the OECD to ask for an opinion from the Court under Article 300 
 
48 TEC Art. 133, as amended by the TEU.  
49 PROTECTIONISM AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (Edmond L. Völker ed., 1988). 
50 PAUL DEMARET, RELATIONS EXTERIEURES DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE ET 
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EC. The advisory Opinion 1/7551 left no doubt as to the “commercial policy nature” of such 
export credit arrangements with state backing. History and evolving jurisprudence have 
gradually provided a much clearer and more convincing outline of the concept of common 
commercial policy. 
 The status of the so-called “cooperation” activities vis-à-vis Article 133 EC is another 
issue of considerable importance. Member States can still sign individual cooperation 
agreements (especially with East European countries), but since 1975 there has been an 
obligation of full consultation on the practical application and terms. The EC can also 
conclude agreements when cooperation is the primary concern. Commodity agreements are 
also covered by the EC common commercial policy. 
 “During this period, the U.S. position as a global economic hegemony deteriorated 
further in January 1973, when Britain, Denmark, and Ireland joined the EC, making it the 
world’s largest trading entity.”52 The successful participation of the EEC in the greatest 
multilateral trade negotiations of the time, the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations from 
1963-1967, gave the EEC a very strong position in the international forum. The EC was the 
first major trading entity in the Western world to implement the proposals for generalized 
preferences adopted in 1968 at UNCTAD II53 in New Delhi. In addition, the executive 
institutions of the three Communities were merged into a single Commission and a single 
 
MARCHE INTERIEUR: ASPECTS JURIDIQUES ET FONCTIONNELS (1986). 
51 Opinion 1/75, 1975 E.C.R. 1355. 
52 Cohn, T.H. Governing Global Trade. International institutions in conflict and convergence, Ashgate, 2002, at 
p. 281. 
53 UNCTAD stands for United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and was established in 1964 as 
a permanent intergovernmental body. UNCTAD is the principal organ of the United Nations General Assembly 
dealing with trade, investment, and development issues. The organization's goals are to maximize the trade, 
investment, and development opportunities of developing countries and assist them in their efforts to integrate 
into the world economy on an equitable basis. The creation of the conference was based on concerns of 
developing countries over the international market, multi-national corporations, and great disparity between 
developed nations and developing nations. Currently, UNCTAD has 191 member States and is headquartered in 
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Council (1967) at this time. With the end of the transitional period in 1970,54 these merged 
institutions would become responsible for the common commercial policy.55 Notably, this 
was a time of negotiation between the EEC and many other countries and organizations, 
which led to a variety of agreements.  
 In the field of the common commercial policy, authors such as Weiler argue against 
the popular belief that the 1970s were nothing much to the history of European integration 
and everything started after Casis de Dijon.56 During that time, the ECJ was the most 
influential international/supranational court, the Commission was assuming its role of the 
engine of the integration process and the European Parliament was requesting more 
institutional powers. The Council found itself more and more restrained in the Community 
game, probably against the original design of some Member States who regarded the EU 
Council as an ultima ratio, a refuge of nationalism. However, the EC was established 
originally on an unquestionable transfer of sovereignty57 from Member States to the EC,58 
Geneva. 
54 During the transitional period, the EEC was competent to conclude tariff agreements linked to the 
establishment of the common custom tariff. The Member States had to coordinate their trade relations with third 
countries. To this end, the EEC decided to insert an EEC clause in the trade agreements, and establish a prior 
consultation procedure. At the end of the transitional period, the Community became competent to conclude 
tariff and trade agreements with third countries, except in certain cases, in accordance with Article 133 EC. The 
EC common commercial policy is based on uniform principles, especially concerning tariff and trade 
agreements, harmonization of liberalization measures, export policy, and measure of trade defense. The EC’s 
trade policy has two distinct forms: 
1. autonomous: unilateral measures decided by the EC. For example, regulations on imports or the fight 
against antidumping; 
2. conventional: agreements and arrangements concluded by the EC with third countries. The doctrine, 
and especially the EU Member States, has rallied either under a strict conception of the common 
commercial policy, on the basis of the terms laid down in Article 133 EC, or under a modern and 
extensive conception. 
55 On December 31, 1970 was the end of the transitional period. The EC Member States introduced a common 
commercial policy. Also on this date, the finance of the EC budget by means of financial contributions from EC 
Member States was replaced by a system of own resources, which meant much greater freedom of action for the 
EC vis-à-vis its Member States. 
56 Case 120/78 REWE Central v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649. 
57 Sovereignty is one of the most used and misused concepts of international affairs and international law. 
Sometimes, it refers to the role of states in international organizations. Other times, it refers to internal division 
of power, or the degree of government authority toward its citizens. Richard N. Haass has defined sovereignty 
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with only the doctrine of implied powers as a caveat. Provisions that do not specify exactly 
what has been transferred to the EC, such as Article 308 EC,59 nevertheless constitute an 
explicit limitation of national sovereignty.60 
EC external relations are not limited to the field of trade policy. The Treaty is not 
very explicit about these other dimensions, but the European Court of Justice has attempted 
to clarify them. In the famous European Road Transport Agreement (ERTA) case on road 
transportation (Case 22/70, Commission v. Council),61 the Court ruled that a matter already 
regulated by the EU institutions could not be dealt with internationally without Community 
participation and approval, precisely because it has been regulated by an EU institution. 
External activity can take three main forms: 1) autonomous legislation, to set out rules for 
relations for the outside world; 2) negotiation, to arrive at agreements with third parties; and 
3) dialogue, to gain a better understanding of other parties in order to better determine their 
own attitudes.62 It was the dialogue that gained importance in the late 1970s.  
 
in the following manner: "Historically, sovereignty has been associated with four main characteristics: First, a 
sovereign state is one that enjoys supreme political authority and monopoly over the legitimate use of force 
within its territory. Second, it is capable of regulating movements across its borders. Third, it can make its 
foreign policy choices freely. Finally, it is recognized by other governments as an independent entity entitled to 
freedom from external intervention. These components of sovereignty were never absolute, but together they 
offered a predictable foundation for world order. What is significant today is that each of these components – 
internal authority, border control, policy autonomy, and non-intervention – is being challenged in 
unprecedented ways." (See, in this respect, Haass's remarks at the School of Foreign Service and the Mortara 
Center for International Studies, Georgetown University, entitled: "Sovereignty: Existing Rights, Evolving 
Responsibilities," on January 14, 2003). Most of the time, though, sovereignty actually refers to questions about 
the allocation of power, i.e., government decision-making power. 
58 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 is a clear example of transfer of sovereignty to the EC, although 
limited. 
59 Article 308 EC reads: If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the 
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community, and this Treaty has not provided the 
necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures. 
60 Mavroidis, P. “Lexcalibur: The House that Joe Built”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 38, 
2000, Number 3, p. 673. 
61 Commission v. Council, Case 22/70, 1971 E.C.R. 263. 
62 Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, External Relations Powers of the European Community, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
149 (1999). 
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In this context, we see that the EU now has diplomatic delegations in many capitals as 
well as in the U.N. headquarters (where it obtained official observer status in 1975). Since 
1973, the EU has conducted a systematic dialogue with the U.S., Japan, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand, separate from the periodic discussions that take place regularly within the 
OECD. Since 1977, the EU has also been involved in the economic world summits of the 
seven major industrialized nations, the so-called G 7.63 
Already in the late 1970s, the Community had become an important interlocutor, not 
only in trade but also in areas such as energy, fisheries and development policies. The 
Community was already a major actor in most world fora, often speaking with one voice, 
even if some aspects of the debate were not under its direct competence. Examples of this 
were the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (the so-called “North-South 
Dialogue”) in Paris in 1976-1977, when the Community had one single delegation to cover 
all points of the agenda, and the Euro-Arab dialogue. 
 During the period of the Tokyo Round (1973-1979), the U.S. continued to have much 
influence in world trade. Some of the early initiatives toward the Tokyo Round came from 
the American side such as the William Commission. That said, the EC and the U.S. held 
informal discussions on various issues throughout the Tokyo Round to avoid major potential 
confrontation. When the U.S. and EC did not cooperate, there was a deadlock in the 
negotiations of the Tokyo Round since they had effective veto power. When the U.S. and the 
EC adopted a unified position, the combined efforts of others had minor chances of changing 
the outcome.64 
63 The main difference between the G8 and the G7 (both coexist) is that the G8 deals with political matters and 
includes Russia as a member, whereas the G7 is for economic matters, and Russia is excluded. 
64 Golt, S. The GATT Negotiations 1973-1979: The Closing Stage, (London, British-North American 
Committee), May 1978, p.1; Winham, “The Prenegotiation Phase of the Uruguay Round,” pp.289-290; Thomas, 
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D.- Other Legal Bases for Trade Agreements
What follows are categories of international agreements that contain provisions on trade 
despite the fact that they are not based on Article 133 EC. I will categorize the various 
agreements into six main groups, namely, 1) development aid and cooperation agreements; 2) 
association agreements; 3) non-preferential trade and cooperation agreements; 4) partnership 
agreements; 5) agreements with international organizations; and 6) the implied powers 
doctrine. 
 
D.1.- Development Aid And Cooperation Agreements 
 
The original Treaty of Rome65 contained guidelines about external relations. First of all, the 
treaty established a special regime for development aid and cooperation, which initially aided 
developing countries that had a long-standing relationship (mostly former colonies) with 
founding Member States. This regime was further developed through the Yaoundé and Lomé 
Conventions, which linked 70 developing countries to the EC. 
In this sense, we see that one of the main reasons for international negotiations 
between the EEC and third-parties was the historic link between the different Member States 
of the EC and overseas territories or dependencies. Shortly after the establishment of the 
EEC, there was an important transformation in the links between these countries and the 
 
J.C. “The GATT and Multilateral Treaty Making: The Tokyo Round,” American Journal of International Law 
77 (1983), pp. 70-71. 
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Common Market, which, according to Part IV of the EEC Treaty, consisted of a two-way 
free access for each other’s products and a special Community aid program. To address the 
issue of access for these countries, the Yaoundé Convention was held.66 
The Yaoundé Convention took place with eighteen African States and Madagascar.67 
After the first enlargement of the Community, the whole system was renegotiated 
(1973/1974) with nearly 50 countries (all the former dependencies of the UK in Africa, the 
Pacific and the Caribbean). In 1975 the Lomé Convention, between the Community and this 
group of countries, introduced new ideas such as the organization of commercial and 
industrial cooperation and the stabilization of export earnings.68 
The Yaoundé Conventions linked the EC to African States, providing, inter alia,
financial and technical assistance for economic development. Two important examples are 
the Convention of Association between the EEC and Associated African States, of July 20, 
196369 and the Convention of Association between the EEC and Associated African States, 
of July 29, 1969.70 With reference to the Lomé Conventions, there have been four additional 
agreements negotiated, the European Economic Community-African, Caribbean and Pacific 
Countries Convention (EEC-ACP Convention), of February 28, 1975,71 the second ACP-
 
65 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community [TEEC]. 
66 It was on January 1, 1971 that the Second Yaoundé Convention entered into force (18 African countries), as 
well as the Arusha Convention (three Eastern African countries) and the Council Decision concerning the 
association of the EC Member States’ overseas territories. 
67 For example, an agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of Madagascar regarding fishing off the coast of Madagascar was signed some years later 
(OJ L 73/86, p. 25). 
68 It was on February 28, 1975 that the signature of the so-called Lomé I took place between the European 
Community and 46 ACP countries. 
69 2 I.L.M. 971 (1970). 
70 9 I.L.M. 484 (1970). 
71 14 I.L.M. 596 (1985). The African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) Group was formed when the first 
Lomé Convention was signed with the EEC in 1975. In 2002, it encompassed 78 states (48 African states, 16 
Caribbean states, 14 Pacific states), which all have preferential trading relation with the EC. 
Rafael Leal-Arcas                                                                
 23
EEC Convention, of October 31, 1979,72 the third ACP-EEC Convention, of December 8, 
1984,73 and the fourth ACP-EEC Convention, of December 1, 1989.74 Thanks to these 
Conventions, over 99% of these countries’ imports enjoy free access to the EU. 
 The status of so-called “cooperation” activities vis-à-vis Article 133 EC is an issue of 
considerable importance. Member States can still sign individual cooperation agreements 
(especially with East European countries), but since 1975 there has been an obligation of full 
consultation on the practical application and terms. The EC can also conclude that 
agreements when cooperation is the primary concern. Commodity agreements are covered by 
the common commercial policy.  
 With respect to industrialized nations, in 1976, the Community signed with Canada the 
first bilateral agreement with an industrialized nation outside Europe. Because trade policy 
between developed countries is covered by the GATT, it was simply a cooperation 
agreement.75 
D.2.- Association Agreements 
 
The Treaty of Rome also provided for the conclusion of association agreements under Article 
310 EC.76 Agreements with various degrees of commitment and different economic and 
 
72 19 I.L.M. 327 (1985). 
73 24 I.L.M. 571 (1985). 
74 Fourth ACP-EEC Convention signed at Lome, 1991 O.J. (L 229) 3. 
75 Council Regulation 2300/76, 1976 O.J. (L 260) 1 (Framework Agreement for commercial and economic 
cooperation between the European Communities and Canada). 
76 In addition to the typical cooperation agreements in economic and commercial matters and development aid, 
the EC concluded association agreements with certain third countries geographically close to the European area, 
establishing extensive relations in economic matters (Article 310 EC). Countries which today are EU Member 
States, such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal, have benefited from such agreements prior to joining the EU. 
Today, Turkey is associated to the EC by such agreements (in 1963, Association Agreement; in 1995, Customs 
Union Agreement). Other examples of Association Agreements – or of similar nature - are with Chile and 
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political purposes have been concluded with almost every country, except for some of the 
most developed countries like the U.S., Japan, and Australia. These Association Agreements 
represent the closest relationship with the EC and usually involve some kind of reciprocal 
obligation.  Agreements with countries of the European Economic Area,77 the Mediterranean 
Agreements,78 the Europe Agreements with Central and Eastern European countries,79 and 
the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements fall within this category. Though most 
mixed agreements involve just the EC (with the Member States, obviously), agreements 
involving the EC and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) were not rare at the 
time when the ECSC existed. In this sense, we find many association agreements in the EC 
legislation. However, agreements involving all three original Communities80 were 
uncommon. Examples of this are some of the regional environmental agreements. 
 The Europe Agreements are a series of association agreements with various Central 
European countries pursuant to the authority granted in Article 310 EC.81 Among them are 
the Europe (association) Agreement between the European Communities and the Republic of 
 
Mexico, and in the future with Mercosur (since 2000, the EC and the Mercosur are in the process of negotiating 
a bi-regional Association Agreement, including a free trade area) and the Andean Community. 
77 Council and Commission Decision 94/1/EC, ECSC, 1994 O.J. (L 1) 1 (on the conclusion of the Agreement on 
the European Economic Area between the European Communities, their Member States and the Republic of 
Austria, the Republic of Finland, the Republic of Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein, the Kingdom of 
Norway, the Kingdom of Sweden and the Swiss Confederation). 
78 Council Regulation 2213/78, 1978 O.J. (L 266) 1 (on the conclusion of the Cooperation Agreement between 
the European Economic Community and the Arab Republic of Egypt); Council Regulation 150/77, 1977 O.J. (L 
23) 13 (concluding the Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters relating to Article 9 of Protocol 1 to 
the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the State of Israel concerning the import into 
the Community of tomato paste originating in Israel). 
79 These specific types of Association Agreements were concluded between the EC and the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe in the first half of the 1990’s. They cover trade-related issues, political dialogue, legal 
approximation and various other areas of co-operation. The Europe Agreements aimed to establish free trade 
between the EC and the associated countries, and provided for progressive alignment with Community rules as 
well as a number of specific provisions in areas such as capital movement, rules of competition, intellectual and 
industrial property rights, and public procurement. 
80 The original European Communities were composed of: European Coal and Steel Community –by the Treaty 
of Paris, 1952; European Economic Community –by the Treaty of Rome, 1957, which in 1992 was renamed as 
European Community; and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) –by the Treaty of Rome, 1957. 
81 Roger Goebel, The European Community and Eastern Europe: Deepening and Widening the Community 
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Bulgaria,82 the Europe (association) Agreement between the European Communities and 
their Member States and the Czech Republic,83 and the Europe (association) Agreement 
between the European Communities and their Member States and the Republic of Hungary.84 
Negotiations were conducted with communist and formerly communist countries. In 
early 1978 a trade agreement was concluded with China and in 1985, a Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Agreement between the EEC and the People’s Republic of China85 replaced the 
previous Commercial Agreement of April 3, 1975. However, with China, and the former 
U.S.S.R. and its allies, the EC had no official dealings. Today, all of the Eastern European 
countries have arrangements with the EC on agricultural, steel and textile products, inter alia.
Romania was the first country to approach the EC and was granted special treatment for 
some of its exports under the generalized scheme of preferences in 1974. A more recent 
agreement with Romania is the Additional Protocol to the Europe Agreement on Trade in 
Textile Products between the EEC and Romania.86 
Before the merger of the institutions mentioned above, the EC composed of the original 
six Member States (West Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxembourg) was involved in a series of individual and collective negotiations.87 For 
example, the Association Agreements for future membership were concluded in 1961 with 
Greece88 and in 1963 with Turkey.89 Negotiations with the UK and other Western European 
 
Brand of Economic Federalism”, 1 NEW EUR. L. REV. 163, 218-23 (1993). 
82 Council and Commission Decision 94/908/EC, ECSC, Euratom, 1994 O.J. (L 358) 1. 
83 Council and Commission Decision 94/910/EC, ECSC, Euratom, 1994 O.J. (L 360) 1. 
84 Council and Commission Decision 93/742/Euratom, ECSC, EC, 1993 O.J. (L 347) 1. 
85 Council Regulation 2616/85, 1985 O.J. (L 250) 1. 
86 Additional Protocol to the Europe Agreement on Trade in textile products between the European Economic 
Community and Romania, 1994 O.J. (L 123) 476. 
87 JAMES JAY ALLEN, EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET AND THE GATT (1960). 
88 Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and Greece, 1963 O.J. 
(L 26) 294. 
89 Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic Community and Turkey, 1964 O.J. 
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countries during the 1960s for membership and special relations with the EC did not end in 
agreements. Negotiations with Austria continued during this period and talks with Israel90 
and Spain were taken up, leading to agreements with the latter country before the end of 
1960s. When the UK, Ireland, and Denmark joined the EC in 1973, the enlarged Community 
(the three Member States which joined in 1973 plus the original six) entered into free trade 
agreements with the remaining members of EFTA, Austria, Switzerland,91 Sweden, 
Iceland,92 and Portugal. Finland and Norway93 followed sometime later. 
 The Community has also signed agreements with a number of Mediterranean countries. 
Some of these countries received special treatment from the Community because of their 
historic link with European countries.94 For example, see the Cooperation Agreement 
between the EEC and the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria,95 the Cooperation 
Agreement between the EEC and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,96 the Cooperation 
Agreement between the EEC and the Lebanese Republic,97 the Cooperation Agreement 
between the EEC and the Kingdom of Morocco,98 the Cooperation Agreement between the 
EEC and the Syrian Arab Republic99 and the Cooperation Agreement between the EEC and 
 
(L 217) 3685, 3705. 
90 Agreement between the European Economic Community and Israel, 1975 O.J. (L 136) 1 (signed on May 11, 
1975, this was a free trade and cooperation agreement). 
91 Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation on the application of 
the rules of Community transit, 1972 O.J. (L 294) 1. 
92 Agreement establishing a free trade area between the European Economic Community and the Republic of 
Iceland, 1972 O.J. (L 301) 1. 
93 Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Norway and provisions for its 
implementation, 1973 O.J. (L 171) 2. 
94 Wellenstein, E. “Twenty-Five Years of European Community External Relations”, 16 COMMON MKT. L. 
REV., 1979, pp. 407-423, at 413. 
95 Council Regulation 2210/78, 1978 O.J. (L 263) 1. 
96 Council Regulation 2215/ 78, 1978 O.J. (L 268) 1. 
97 Commission Decision 78/992/EEC, 1978 O.J. (L 267) 1.  
98 Council Regulation 2211/78, 1978 O.J. (L 264) 1. 
99 Council Regulation 2216/78, 1978 O.J. (L 269) 1.  
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the Republic of Tunisia.100 During this period, the “global Mediterranean policy” was 
created. This nomenclature is not very precise since it suggests that all of these agreements 
were similar, but the agreements were very different from those completed between 1973 and 
1975. 
D.3.- Non-Preferential Trade And Cooperation Agreements 
 
In contrast to the association agreements, the “non-preferential trade and cooperation 
agreements” provide closer relationships between the EU and many countries of Southeast 
Asia and Latin America. These agreements are usually aimed at lesser-developed countries. 
Examples of cooperation agreements101 are the one signed with the Andean Pact (today 
Andean Community)102 as well as with ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian 
Nations)103 in 1980. Agreements were also designed to help some Asian countries address 
problems arising from the loss of certain preferences from the Commonwealth.104 This was 
the case with India,105 Pakistan,106 Sri Lanka,107 and Bangladesh.108 
100 Council Regulation 2212/78, 1978 O.J. (L265) 1. 
101 Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the conclusion of Framework Agreement for cooperation 
between the European Economic Community and the Andean Pact, 1993 O.J. (C 25) 31. 
102 The Andean Community is a trade bloc comprising until recently 5 South American countries: Venezuela, 
Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. In 2006, Venezuela announced its withdrawal, reducing the Andean 
Community to 4 member states. The trade bloc was called the Andean Pact until 1996, and came into existence 
with the signing of the Cartagena Agreement in 1969. Its headquarters are located in Lima, Peru. 
103 ASEAN is composed of 10 members. The six Founding Countries of ASEAN are Malaysia, Indonesia, The 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Brunei. The rest of countries are Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. 
The aims and purposes of the Association are to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development, and to promote regional peace and stability.  
104 The implementation of the “declaration of intent” does not require the conclusion of any agreement. 
105 Council Regulation 3113/84, 1984 O.J. (L 292) 1, 5 (Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters 
between the European Economic Community and the Republic of India on the guaranteed prices for cane sugar 
for the 1984/85 delivery period). 
106 Council Regulation 1196/86, 1986 O.J. (L 108) 1 (on the conclusion of the Agreement for commercial, 
economic and development cooperation between the European Economic Community and the Islamic Republic 
of Pakistan). 
107 Council Decision 90/537/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 301) 1 (concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between 
the European Economic Community and the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka on trade in textile 
products). 
Rafael Leal-Arcas                                                                
 28
In Latin America, agreements were concluded with Argentina,109 Uruguay,110 Brazil,111 
and Mexico.112 There was also, inter alia, the Interregional Framework Cooperation 
Agreement between the EC and its Member States and the Southern Cone Common Market 
(Mercosur),113 as well as the Framework Agreement for Cooperation between the EEC and 
the Federal Republic of Brazil.114 Regarding preferential access to the Community’s markets, 
it must be said that Iran requested such a negotiation, but the response was less than positive. 
There is also an Agreement between the EEC and Malaysia on trade in textile products115 and 
a Cooperation Agreement between the EEC and Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand, all member countries of the Association of South East Asian 
Nations.116 
D.4.- Partnership Agreements 
 
108 One early agreement with Bangladesh was on commercial cooperation. See Council Regulation 2785/76, 
1976 O.J. (L 319) 1. 
109 Council Decision 90/530/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 295) 66 (concerning the conclusion of the Framework 
Agreement for trade and economic Cooperation between the European Economic Community and the 
Argentine Republic). 
110 Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between the European Economic Community and the 
Eastern Republic of Uruguay on trade in mutton and lamb, 1980 O.J. (L 275) 37. 
111 Council Decision 91/64/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 40) 39 (concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the 
European Economic Community and the Federal Republic of Brazil on trade of textile products). 
112 Council Decision 87/504/EEC, 1987 O.J. (L 292) 73 (Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters 
between the European Economic Community and the United States of Mexico on trade of textile products). 
113 Proposal for a Council Decision concerning the conclusion of the interregional framework cooperation 
Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Southern Cone 
Common Market and its member countries, of the other part, 1996 O.J. (C 14) 3; see also Council Decision 
96/205/EC, 1996 O.J. (L 69) 1 (concerning the provisional application of certain provisions of the Interregional 
Framework Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, 
and the Southern Common Market and its Party States, of the other part). MERCOSUR stands for Mercado 
Comun del Sur (Common Market of the Southern Cone) and is composed of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and 
Uruguay. On 9 December 2005, Venezuela was accepted as a new member, but it will be officialized in late 
2006. It was founded in 1991 by the Treaty of Asuncion, which was later amended and updated by the 1994 
Treaty of Ouro Preto. Its purpose is to promote free trade and the fluid movement of goods, peoples, and 
currency. 
114 Council Decision 95/445/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 262) 53. 
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The EC has developed a hybrid of “partnership agreements,” which share features of 
cooperation accords and Europe agreements to manage its relations with the successor States 
of the former U.S.S.R. One example is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between 
the European Communities and their Member States and the Russian Federation.117 
D.5.- Agreements With International Organizations 
 
The Community’s role in the UNCTAD negotiations was less satisfactory than its fully 
integrated stand in the GATT.118 This is due to the application of Article 116 EC,119 which is 
far more complicated than that of Article 133 EC.120 There was also a general problem with 
the position of the EC (Commission) representatives in international organizations, especially 
those of the U.N. family. Since at that time only states could be members of these 
organizations, the Commission’s representatives had many difficulties in international 
negotiations. Whatever their constitutional powers may have been under EC law (like the 
exclusive right to negotiate), the Commission’s representatives were at best “observers.”121 
There were also problems at the European Conference on Security and Cooperation. 
The Commission’s representative had to find his place within the delegation of the Member 
State exercising the Presidency of the EU Council. The conference began with a Dane 
exercising the presidency and finished with an Italian. The primary goal for the Security 
 
115 Council Decision 90/625/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 339) 42. 
116 Council Regulation 1440/80, 1980 O.J. (L 144) 1. 
117 Council and Commission Decision 97/800/EC, ECSC, Euratom, 1997 O.J. (L 327) 1. 
118 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities,” 20 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 397, 420 (1983). 
119 Treaty establishing the European Community [TEC], art. 116, as amended by the Treaty on European Union 
[TEU]. 
120 Id. at art. 133. 
121 DOMINICK MCGOLDRICK, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 41 
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Conference was to make clear in all statements and documents that certain matters simply 
could not be addressed unless the Community, through its institutions, agreed to it. Even in 
1967, this point made the U.S.S.R. give up its resistance to Community participation in the 
international wheat agreement. 
 
D.6.- Theory Of Implied Powers122 
The sixth category which I would like to present deals with three groups: 1) the implicit123 
and explicit124 attribution of external EC competences;125 2) the exclusive versus non-
exclusive EC competences; and 3) the external versus internal EC competences.  
 The Community’s competence can arise by express conferment in a Treaty Article, or 
by implication from a Treaty Article. In the former case, we speak of express powers, 
whereas in the latter case, we speak of implied powers of the Community.126 The doctrine of 
implied powers developed in the jurisprudence of the ECJ ensured that the EC could enter 
into agreements – within its internal competence - in areas beyond the original areas given by 
 
(1997). 
122 For a useful and insightful analysis of implied competences and treaty-making powers, see de Witte, B. “The 
Constitutional Law of External Relations,” in Pernice, I. & Maduro, M. (eds.) A Constitution for the European 
Union: First Comments on the 2003-Draft of the European Convention, Nomos, 2003, pp. 95-106; see also, 
Dashwood, A. “The Attribution of External Relations Competence,” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, Ch. (eds.) The 
General Law of EC External Relations, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, pp. 115-38; Neuwahl, N. “The WTO Opinion 
and Implied External Powers of the Community –A Hidden Agenda?,” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, Ch. (eds.) 
The General Law of EC External Relations, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, pp. 139-51. 
123 Implicit powers refers to a situation in which the European Community has explicit powers in a particular 
area (e.g., transport), and it also has a power in the same field with regard to external relations (e.g., negotiation 
of international agreements). 
124 Explicit powers refers to a situation where the powers are those clearly defined in the Treaties. 
125 There is a third type of power, which depends on the mode of attribution, i.e., subsidiary powers. This refers 
to situations where the Community has no explicit or implicit powers to achieve a Treaty objective concerning 
the single market. In such situations, Article 308 EC allows the Council, acting unanimously, to take the 
measures it considers necessary. 
126 Implied powers are often referred to as derived powers.  
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the EC Treaty, namely the common commercial policy and association agreements. Although 
the exact scope of the EC’s implied powers, and the nature of the competence which arose 
from the operation of the principles developed by the ECJ were unclear and controversial, 
matters have been clarified with case-law127 of the ECJ and substantive law. The Treaty of 
Rome has resolved some of the contested points of legal theory in the doctrine of implied 
powers, whereas the Maastricht Treaty has clarified matters by creating express powers to act 
externally in a range of areas where previously such powers were of uncertain scope, or arose 
only by implication. 
 
D.6.a.- Implicit and Explicit Attribution of External EC Competences 
 
This distinction deals only with the external EC competences. It results from the 
interpretation given by the ECJ to the provisions of the Treaty in a constant case-law whose 
main steps are, in the past, the ERTA principle128 and Opinion 1/76 (Rhine and Mosselle 
Navigation Case)129 and, more recently, Opinions 2/91, 1/94 (Uruguay Round),130 and 
Opinion 2/92 (OECD national treatment).131 The Court has decided in its Opinion 1/76 that 
“competence to be internationally engaged can result not only from an explicit attribution by 
the Treaty but also as an implicit consequence from its [the Treaty’s] provisions”132 “and 
from acts taken, in the framework of these provisions, by the Community’s institutions.”133 
127 See mainly Opinion 2/91, ECR I-1061; Opinion 1/94; and Opinion 2/92. 
128 Case of 31 March 1971, ERTA, ECR p. 273. 
129 E.C.R. 1977, p. 741. 
130 E.C.R. 1994, p. I-5267. 
131 E.C.R. 1995, p. I-521. 
132 Opinion 1/76, para. 3. 
133 ERTA Case, para. 16. 
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Two more points concerning this distinction between the implicit and explicit 
attribution of EC external competences: 
 1.- among the explicitly attributed external competences, some are exclusive (mainly 
Article 133 EC, dealing with the common commercial policy) and others are not (such as 
Article 181 TEU, dealing with cooperation to development). 
2.- among the implicitly attributed external competences, some are exclusive (see 
ERTA case) and others are not. An example of implicitly attributed external competences 
which are non-exclusive is the general principle by which a non-exclusive competence can 
be exercised directly on the external sphere to conclude an international agreement without 
any prior exercise on the internal sphere. 
 
D.6.b.- Exclusive versus Non-Exclusive EC Competence in International Relations134 
With respect to the EC position in international organizations, when a matter falls within the 
exclusive competence of the EC, only the Community acts with regard to that matter on the 
international level.135 Therefore, only the EC, not the Member States, expresses a position or 
a vote on such matters. However, when the services of the Commission assure that the 
content of an international agreement belongs to “Community competence”, do they mean 
 
134 A good article that deals with the exclusivity of Community competences vis-à-vis shared competences is: 
Torrent, R. “Whom is the European Central Bank the Central Bank of?: Reaction to Zilioni and Selmayr”, 
COMMON MKT. L. REV., 36, 1999, 1229-41, especially pp. 1236-38; see also, Kaniel, M. The Exclusive 
Treaty-Making Power of the European Community up to the Period of the Single European Act, Kluwer Law 
International, 1996; Tizzano, A. “Note in Tema di Relazioni Esterne dell’Unione Europea,” in Daniele, L. (ed.) 
Le Relazioni Esterne dell’Unione Europea nel Nuovo Millennio, Giuffrè Editore, 2001, pp. 31-68. 
135 MACLEOD, I., HENDRY, I. & HYETT, S. The External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon 
Press Oxford, 1996, at 171. 
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European Community’s exclusive competence or non-exclusive competence? This same 
question could be addressed to civil servants, Community or national ones, who very often 
use the expression “concerning the first pillar” to refer to works done in the framework of 
ASEM meetings.136 These assertions have a completely different meaning depending on 
whether we are dealing with exclusive or non-exclusive Community competence. In the 
framework of exclusive competences, only the Community can act, whereas in the 
framework of non-exclusive competences, if the Community does not act, Member States 
may do so and, in certain cases, they may continue to act even if the Community also acts. 
 
D.6.b.1.- Exclusive EC Competence 
 
The case-law of the ECJ has established that the EC has exclusive competence in the field of 
common commercial policy. Therefore, Member States are no longer competent to act in 
areas dealing with common commercial policy. The Court clearly acknowledges in its 
Opinion 1/75137 the exclusivity of the EC on the basis that the commercial policy was 
conceived in the context of the common market and for the defence of the common interests 
of the EC. The ECJ concluded that it could not be accepted that the Member States could 
exercise powers which were concurrent with those of the EC in this field. As a logical 
consequence, one could say that national commercial policy measures are only permissible 
by virtue of specific authorization by the EC. As an example of it we have Case 41/76, Criel, 
née Dockenwolcke et al. v. Procureur de la Republique au Tribunal de Grande Instance, 
 
136 ASEM meetings are held between the European Union and the Asian States. 
137 Opinion 1/75, 1975 E.C.R. 1355, at 1363-4. 
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Lille et al.138 The exclusive nature of the EC’s competence has most recently been confirmed 
in Opinion 1/94.139 
The main effect of exclusivity in EC competence is that Member States may no 
longer act in the areas in which the EC has exclusive competence. The Court has pronounced 
itself in this way in Opinion 1/75 (Re OECD Local Costs Standard) by saying that “the 
exercise of concurrent powers by the Member States in this matter is impossible.”140 In Case 
804/79 Commission v UK (which is not an external relations case), the ECJ expressed herself 
in the same terms when saying that:  
 
“the power to adopt measures…has belonged fully and definitively to the 
Community. Member States are therefore no longer entitled to exercise any 
power of their own in [these matters]. The adoption of…measures is a matter 
of Community Law. The transfer to the Community of powers in this matter 
being total and definitive,…a failure [of the Council] to act could not in any 
case restore to the Member States the power and freedom to act unilaterally 
in this field.” 141 
In legal theory, the powers of the Member States have been transferred completely to 
the EC level, and the Member States may not enter into any international agreements which 
could affect measures adopted by the EC or change the scope of these measures. It must be 
clarified, though, that the exclusivity of the EC common commercial policy is not the same 
as the exclusivity of the EC’s implied powers under the ERTA principle. In this respect, Case 
22/70 Commission v Council at paragraph 22 is an example. Paragraph 22 reads: 
 
138 1976 E.C.R. 1921, at 1937. 
139 Opinion 1/94, 1995 1 COMMON MKT. L. REV., 205, paras. 22-34. 
140 1975 E.C.R. 1355, at 1364. 
141 1981 E.C.R. 1045, at paras. 17, 18 and 20. 
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If these two provisions are read in conjunction, it follows that to the 
extent to which Community rules are promulgated for the attainment of the 
objectives of the Treaty, the Member States cannot, outside the framework of 
the Community institutions, assume obligations which might affect those 
rules or alter their scope.142 
Opinion 1/75 (Re OECD Local Costs Standard) shows that Member States no longer 
have the right to adopt positions which differ from those which the EC intends to adopt in 
relations with third countries, or take over actions which would hinder the EC in the exercise 
of its tasks.143 Nor may they adopt internal legislation which undermines, or contradicts, 
measures adopted, externally or internally, by the Community. 
 Another effect of exclusivity is that the EC must be allowed to exercise its powers 
with total freedom. Ruling 1/78 (Re the Draft Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Transports) in this respect concludes that “the Member 
States, whether acting individually or collectively, are no longer able to impose on the EC 
obligations which impose conditions on the exercise of prerogatives which thenceforth 
belong to the EC and which therefore no longer fall within the field of national 
sovereignty.”144 Therefore, the EC may have to become party to international agreements 
which relate to areas of exclusive competence, in order to be in a position to comply with the 
obligations in the agreements in question,145 and in order that the fulfillment of the tasks 
given to the European Communities by the Treaties is not put in jeopardy.146 In addition to 
that, as we can gather from the Joint Cases 3, 4 and 6/76 Cornelis Kramer, Member States 
 
142 1971 E.C.R. 263, at 275. 
143 1975 E.C.R. 1355, at 1364. 
144 1978 E.C.R. 2151, at para. 32. 
145 Id., at para. 22. 
146 Id., at para. 33. 
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are under a duty to use all the political and legal means at their disposal in order to ensure the 
participation of the Community in such agreements.147 
D.6.b.2.- Non-Exclusive Nature of EC Competence 
 
As for non-exclusive Community competence, there are two types depending on the kind of 
exercise of these competences. This exercise may be alternative or parallel (or 
complementary) with the exercise of Member States’ competences. In the first case (when 
the exercise of non-exclusive Community competence is alternative with the exercise of 
Member States’ competences), if the Community exercises its non-exclusive competence, 
Member States lose the possibility to exercise theirs.148 However, from the moment in which 
the Community exercises its non-exclusive competence and to the extent where it will do so, 
this exercise pushes away the possibility for Member States to act individually. The second 
case (when the exercise of non-exclusive Community competence is parallel or 
complementary with the exercise of Member States’ competences) appears in two occasions: 
 
a) when the Community is competent to put into practice “action’s programmes” over 
a Community policy which co-exists with national policies on the same field. The 
typical example would be the one of research policies or cooperation policies to 
development; 
 
147 1976 E.C.R. 1279 at paras. 44-45 of the judgment. 
148 RAMON TORRENT, DROIT ET PRATIQUE DES RELATIONS ECONOMIQUES EXTERIEURES 
DANS L'UNION EUROPEENNE, <<http://www.ub.es/dpecp/ep/livreTorrent.html>>, 1998, at chapter 2. 
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b) when the Community produces a regulation which, by its own nature, can co-exist 
with non-harmonized national rules. This is an exceptionally hypothetical case which 
occurs in practice only in the field of intellectual property: the Community introduces 
a title and/or a mechanism for protection of the additional intellectual property which 
co-exists with the titles and/or mechanisms of the various Member States. Some 
people may say that this hypothetical case shows an exclusive Community 
competence (and not non-exclusive competence) since only the Community can 
create a Community title of protection of intellectual property. This argument, 
however, runs the risk of transforming all Community competences in exclusive 
competences; since only the Community can act at a Community level, all 
Community actions belong to the exclusive Community competence. It is, then, 
preferable to reserve the term “exclusive” for cases where Community competence 
excludes any possible national regime in the same field. 
 
One should also observe that the analysis of Community competences must be 
completed in relation to specific legal situations which are the subject of a potential 
regulation. An international agreement can regulate different legal situations. Those 
situations which do not belong to EC exclusive competence keep belonging to Member 
States’ competences (unless the Community exercises its non-exclusive competence, 
assuming that it exists in a specific issue). 
 
D.6.c.- External and Internal EC Competences 
 
Rafael Leal-Arcas                                                                
 38
The distinction between external and internal competence is a problematic issue.149 During 
the Community’s early years, there was a strong tendency to consider that the EC’s external 
competence had a more limited scope than the internal competence. The evolution of the ECJ 
case-law in its European Road Transport Agreement (ERTA) case [Case 22/70, Commission 
v Council]150 and its Opinions 1/68 and 1/76151 consolidated the thesis of “parallelism” 
between external and internal competences.152 McGoldrick explains this thesis: “[The 
doctrine of parallelism] asserts that the competence of the EC to enter into international 
agreements should run in “parallel” with the development of its internal competence –in 
interno in foro externo.”153 
With regard to the ERTA Case, I would like to write a few lines. The thesis of 
parallelism previously mentioned gained approval in the ERTA Case.154 It was in 1962 when 
five of the then six Member States of the EEC had signed an agreement known as the first 
ERTA with certain other European States. Such an agreement was not ratified by enough of 
the contracting States, which meant that the Member States began negotiations to conclude a 
second ERTA. Meanwhile, the Council issued a regulation deriving from its internal power 
covering the same areas. The Commission objected to the Council’s decision to allow 
negotiations to continue and tried to annul the resolution to that effect in the ECJ. The second 
 
149 RAMON TORRENT, DROIT ET PRATIQUE DES RELATIONS ECONOMIQUES EXTERIEURES 
DANS L'UNION EUROPEENNE, available at http://www.ub.es/dpecp/ep/livreTorrent.html, 1998, at chapter 
2. 
150 The ERTA Case (1970): 1971 E.C.R. 263. 
151 Opinion 1/76 (Re the Draft Agreement for a Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels) (Rhine 
Navigation Case) 1977 E.C.R. 741. 
152 For a deeper understanding of the issue, see Groux, J. "Le parallelism des competences internes et externes 
de la Communaute economique europeenne" (1978), Cahiers de droit europeenne, pp. 3-32 and 
MCGOLDRICK, D., INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Longman, 1997, 
pp. 48-50. 
153 MCGOLDRICK, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Longman, 
(1997), at 48. 
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ERTA was nevertheless concluded in 1970. According to Kent, “the ECJ held that the EC 
had the authority to enter into such an agreement. Authority may arise not only out of express 
provision in the Treaty but also from other Treaty provisions and from secondary legislation. 
When the EC had adopted common rules to implement a transport policy in 1960, Member 
States lost their competence to conclude international agreements in this area.” 155 
The European Court of Justice, in its Case C-327/91 France v Commission,156 deals 
with parallel internal and external powers of the European Community. In the above case, the 
Court gives the following view: “the ERTA judgment,157 as we know, is the frame of 
reference for identifying the external powers of the Community, the Court having stated that 
the possibility of concluding international agreements exists not only in the situations 
exhaustively listed in the Treaty but also whenever the Community has internal powers.158”
The ECJ goes further by saying in this same judgment [Judgment in Case 22/70 Commission 
v Council]159 that:  
 
“with regard to the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty the 
system of internal Community measures may not...be separated from that of 
external relations. Clearly, if no account were taken to the fact that the point 
at issue in that case was the division of powers between the Community and 
the Member States, such a statement could be used for recognising, on the 
assumption that the conditions are fulfilled, the Commission’s limited power 
to conclude international agreements, which would thus constitute a 
corollary, as it were, of its specific internal powers in a given area.”160 
154 For a good explanation of the ERTA Case (1970), Case 22/70, Commission v Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263, see 
MCGOLDRICK, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Longman, (1997), 
at 50-61. 
155 KENT, P. LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Financial Times Pitman Publishing, 1996, p. 28. 
156 1994 E.C.R. I-3661, paragraph 35. 
157 Judgment in Case 22/70 Commission v Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263, paragraphs 12 to 15 and 20 to 22. 
158 For the same view see, most recently, Opinion 1/92 of 10 April 1992 on the draft agreement between the 
Community and the EFTA countries concerning the creation of a European Economic Area, 1992 E.C.R. I-
2821, paragraph 39. 
159 1971 E.C.R. 263, paragraphs 16 to 19. 
160 Case C-327/91 France v Commission, 1994 E.C.R. I-3661, paragraph 35. 
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Under this theory of parallelism (or implied powers), the treaty-making or external 
competence of the EC should reflect its internal jurisdiction. The reasoning behind this 
theory is that if the EC has the powers to legislate internally, it should also be competent to 
enter into international agreements in the same fields. In this line of argument, one should 
recall that the EC’s treaty-making powers may be divided into two categories: express 
powers and implied powers. Agreements are negotiated by the Commission and concluded 
by the Council, normally after consultation with the European Parliament.161 
However, during the 70s, the Commission and an important part of the doctrine 
developed the thesis by which the exclusive competence had a larger scope in the external 
level than in the internal one. In other words, the Community would have an exclusive 
competence to conclude international agreements on issues that, in the internal sphere, still 
belong to Member States’ competences. This thesis has been invalidated by the Court of 
Justice in its Opinions 1/94 and 2/94 which, grosso modo, follow the thesis of parallelism 
between external and internal competences. 
The so-called “open skies” agreement is evidence that, for a given distribution of 
preferences, internal EC institutional mechanisms affect the outcomes of international trade 
agreements.162 Since the U.S. is, and has been, the EC’s main trading and investment partner, 
many trade negotiations have been successfully concluded between the two parties. This has 
been the case “when their bargaining position easily converged or when trade-offs between 
sectors were possible.”163 However, there are still many contested issues in EC-U.S. trade 
 
161 KENT, P. LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Financial Times Pitman Publishing, 1996, p. 28. 
162 For a detailed analysis on the transatlantic open skies agreements, see Meunier, S. Trading Voices: The 
European Union in International Commercial Negotiations, Princeton University Press, 2005, pp. 144-65. 
163 Sophie Meunier, What Single Voice? European Institutions and EU-U.S. Trade Negotiations, 54, 1 INT’L 
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negotiations. One clear example is the field of aeronautics where, given the Member States’ 
preferences and depending on the negotiating context, the institutional mechanisms through 
which Member States transferred their trade sovereignty affected the process and outcome of 
the final international agreement.164 
Open skies agreements eliminate restrictions on how often carriers can fly, the kind of 
aircraft they can use, and the prices they can charge.  The agreement covers both passenger 
and cargo services, as well as scheduled and charter operations.165 The EC-U.S. dispute over 
the “open skies” agreement illustrates of how third countries can get better outcomes when 
EU Member States are free from the Commission in international trade negotiations, as 
opposed to when the EU Member States negotiate with a single voice.  
Regarding the deregulation of international aviation, the U.S. concluded various 
bilateral agreements with several EU Member States. If the Commission had been the sole 
negotiator for the entire EC, these agreements would not have been reached because three of 
the big EU Member States (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) initially opposed 
this U.S.-led liberalization.166 In 1990, when the international aviation deregulation took 
place, these three countries resisted U.S. attempts to open up the transatlantic skies because 
of the large international stakes held by their national carriers. According to the Commission, 
Article 133 EC gave it the exclusive authority to negotiate international air services with 
 
ORG. 103, 121 (Winter 2000). 
164 Id. at Abstract. 
165 Bill Mosley, Secretary Mineta Signs U.S.-France Open-Skies Agreement, available at 
http://www.dot.gov/affairs/dot0902.htm (last visited March 25, 2002). 
166 Sophie Meunier, What Single Voice? European Institutions and EU-U.S. Trade Negotiations, 54, 1 INT’L 
ORG. 103, 129 (Winter 2000). 
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third parties. However, most EU Member States opposed the Commission’s proposal to take 
over aviation negotiations.167 
Since there was no supranational negotiating authority, the U.S. was able to enter into 
bilateral agreements with Member States individually. Its strategy was to negotiate with “one 
country at a time.”168 The smaller EU Member States became the focus of the EC-U.S. “open 
skies” dispute. U.S. negotiators hoped that the success they had with bilateral agreements 
with smaller EU Member States would be replicated with the big EU countries through 
pressure to conclude similar deals. 
 Airlines in small EU Member States were interested in international liberalization. 
They needed to compete in aggressively on world routes since they were not offering 
domestic service. In December of 1992, the Netherlands and the U.S. signed the first of the 
“open skies” agreements. The reaction of the Commission and the big EU Member States 
was that this was an attempt by the U.S. government to “divide and conquer EC aviation.”169 
In addition to that, the Commission also was concerned that the unilateral Dutch action 
would undermine future negotiations should the supranational EC level ever take over.170 
The Dutch-U.S. agreement made the Commission attempt to assert its negotiating 
authority and competence in the field of international aviation in order to “prevent 
discriminatory rights being gained by individual states at the cost of fellow members.”171 
167 Id.
168 Standing Firm for Open Skies, N.Y. TIMES, December 24, 1992. 
169 BRUCE BARNARD, EC Weighs Pooling of Aviation Accord, Journal of Commerce, 15 March 1993. 
170 Under the Carter and Clinton administrations the U.S. had openly adopted such a “divide-and-rule” approach 
in dealing with the EC. This approach failed to break down the resistance of the more stubborn Member States 
but it was highly successful in diverting trade towards more cooperative countries such as the Netherlands. 
171 Dobson, Alan P. Flying in the face of competition: The policies and diplomacy of airline regulatory reform 
in Britain, the USA, and the European Community 1968-94. Aldershot, England: Avebury Aviation, Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd. 
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When EU Member States hold veto power, it is not likely that an EU-led offensive 
will actually materialize into a genuine negotiation with a third country because it takes only 
one single Member State to cancel EC demands for change. 
 
IV. The EC In International Trade Affairs During the Decades of the 80s and 
90s172 
A.- An Overview
Looking back to the 1950s, what is most surprising is the place the EC now holds in world 
affairs. When the process of European integration started, the role of the EC in the 
international arena was minimal. As time has gone by, it has developed a greater role in 
international fora. There are a few important examples of EC action in the international arena 
in 1997. In the trade sector, the EC played an important role in two significant WTO 
agreements: the Telecommunications Service Agreement,173 which covers about 90% of 
world revenues in the telecommunications sector and the Agreement on Financial Services, 
which covers about 95% of trade in the banking, insurance, and security sectors. 
 In the same year, the EU donated Euros 438 million in humanitarian aid, and an EU 
special envoy was sent to support the Middle East Peace Process. The EU has adopted a 
strong position with regard to problematic states such as Cuba and Burma and led the 
industrialized nations in their decision to reduce greenhouse emissions by the year 2010 at 
 
172 RICHARD WHITMAN, FROM CIVILIAN POWER TO SUPERPOWER? THE INTERNATIONAL 
IDENTITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (1998). 
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the Kyoto Summit on Climate Change174 in the Conference of the Parties to the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol, in December 1997.175 Clearly, the EU has 
developed into a significant actor in many international spheres. 
 That said, it is important to note that more than just traditional external policies will 
define the EU’s role. As the EC has integrated to create a single European Market with a 
single currency, its domestic policies are increasingly influencing its role in the international 
arena.176 Since 1958, the vision of the EEC Founders has been expanding geographically as 
the EU has grown from six members to the current 25. With the Single European Act177 and 
the completion of the single market, economic integration has created a cohesive entity. 
Already in 1973, with the first enlargement of the EC to nine Member States, the EC had 
become the world’s largest trading bloc. 
 The 12-member EC of 1986 was already the largest trading power in the world. 
However, the EC, just like the U.S., showed some significant internal weaknesses to the 
outside world: although the European Commission has the power to initiate and execute 
decisions for its Member States in international trade negotiations, its proposals must, by law, 
first be approved by the EU Council. Some authors argue that this internal division is 
 
173 Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (WTO 1997), 36 I.L.M. 354, 366 (1997). 
174 Leal-Arcas, R. “Is the Kyoto Protocol an Adequate Environmental Agreement to Solve the Climate Change 
Problem?,” in European Environmental Law Review, Vol. 10, Issue 10, winter 2001, pp. 282-294. 
175 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 
22 (1998). 
176 David O’Keeffe, Community and Member State Competence in External Relations Agreements of the EU, 4
EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 7 (1999). 
177 The Single European Act (SEA) was signed on February 17, 1986 in Luxembourg by representatives of the 
then twelve EC Member States. The Danish Parliament had rejected the project of institutional reform, but the 
Danish people approved it by referendum on February 27, 1986. Apart from minor modifications, this Treaty 
was the first profound and wide-ranging constitutional reform of the EU since the 1950s. The SEA introduced 
measures aimed at achieving an internal market (for instance, harmonization) plus institutional changes related 
to these (such as a generalization of qualified majority voting and a cooperation procedure involving the 
European Parliament). It also provided legal form for European Political Cooperation. 
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detrimental for the EC’s role as leader in the international trading system.178 Toward the end 
of the Uruguay Round (early 90s), the U.S. leadership was being weakened. President 
Clinton utilized U.S. protectionist pressures which slowed the moves toward a Uruguay 
Round agreement. By contrast, Leon Brittan, EU trade commissioner at the time, adopted a 
more assertive role. This made the leadership between the U.S. and the EC in the framework 
of the Uruguay Round more balanced. 
 In the late 1990s, the EC devoted important efforts to encouraging other countries to 
launch a comprehensive WTO round. One of the reasons for the EC to favor a more 
comprehensive and broader agenda was that it believed there would be more opportunities 
for cross-cutting agreements among sectors. It would also facilitate progress in the 
negotiations themselves. However, the EC had neither the economic power nor the unity of 
purpose to replace the U.S. as a leader in the world trading system. Thus, a degree of 
consensus was necessary between the U.S. and the EC if a new WTO round was to be 
possible. The U.S. and the EC have both become highly dependent on trade and they both 
had a shared interest in launching the new WTO round at Doha.179 
B.- Marrakesh: Opinion 1/94 and its Consequences between 1994 and now
178 Cohn, T.H. Governing Global Trade. International institutions in conflict and convergence, Ashgate, 2002, 
at p. 282. 
179 Cohn, T.H. Governing Global Trade. International institutions in conflict and convergence, Ashgate, 2002, 
at p. 284. 
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Already during the negotiations to the Maastricht Treaty,180 the Commission had envisaged 
the replacement of the common commercial policy with a common external economic policy, 
whose scope would be larger, including not only trade in services, commercial aspects of 
intellectual property, and goods but also the external dimension of competition, 
establishment, and investment.181 The decision to include aspects of external economic 
policy within the scope of Article 133 EC thanks to the Nice amendment to that Article was 
based “on the desirability of specific procedures, reinforcing the ‘open’ nature of the 
CCP.”182 
In April 1994, the WTO Agreement was signed in Marrakesh. As a consequence of 
such agreement, Opinion 1/94 of the ECJ saw the light a few months later. The Court had to 
examine the question of whether the EC has the exclusive competence to conclude the WTO 
Agreement, including the GATT,183 the GATS,184 the TRIPS Agreement,185 and the dispute 
 
180 On February 7, 1992 was the signing of the Maastricht Treaty by the EU Member States’ foreign affairs 
ministers and finance ministers. The Treaty provides for a reinforcement of the European Parliament’s powers, 
an increase in legitimacy for the Commission, and the creation of the Committee of the Regions. 
181 Maresceau, M. “The Concept of ‘Common Commercial Policy’ and the Difficult Road to Maastricht,” in 
Maresceau, M. (ed.) The European Community’s Commercial Policy after 1992: The Legal Dimension,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993. 
182 Cremona, M. “A Policy of Bits and Pieces? The Common Commercial Policy After Nice,” The Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Vol. 4, 2001, 61-91, at 87. See also Cremona, M. “EC External 
Commercial Policy after Amsterdam: Authority and Interpretation within Interconnected Legal Orders,” in 
Weiler, J. (ed.) The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA. Towards a Common Law of International Trade?, Oxford 
University Press, 2000. 
183 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, signed in 1947, was created by the Bretton Woods meetings 
that took place in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire (U.S.), in 1944, setting out a plan for economic recovery 
after World War II, by encouraging reduction in tariffs and other international trade barriers. The GATT is one 
of the three mechanisms for global economic governance established at Bretton Woods, being the other two the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The GATT was a collection of rules applied 
temporarily, without an institutional basis, unlike the WTO, which is a permanent organization with a 
permanent framework and its own Secretariat. For almost fifty years, the GATT focused exclusively on trade in 
goods, leaving tariffs and quotas aside in the various rounds of negotiations of the world trading system. The 
GATT set the terms for countries who wanted to trade with each other. The GATT signatories were called 
“contracting parties.” The Uruguay Round, completed in 1994, replaced the GATT with the WTO, a global 
trade agency with binding enforcements of comprehensive rules expanding beyond trade. The GATT has now 
become one of the eighteen agreements enforced by the WTO. 
184 General Agreement on Trade in Services, April 15, 1994, Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1B, “The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations –The 
Legal Texts,” 325, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994). For a full text of agreements resulting from the Uruguay Round, see 
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settlement understanding (DSU).186 The answer to this question depended on the scope of 
Article 133 EC. The European Commission’s position at the hearing was that shared 
 
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, April 15, 1994, 
“Legal Instruments –Results of the Uruguay Round,” 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). The GATS is one of the 
Agreements implemented by the WTO. The GATS sets rules for who controls or owns services and limits 
government regulation in the services sector. The GATS covers all services including health care, education and 
utilities such as water, data management, energy, banking, transportation, and insurance. Some commentators –
especially Lori Wallach- argue that only a small part of the GATS is about trade. The GATS is often called a 
“backdoor Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI),” because it creates rights for foreign investors to set 
up service business inside other WTO countries. The GATS allows some flexibility for countries to determine 
which service sectors they want to subject to the GATS full participation and deregulation pressures. However, 
some GATS rules apply even to sectors where countries have not committed. In addition, the text of the GATS 
commits all WTO countries to “progressive liberalization” (Article XIX.1 of the GATS). Expansion of the 
GATS scope and the sectors it covers is now underway in the so-called “GATS 2000” negotiations. Currently, 
the GATS 2000 negotiations are in the “request/offer” phase, where WTO members engage in bilateral 
negotiations requesting that other countries open up service sectors and offering sectors that they themselves 
will put on the negotiating table. For example, the EC has requested that WTO countries liberalize their water 
service, and the U.S. has requested that Brazil open for ownership by U.S. corporations elements of public 
higher education services. Once a sector is committed to the GATS, it is virtually impossible for the public to 
reinstall control over it because the GATS rules require financial compensation to every WTO member to do so. 
185 The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is an international treaty 
administered by the WTO which sets down minimum standards for most forms of intellectual property 
regulation within all WTO Members. It was negotiated at the end of the Uruguay Round in 1994. Specifically, 
the TRIPS Agreement deals with: copyright and related rights, such as rights of performers, producers of sound 
recordings and broadcasting organizations; geographical indications, including appellations of origin; industrial 
designs; integrated circuit layout-designs; patents, including the protection of new varieties of plants; 
trademarks; trade dress; and undisclosed or confidential information, including trade secrets and test data. The 
TRIPS also specifies enforcement procedures, remedies, and dispute resolution procedures. The obligations 
under the TRIPS Agreement apply equally to all WTO Member, however developing countries were allowed 
extra time to implement the applicable changes to their national laws, in two tiers of transition according to their 
level of development. The transition period for developing countries expired in 2005. The transition period for 
least-developed countries was extended to 2016, and could be extended beyond that. 
The TRIPS Agreement introduced intellectual property law into the international trading system for the 
first time, and remains the most comprehensive international agreement on intellectual property to date. In 
2001, developing countries concerned that developed countries were insisting on an overly-narrow reading of 
the TRIPS Agreement, initiated a round of talks that resulted in the Doha Declaration: a WTO statement that 
clarifies the scope of the TRIPS Agreement; stating for example that the TRIPS Agreement can and should be 
interpreted in light of the goal to promote access to medicines for all. 
186 The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is one of the most important new features of the WTO. The 
DSU established a system of review and procedures for when one of the WTO members complains that the 
actions or policies of another member have harmed it through a violation of WTO rules. Typically, a complaint 
would be followed by consultations, possible arbitration, then the formation of a panel of experts, the panel 
ruling, possible appeal to the Appellate Body, and, based on the outcome of the case, either compliance, 
compensation to the complaining country, or eventual retaliation. The WTO’s system of settling disputes 
provides for specific deadlines, and is therefore quicker than the old GATT system. Its type of functioning is 
more automatic, which reduces the number of blockages compared to the GATT system. The rules concerning 
the establishment of the findings’ process are more detailed than they were under the GATT system. Panel 
reports and Appellate Body rulings can be overturned only by a unanimous vote of the Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB), which is a WTO body that rules on dispute settlement cases under the DSU. The DSB consists of all 
members of the WTO General Council, that is to say, all WTO members’ representatives in Geneva, who 
oversee the operation of all of the constituent WTO Agreements in general. The DSB rules on actions taken 
under the DSU. 
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competence would bring a series of problems in relation to the administration of these trade 
agreements, and that the EC had exclusive competence in the areas covered by these 
agreements. However, the EU Council indicated that these are areas of shared competence 
between the EC and its Member States and thus one could have a mixed agreement.187 
In Opinion 1/94, the ECJ rejected the Commission’s argument that all trade in 
services and intellectual property rights were included in the EC’s common commercial 
policy insofar as they were covered by the TRIPS Agreement.188 That said, the ECJ also 
refused the exclusion of trade in services from the common commercial policy as a matter of 
principle: “it follows from the open nature of the common commercial policy, within the 
meaning of the Treaty, that trade in services cannot immediately, and as a matter of principle, 
be excluded from the scope of Article 113.”189 
The ECJ’s response was that the EC did not enjoy exclusive competence for the 
conclusion of the WTO Agreement. In trade in goods, the ECJ did accept the EC’s exclusive 
competence on the basis of Article 133 EC.190 With regard to trade in services and trade-
related aspects of intellectual property rights, the Court decided that the EC is only partially 
competent for theses matters.191 With regard to exclusive external EC competence on these 
areas, it was also denied by the ECJ on the grounds that the EC had neither completely 
harmonized all services sectors nor all matters covered by the TRIPS Agreement.192 The 
Court also considered whether an exclusive external EC competence for areas covered by the 
 
187 Balekjian, “Mixed Agreements: Complementary and Concurrent Competences,” in O’KEEFFE & 
SCHERMERS (EDS.), MIXED AGREEMENTS, (1983), p. 141 et seq. 
188 For a legal analysis of the Court’s problems with international (trade) agreements, see Leal-Arcas, R. “The 
European Court of Justice and the EC External Trade Relations: A Legal Analysis of the Court’s Problems with 
Regard to International Agreements,” in Nordic Journal of International Law, 72:2, 215-251, 2003, Kluwer 
Law International. 
189 Opinion 1/94, [1979] ECR I-5267, para. 41. 
190 1994 E.C.R. I-5267, para. 27. 
191 Id. at paras. 47 and 71. 
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GATS and the TRIPS Agreement could be implied from the necessity to conclude the WTO 
Agreement as a means to achieve the goals of the EC Treaty, or from Article 95 EC193 or 
Article 308 EC. The Court, however, denied such an interpretation.194 
192 Id. at paras. 96-97 and 102 et seq. 
193 Article 95 EC reads: 
 
1.   By way of derogation from Article 94 and save where otherwise provided in this Treaty, the following 
provisions shall apply for the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 14. The Council shall, acting in 
accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after consulting the Economic and Social 
Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market. 
2.   Paragraph 1 shall not apply to fiscal provisions, to those relating to the free movement of persons nor to 
those relating to the rights and interests of employed persons. 
3.   The Commission, in its proposals envisaged in paragraph 1 concerning health, safety, environmental 
protection and consumer protection, will take as a base a high level of protection, taking account in particular of 
any new development based on scientific facts. Within their respective powers, the European Parliament and the 
Council will also seek to achieve this objective. 
4.   If, after the adoption by the Council or by the Commission of a harmonisation measure, a Member State 
deems it necessary to maintain national provisions on grounds of major needs referred to in Article 30, or 
relating to the protection of the environment or the working environment, it shall notify the Commission of 
these provisions as well as the grounds for maintaining them. 
5.   Moreover, without prejudice to paragraph 4, if, after the adoption by the Council or by the Commission of a 
harmonisation measure, a Member State deems it necessary to introduce national provisions based on new 
scientific evidence relating to the protection of the environment or the working environment on grounds of a 
problem specific to that Member State arising after the adoption of the harmonisation measure, it shall notify 
the Commission of the envisaged provisions as well as the grounds for introducing them. 
6.   The Commission shall, within six months of the notifications as referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5, approve 
or reject the national provisions involved after having verified whether or not they are a means of arbitrary 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States and whether or not they shall 
constitute an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market. 
In the absence of a decision by the Commission within this period the national provisions referred to in 
paragraphs 4 and 5 shall be deemed to have been approved. 
When justified by the complexity of the matter and in the absence of danger for human health, the Commission 
may notify the Member State concerned that the period referred to in this paragraph may be extended for a 
further period of up to six months. 
7.   When, pursuant to paragraph 6, a Member State is authorised to maintain or introduce national provisions 
derogating from a harmonisation measure, the Commission shall immediately examine whether to propose an 
adaptation to that measure. 
8.   When a Member State raises a specific problem on public health in a field which has been the subject of 
prior harmonisation measures, it shall bring it to the attention of the Commission which shall immediately 
examine whether to propose appropriate measures to the Council. 
9.   By way of derogation from the procedure laid down in Articles 226 and 227, the Commission and any 
Member State may bring the matter directly before the Court of Justice if it considers that another Member State 
is making improper use of the powers provided for in this Article. 
10.   The harmonisation measures referred to above shall, in appropriate cases, include a safeguard clause 
authorising the Member States to take, for one or more of the non-economic reasons referred to in Article 30, 
provisional measures subject to a Community control procedure. 
194 Id. at paras. 73 et seq., 99 et seq. 
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The unique nature of the EC in the WTO (the European Communities, along with the 
EU Member States, are members of the WTO) has some policy and procedural implications. 
In my opinion, the ECJ is responsible for the fiasco on the interpretation of the WTO 
Agreement, reflected in Opinion 1/94 (WTO Agreement) for the allocation of powers 
between the EC and its Member States in trade matters. In this case, the Commission had 
requested the ECJ to confirm the exclusive EC competence to sign all the agreements which 
are part of the WTO Agreement.195 The Commission raised the issue of potential problems 
regarding the administration of the various agreements that were part of the WTO package, if 
the Community and the Member States were to share competence to participate in the 
conclusion of the GATS and TRIPS Agreement.196 According to the Commission, the 
Community’s unity of action vis-à-vis the rest of the world would be undermined and its 
negotiating power greatly weakened if the Member States were allowed to express their own 
views in the WTO, or if the Community position had to always be adopted by consensus.197 
According to the Commission, the Community should have sole responsibility for the 
conclusion of the agreement. 
 
195 For a more in-depth explanation of the facts, see Van de Bossche, “The European Community and the 
Uruguay Round Agreements,” in Jackson, J. & Sykes, A. (eds.) Implementing the Uruguay Round, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1997, pp. 27-29. 
196 The Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Measures (TRIPS) is a Uruguay Round Agreement 
that extends WTO disciplines into the protection of patents, trademarks, copyrights, geographical indications, 
industrial designs, and trade secrets. Unlike most WTO rules, the TRIPS Agreement requires both domestic 
enforcement and border measures as part of a member’s compliance to prevent piracy and other violations. 
Developing countries were given longer transition periods for the phase-in of the TRIPS Agreement 
requirements. The WTO (but also the North America Free Trade Agreement –NAFTA- and the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas –FTAA-) includes new intellectual property rules which require signatory countries to establish 
specific patent, copyright and trademark protections in their domestic laws. The pharmaceutical industry 
exercised heavy influence on WTO negotiations, and these agreements require countries to adopt U.S.-style 
intellectual property laws, such as granting monopoly sales rights to individual patent holders for extended time 
periods and including seeds, medicines and other traditionally excluded items as those for which countries must 
provide patent protections. The TRIPS rules have been subject of a major international fight regarding poor 
countries’ rights to issue compulsory licenses for essential medicines. 
197 Bourgeois, J.H.J. “The EC in the WTO and Advisory Opinion 1/94: an Echternach Procession,” COMMON 
MKT. L. REV., 32, 1995, pp. 763-787. 
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The Court responded to the Commission’s concern by saying: 
 
first, that any problems which may arise in implementation of the WTO 
Agreement and its annexes as regards the co-ordination necessary to ensure 
unity of action where the Community and the Member States participate 
jointly cannot modify the answer to the question of competence, that being a 
prior issue... 
 (108) Next, where it is apparent that the subject matter of an 
agreement or convention falls in part within the competence of the 
Community and in part within that of the Member States, it is essential to 
ensure close cooperation between the Member States and the Community 
institutions, both in the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the 
fulfillment of the commitments entered into. That obligation flows from the 
requirement of unity in the international representation of the Community... 
 (109) The duty to co-operate is all the more imperative in the case of 
agreements such as those annexed to the WTO Agreement, which are 
inextricably interlinked, and in view of the cross retaliation measures 
established by the Dispute Settlement Understanding.198 
From this Opinion,199 one can infer that the primacy of the Commission as negotiator 
of trade agreements was undercut somewhat by the Court of Justice when it ruled in 1994 
that certain aspects of matters dealt with by the WTO -involving services trade and 
intellectual property- did not fall within the scope of the common commercial policy. The 
Nice Treaty further developed this issue so that today the common commercial policy 
includes trade in goods, intellectual property rights and services, except health, education, 
and audiovisual services, which are shared with the EU Member States.200 Since the notion of 
European identity has not yet coalesced to the point that it is possible to speak of a common 
good for the entire EU, perhaps for this reason the European Court of Justice, in its Opinion 
1/94 upon the WTO, emphasizes the duty of cooperation between the Member States and the 
Community institutions. It is, nevertheless, important to distinguish between what the law 
 
198 Opinion 1/94, paras. 107-109, 1994 E.C.R. I-5267. 
199 Opinion 1/94 (World Trade Organization - WTO), competence of the Community to conclude international 
agreements concerning services and intellectual property (15 November 1994), 1994 E.C.R. I-5267. 
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requires and what the policy adopted by the EU institutions and Member States may be in a 
particular case.201 
B.1.- Consequences of Opinion 1/94
B.1.a- The EC and its Member States Have Competence 
 
The European Court of Justice has its own view with regard to agreements where some of 
their provisions fall under EC competence, and others remain under the competence of the 
Member States. Unfortunately, although the Court deals with the issue throughout its case-
law, it does not say how to solve the problem. The view of a national Court (the French 
Conseil Constitutionnel) on this matter shall be analyzed later to help us understand how this 
issue is resolved in practice. 
In Opinion 1/94,202 the European Commission argued that the EC had exclusive 
competence in all matters covered by the agreement giving effect to the Uruguay Round. In 
Opinion 2/92203 on OECD National Treatment Instrument, the European Commission also 
argued that the EC had exclusive competence with regard to trade in services. The European 
Commission was therefore arguing that the EC had exclusive competence with respect to the 
whole field of external trade relations. 
 
200 See Article 133.6.2 of the Nice Treaty. 
201 Stephen Hyett, ‘The Duty of Co-operation: A Flexible Concept,’ in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) THE 
GENERAL LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, p. 248. 
202 Opinion 1/94, competence of the Community to conclude international agreements concerning services and 
intellectual property (15 November 1994), 1994 E.C.R. I-5267. 
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The ECJ rejected this statement. In the case of Opinion 1/94, the ECJ held that the EC 
and its Member States were jointly competent to conclude the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS). With respect to Opinion 2/92, the ECJ held that the EC and its Member States were 
jointly competent to enter into the instrument in question.204 When asked to clarify the 
allocation of competence within the Union to conclude the Uruguay Round Agreements, the 
European Court of Justice confirmed in November 1994 the Community's exclusive 
competence with respect to the conclusion of multilateral agreements relating to goods. 
However, competence to conclude agreements related to certain types of services and 
intellectual property was shared between the Community and the Member States. 
Consequently, the WTO Agreements were signed by the Council, Commission and the 
Member States and ratified by the Council, with the European Parliament's approval, as well 
as by national parliaments. 
In practical terms, this means according to the ECJ that the EC and its Member States 
can be jointly competent with regard to international agreements.205 For Member States, this 
is an important ‘victory’ since their competence is given full recognition for the 
implementation of the international agreements in question. Along the same line, where the 
agreements are being negotiated, the Member States’ competence and rights which flow from 
it are entitled to recognition.206 Since in both Opinion 1/94 and 2/92 the ECJ clarified the 
division of competence between the EU institutions and the Member States in areas of 
 
203 Opinion 2/92, Competence of the Community or one of its Institutions to participate in the Third Revised 
Decision of the OECD on national treatment, 1995 E.C.R. I-521. 
204 Stephen Hyett, ‘The Duty of Co-operation: A Flexible Concept,’ in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) THE 
GENERAL LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, p. 249. 
205 For an overview of the great legal and political difficulties in this matter, see Timmermans, Ch. “Organizing 
Joint Participation of EC and Member States,” in Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) THE GENERAL LAW OF 
EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, pp. 239-47. 
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services, establishment and intellectual property. Therefore, this means that in practice the 
duty of cooperation will assume great importance. 
More recently, we see how Article I-13 (2) of the Constitutional Treaty reflects the case-
law of the ECJ on the Union’s exclusive competence to conclude international agreements.  
The Community’s competence to conclude international agreements arises from two sources: 
1. express provisions in the Treaty. For example, Article 133 EC enables the EC to enter 
into tariff and trade agreements within the scope of the common commercial policy; 
and 
2. The jurisprudence of the ECJ.207 The Court has held that external competence may 
flow from other provisions of the Treaty and measures adopted within the framework 
of those provisions.  The existence of internal rules208 or unexercised Treaty 
powers209 to adopt such rules confers external competences to the Community. 
 
As a matter of law, the Community’s ability to conduct external relations is restricted to 
those areas where it has competence, whether it is exclusive or shared.  On the other hand, 
where and to the extent that the Community has competence, Member States’ freedom of 
action is limited.  A consequence of the supremacy of EC law is that Member States cannot 
prejudice the operation of Community law by entering into external obligations.  Thus, 
Member States may not enter into agreements between themselves or with third States on the 
same subject matter.  The EC and its Member States share competence in a situation in which 
the transfer of competence is partial, because the Treaty expressly preserves Member States’ 
 
206 Id.
207 Opinion 1/94, WTO [1994] E.C.R. I-5267. 
208 ERTA, Case 22/70 Commission v Council, [1971] E.C.R. 263. 
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competence210 or because the internal rules do not occupy the whole field.  Both will be 
parties to the international agreement, which is commonly known as a mixed agreement. 
As Dashwood suggests,211 critics of the ECJ’s Opinion 1/94 have seen that cross-
retaliation (for example, imposition of trade restrictions as a sanction for the failure by a third 
country adequately to protect intellectual property rights) may not be a possible option for the 
EC and its Member States, where different elements of a strategy fall under different 
competencies.212 According to Dashwood, the problems of legal mixity are not unsolvable or 
uncontrollable.213 As we will see later in this article, zealous efforts were made during the 
Nice Summit to secure an amendment to Article 133 of the Amsterdam Treaty that would 
change the consequences of Opinion 1/94 with regard to action within the WTO. The 
outcome was not very radical: Article 133 (5) EC empowered the EU Council to change the 
existing law. 
 According to Weiler, Member States are not prepared to live in a world in which the 
Community assumes that it is competent in all fields of trade. Proof competence is necessary 
from now on. Opinion 1/94 is a good example.214 The Commission had requested the ECJ 
under the procedure of Article 300 (6) EC to confirm the exclusive competence of the EC to 
conclude the WTO Agreement (the GATT, the GATS, and the TRIPS Agreement) which had 
been negotiated within the framework of the Uruguay Round.215 The Council, however, 
 
209 Rhine navigation, Opinion 1/76 [1977] E.C.R.A. 741. 
210 For example, Article 174 (4) EC. 
211 A. Dashwood, “E.C. External Relations Provision Post-Amsterdam” in A. Dashwood & C. Hillion (eds.) 
THE GENERAL LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, 2000, p. 280. 
212 For example, mixing exclusive EC competence in trade matters with Member State competence in 
intellectual property matters. 
213 See A. Dashwood, “E.C. External Relations Provision Post-Amsterdam” in A. Dashwood & C. Hillion (eds.) 
THE GENERAL LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, 2000, p. 280. 
214 [1994] ECR I-5267. 
215 Hilf, M. “The ECJ’s Opinion 1/94 on the WTO –No Surprise, but Wise?- in European Journal of 
International Law, 245 Vol. 6 (1995), No. 2. 
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hoped that the Court would establish a clear dividing line between the Community’s and the 
Member States’ competence with respect to trade liberalization for purposes of ratification 
and future negotiations. The outcome was a shock to many: the Commission’s powers in the 
field of services and intellectual property rights were severely curtailed. The ECJ concluded 
that the GATS and the TRIPS Agreement had to be concluded as a mixed agreement. Had 
the ECJ’s interpretation of the ERTA doctrine been more expansive, it would have supported 
a more pro-Community view. In the post-Opinion 1/94 period, Member States have worked 
more closely together in international trade issues.216 There are signs that the Commission is 
more cautious now. A new code of conduct has evolved in this field, regulating the 
interaction between the Commission and EU Member States.217 
It is important to mention the distinction made by the ECJ between the modes to 
supply services, on the one hand, and the trade-related intellectual property rights, on the 
other. As for the modes to supply services, they do not concern the nature of the services 
rendered, but rather the way in which the services concerned are provided. By contrast, trade-
related intellectual property rights concern the nature of these rights.218 
B.1.b.- Doctrine Of The French Conseil Constitutionnel 
 
216 For an analysis of the common commercial policy after Opinion 1/94 of the ECJ, see Burnside, A. “The 
Scope of the Common Commercial Policy Post Opinion 1/94: Clouds and Silver Linings,” in Dashwood, A. & 
Hillion, Ch. (eds.) The General Law of EC External Relations, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, pp. 152-59. 
217 Mavroidis, P. “Lexcalibur: The House that Joe Built”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 38, 
2000, Number 3, pp. 673-74. 
218 Krenzler, H.G. & Pitschas, C. ‘Progress or Stagnation?: The Common Commercial Policy After Nice,’ 
EUROPEAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS REV., 6, 291-313, 2001, at p. 296. 
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Ruling Number 37-394 DC, of December 31, 1997, of the French Conseil Constitutionnel on
the required Constitutional revisions for ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam,219 illustrates 
some of the problems mentioned above. On one hand, the ruling corrects Article 88-1 of the 
French Constitution from the constitutional Act of June 25, 1992, on the division of 
competences between the Community and the Member States. By that provision, the 
Community will only be a simple mechanism to “exercise in common” certain Member 
States’ competences, and the French Conseil Constitutionnel refers consistently to the 
“transfer of competences” from the French State to the Community.220 On the other hand, the 
Conseil Constitutionnel continues to develop the thesis by which “the necessary conditions to 
exercise national sovereignty” are not affected by the transfer of competences itself but by 
the types of exercise of these competences. This would be affected if the Council adopted 
decisions by qualified majority but not if unanimity was used. The above thesis had already 
been introduced by the Conseil Constitutionnel in its previous Ruling on the Treaty of 
Maastricht. 
There are three problems with this thesis. First of all, Ruling Number 37-394 DC of 
December 31, 1997 of the French Conseil Constitutionnel is relevant to the external 
economic relations of the EC because it states that the Community is a mechanism used to 
obtain a common position between the EC and its Member States in certain domains. The 
ruling states that there will be a transfer of competences from the national to the Community 
level. Secondly, in its Opinion 1/94 on the division of competences between the Community 
and the Member States regarding the agreements from the negotiations in the Uruguay 
 
219 See Décision No. 97-394 DC, Official Journal of the French Republic of January 3, 1998, at 165. 
220 “Appendice III: Deux Commentaires a la Doctrine du Conseil Constitutionnel Francais” in TORRENT, R. 
DROIT ET PRATIQUE DES RELATIONS ECONOMIQUES EXTERIEURES DANS L'UNION 
EUROPEENNE, available at http://www.ub.es/dpecp/ep/livreTorrent.html, 1998, chapter 1. 
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Round, had the European Court of Justice taken a position stating that the exclusive EC 
competence covered the integrity of the agreements, the consequence for the French State 
would have been that it would not have had competences on trade matters. Therefore, it 
would not have been able to become a member of the World Trade Organization, which was 
clearly not intended and would not have been agreed to by France.  
Finally, the “constitutional” problem is that of the existence, the nature (whether 
exclusive or non-exclusive) and the limits of EC competences and not of the exercise of EC 
competences. The exercise of EC competences is primarily a political problem, in which 
juridical-constitutional apriorisms are often bad advisors. As Professor Torrent points out, the 
requirement of unanimity in the Council is seen by some as a guarantee of the ability to block 
the action of a majority that is against the interest of the French government.221 However, the 
example could be reversed: unanimity allows the representative of a government of any other 
Member State to block the action of a majority where the French government participates.  
In the case of EC exclusive competences, blocking Community action cannot be 
compensated for by an action at the national level. In such a case, preference for unanimity or 
qualified majority depends on seeing if in the near future it will be more beneficial to “block 
others” (by choosing inaction) or to run the risk of “being blocked by others” (and being 
condemned to inaction).222 This is a question of a political nature and not a juridical-
constitutional question. 
 
B.2.- Trade in Services
221 Id.
Rafael Leal-Arcas                                                                
 59
With regard to trade in services, the distinction made by the ECJ between modes to supply 
services and services as such had an immediate consequence: competencies between the EC 
and its Member States were divided since trade in services is not restricted to a specific mode 
to supply services, in other words, cross-border supply of services.223 As an example, we 
have the ECJ’s judgment on the legal base of the agreement on government procurement 
between the EC and the U.S. before the entry into force of the plurilateral WTO Government 
Procurement Agreement.224 Here, the ECJ declared void the Council’s decision by which the 
bilateral agreement between the EC and the U.S. had been approved. Article 133 EC was 
considered not to be a sufficient legal base for this decision.225 
The ECJ interpreted that the EC has both explicit and implied foreign trade 
competencies. The WTO Agreement was jointly ratified by the EC and its Member States.226 
This means that the WTO Agreement is a mixed agreement and, therefore, there is a need for 
constant cooperation between the EC and its Member States in areas where there is no 
exclusive EC competence. The ECJ’s Opinion 1/94 on the division of competencies between 
the EC and its Member States in the area of external trade relations meant that the legal 
phenomenon of “mixed agreements” had to be relied upon more often, given that new free 
trade agreements include trade in services and intellectual property rights due to their 
 
222 Id.
223 T. Tridimas, “The WTO and OECD Opinions”, in A. Dashwood & C. Hillion (eds.) THE GENERAL LAW 
OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, 2000, p. 52. 
224 The WTO Government Procurement Agreement was first negotiated during the Tokyo Round and entered 
into force on 1 January 1981. This is a plurilateral agreement —only some countries (members of the WTO) are 
parties to the agreement (it now has twenty-five members)-. Its purpose is to open up as much of the 
government procurement business as possible to international competition. It is responsible for improving the 
transparency of the government procurement laws, regulations, procedures and practices. It also has to ensure 
that these laws do not protect domestic products or suppliers, or discriminate against foreign products or 
suppliers. 
225 Case C-360/93, 1996 E.C.R. I-1195, paras. 25 et seq. 
226 For an overview on a judicial approach to the EC and the WTO in trade matters, see Leal-Arcas, R. “The 
European Community and the International Trading System: A Judicial Approach,” in The International 
Relations Journal, San Francisco State University, Vol. XXII, No.1, Fall 2002, pp. 47-54. 
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increased economic significance, for example, the mixed agreement between Mexico and the 
EC on economic partnership,227 political coordination, and cooperation.228 Another witness 
of this legal phenomenon is the mixed agreement between the EC and its Member States and 
South Africa. This agreement’s conclusion was blocked by some Member States on the 
grounds that the South African concessions in the area of geographic indications for 
alcoholic beverages such as Grappa, Ouzo and Port were insufficient.229 
B.3.- Intellectual Property Rights
With respect to intellectual property rights, according to the ECJ, the primary objective of the 
TRIPS Agreement is “to strengthen and harmonise the protection of intellectual property on a 
worldwide scale.”230 Therefore, those who were hoping to bring into the single procedure of 
Article 133 EC the whole range of matters that appear in the WTO package where the EC is 
competent are likely to be disappointed. 
 
227 These agreements were done in the framework of the so-called Economic Partnership Agreements. For 
instance, the ACP countries and the EU have agreed to enter into economic integration agreements -concluding 
new WTO compatible trading arrangements, progressively removing barriers to trade among them, and 
enhancing co-operation in all areas related to trade-. To this end, Economic Partnership Agreements will be 
negotiated with ACP regions, engaged in a regional economic integration process. Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) are thus intended to consolidate regional integration initiatives within the ACP. They are 
also aimed at providing an open, transparent and predictable framework for goods and services to circulate 
freely, thus increasing competitiveness of the ACP and ultimately facilitating the transition towards their full 
participation in a liberalizing world economy -thereby complementing any initiative taken in the multilateral 
context-. Formal negotiations started in September 2002 and EPAs will enter into force by 1 January 2008 at the 
latest. The non-reciprocal Lomé IV trade preferences will continue to be applied during the interim period 
(2000-2007). 
228 OJ 2000 L 276/44. 
229 “EC-South Africa: Wine and Spirits Sage Draws to a Close,” European Report No. 2509, 17 June 2000,  p. 
1. 
230 Id. para. 58. 
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The exclusive EC competence in trade matters did not extend to certain aspects of the 
international supply of services,231 or to the harmonization of rules on the protection of 
intellectual property rights,232 which the Court identified as the primary objective of the 
TRIPS Agreement.233 Two issues can be analysed from the construction given to Article 133 
EC in Opinion 1/94: first, there were large parts of the WTO Agreement where EC 
competence fell to be exercised on the basis of provisions other than Article 133 EC, 
including Article 308 EC. This last Article requires the Council to act by unanimity, 
strengthening thereby the hand of the EC negotiators to resist demands for policy changes; 
second, EU Member States were free to conclude the relevant parts of the WTO package 
through the collective exercise of national powers, rather than through the EC.234 In this 
sense, in Case C-53/96 Hermes International v. FHT Marketing Choice BV, the Court said 
that “the WTO Agreement was concluded by the Community and ratified by its Member 
States without any allocation between them of their respective obligations towards the other 
contracting parties.”235 
B.4.- Duty of Cooperation
Once again, the ECJ, in the final part of its (in)famous Opinion 1/94,236 opted for the duty of 
cooperation as the panacea in cases of division of powers between the EC and its Member 
States. The duty of co-operation seems to be a rather broad formula for the achievement of a 
 
231 1994 E.C.R. I-5267, paras. 36 to 53. 
232 Id., paras. 54 to 71. 
233 Id., para. 58. 
234 Id., paras. 78 to 105. 
235 1998 E.C.R. I-3603, para. 24. 
236 1994 E.C.R. I-5267, paras. 106 et seq. 
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unitary character for the EC. An example is the Community’s post-Opinion 1/94 external 
relations regime. Opinion 1/94 does not give any guidelines as to the more specific 
implementation of the “duty of cooperation”.237 Co-operation has taken place until now 
either ad hoc or under an informal “code of conduct” agreed in May 1994 between the 
Council, the Commission and the Member States at the “post-Uruguay Round” negotiations 
on services.238 However, the Member States, the Council and the Commission have been 
unable to reach an agreement –in spite of numerous attempts- upon a permanent and more 
comprehensive code that would cover the Community and Member States’ participation in 
the WTO as a whole. 
Nor does Opinion 1/94 indicate any provisions of either the EC Treaty or the Treaty 
on European Union in which the duty of co-operation can be found.239 To justify its position, 
the Court simply referred to its previous case-law (Ruling 1/78 on the Draft Convention of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, 
Facilities and Transport, paragraphs 34-36 240 and Opinion 2/91 on ILO Convention 170 on 
Chemicals at Work, paragraph 36241).242 
237 [1994] ECR I-5267. 
238 See European Commission, General Report on the Activities of the European Union 1994, pt. 990. The code 
has never been officially published but the text is cited in Part XVII of the “Description of the Request” 
(“Questions put by the Court to the Commission, the Council and the Member States and the answers given to 
those questions”), Opinion 1/94, at pp. 5365-5366. 
239 [1994] ECR I-5267. 
240 Ruling 1/78 of 14 November 1978, [1978] ECR 2151. 
241 Opinion 2/91 of 19 March 1993, (1993) CMLRev 800. 
242 Professor Jacques H.J. Bourgeois has been very critical in this respect: see Bourgeois, J.H.J. “The EC in the 
WTO and Advisory Opinion 1/94: an Echternach Procession”, (1995) 32 CMLRev, 763 at p. 785; Bourgeois, 
J.H.J. “The Uruguay Round Results from a European Lawyers’ Perspective: an Introduction” in Bourgeois, 
J.H.J. et al. (eds.) The Uruguay Round Results. A European Lawyers’ Perspective, European University Press, 
1995, p. 19. See also Kuijper, P.J. “The Conclusion and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results by the 
European Community” (1995) 6 EJIL 222 at pp. 242-243; Hilf, M. “The ECJ’s Opinion on the WTO –No 
Surprise, but Wise?,” (1995) 6 EJIL 245 at p. 258; Dutheil de la Rochère, J. “L’ère des compétences partagées. 
À propos de l’étendue des compétences extérieures de la Communauté européenne”, (1995) 390 RMUE 461 at 
p. 470; Maunu, A. “The Implied External Competence of the European Community After the ECJ Opinion 1/94 
–Towards Coherence or Diversity?” (1995) 2 LIEI 115 at p. 126; Macleod, I., Hendry.I. & Hyett, S. The 
External Relations of the European Communities, Claredon Press Oxford, 1996, p. 145. 
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Where competence is shared between the EC and its Member States, both Member 
States and the EC are obliged to seek a common position. Coordination of their positions is 
indispensable to prevent inconsistencies or even mutual blockage within the framework of an 
international organization.243 According to the ECJ, this requirement of unity in the 
international representation of the three Communities shows the importance of co-operation 
or close association between the Member States and the EC institutions in the negotiation or 
conclusion of agreements and in the fulfillment of commitments at the international level.244 
Community and Member States, since they have an obligation to co-operate, must attempt to 
organize harmoniously their coexistence in international organizations in which they share 
membership and competence, such as the WTO,245 as was already stated in Opinion 2/91.246 
As for the fulfillment of commitments at the international level, Opinion 1/94 (Re 
WTO Agreement)247 describes how Community and Member States are each other’s 
prisoners. The one cannot act without the other. Achieving a common position of Member 
States is a sine qua non for Community action. As a consequence of Opinion 1/94 of the 
ECJ,248 there was a need for a uniform international representation of the EC.249 In spite of 
this, the EU Member States tried to pursue more strongly their interests in the area of 
external trade. One example is the use of voting rights within the Food and Agriculture 
 
243 See Editorial Comments, “The Aftermath of Opinion 1/94 or how to ensure unity of representation for joint 
competencies”, (1995) 32 CMLRev, p. 386. 
244 [1994] ECR I-5267. 
245 See Editorial Comments, “The Aftermath of Opinion 1/94 or how to ensure unity of representation for joint 
competencies”, (1995) 32 CMLRev, p. 385. 
246 [1993] ECR I-1061, at para. 36. 
247 [1995] 1 CMLR 205 at para. 108. 
248 1994 E.C.R. I-5267, paras. 106 et seq. 
249 1994 E.C.R. I-5267, para. 108. See also Neframi, E. “Quelques Reflexions Sur La Reforme De la Politique 
Commerciale Par le Traite d’Amsterdam: Le Maintien Du Status Quo et l’Unite de la Representation 
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Organization (FAO).250 Here, the ECJ ruled that the Member States did not respect their duty 
of cooperation with the EC.251 
C.- The Amsterdam Treaty252 
The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty provided for a possible future decision by the Council to extend 
the common commercial policy to new areas: “The Council, acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may extend the 
application of paragraphs 1 to 4 to international negotiations and agreements on services and 
intellectual property insofar as they are not covered by these paragraphs.”253 In this sense, the 
Commission saw the Treaty of Amsterdam as giving an answer to the fundamental question 
of competence:  
 
250 The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations that works to 
raise levels of nutrition and standards of living; to improve the production, processing, marketing, and 
distribution of food and agricultural products; to promote rural development; and, by these means, to eliminate 
hunger. In the past, the United States and several European nations have contributed to this organization by 
providing blankets, food, shelter, and mung beans to those in need. The FAO was founded in 1945 in Quebec 
City. In 1951 the headquarters were moved from Washington, D.C. to Rome. As of April 2006, it had 190 
members (189 States and the European Community). 
The main activities concentrate on four areas: 
1. Developing assistance to developing countries; 
2. Information about nutrition, food, agriculture, forestry, and fishery;  
3. Advice to governments; and 
4. Neutral forum to discuss and formulate policy on major food and agriculture issues.  
251 Case C-25/94, 1996 E.C.R. I-1469, paras. 40 et seq. See also J. Heliskoski, “Internal Struggle for 
International Presence: The Exercise of Voting Rights Within the FAO,” in A. Dashwood & C. Hillion (eds.) 
THE GENERAL LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, 2000, p. 79 et seq.; Rudolph, 91 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1997, 352 et seq. 
252 For an earlier analysis of the Amsterdam Treaty and the EC common commercial policy, see Leal-Arcas, R. 
“Exclusive or Shared Competence in the Common Commercial Policy: From Amsterdam to Nice,” in Legal 
Issues of Economic Integration, 30(1): 3-14, 2003. 
253 Article 133.5 of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
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“Questions relating to trade in goods, but only parts of 
investment, services and intellectual property are already 
included in the day-to-day EU trade activity. Since the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, the rest is in an intermediate position: essentially an 
EU competence, but only to be used when the Council decides so 
by unanimity.”254 
Paragraph 5 was added to Article 133 EC by the Treaty of Amsterdam as a result of 
Opinion 1/94 of the ECJ,255 which held that the EC and its Member States were jointly 
competent to participate in the WTO agreement. This clause has not been used thus far. 
 “Amsterdam did not succeed in transferring enough policy areas from unanimity to 
qualified-majority voting to free up the decision-making process looking ahead to a Union of 
28 Member States.”256 In fact, some commentators speak of unanimity as a dictatorship in 
EU policy-making, given the heterogeneity of the Member States’ legal systems.257 Thus, the 
EC continues to face some difficulties in creating a coherent commercial policy. The 
Amsterdam intergovernmental conference negotiations did not extend the scope of EC 
powers in the field of external trade policy. However, they laid the foundations for a broader 
scope of EC powers in this field.258 Although the Treaty of Amsterdam included some 
amendments stating that Article 133 EC procedures could have extended over intellectual 
 
254 EC Commission, “EU Common Commercial Policy and the Intergovernmental Conference,” MEMO/00/86, 
Brussels, 22 November 2000. 
255 [1994] ECR I-5267. 
256 Yataganas, X.A. ‘The Treaty of Nice: The Sharing of Power and the Institutional Balance in the European 
Union- A Continental Perspective,’ Jean Monnet Working Paper 1/01, available at 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/010101-03.html (last visited November 29, 2002). 
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property and services, it still represents a hurdle because most decisions relating to these 
sectors must be unanimous,259 in reference to the use of Article 133 (5) EC.  
 However, not all agreements on intellectual property and services would have to be 
concluded by unanimous vote, since there are aspects of services and intellectual property 
which already fall within the scope of the EC’s common commercial policy. In addition, 
even with the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty enabling the Commission to act as 
spokesperson in this type of negotiation,260 it would have been more difficult to reach a 
Community position if Member States had been forced to reach unanimity. 
 As a result of shared competence between the EC and its Member States in intellectual 
property rights, some WTO members have introduced cases related to services and 
intellectual property rights against individual Member States instead of against the EC as a 
whole. For instance, the United States has brought various cases under the TRIPS 
Agreement261 against Denmark, Sweden, and Ireland. In the last case, the U.S. brought a case 
against Ireland regarding measures affecting the grant of copyrights and neighboring 
rights.262 The Commission’s main argument in the discussion on expanding EC competence 
over intellectual property and services was based on the EC’s need to be effective in 
international negotiations.  However, Member States were not readily convinced, perhaps 
 
259 See the consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, Article 133 (5), 1997 O.J. 
(C 340) 173, 238. 
260 See Treaty of Amsterdam, amending the Treaty of European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and certain related acts, Part one, Substantive amendments, Article 2.20, 1997  O.J. (C 340) 1, 35 
(inserting Art. 113(5) into the TEC). 
261 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments: Results of the Uruguay Round, Vol. 
31; 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994). 
262 Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, The EC in the WTO and Advisory Opinion 1/94: An Echternach Procession, 32 
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 763 (1995). 
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because the success of the Uruguay Round revealed concerns on the balance between the 
respective roles of the EC and its Member States in international affairs.263 
The Amsterdam Treaty thus offered the possibility to modify the EC Treaty 
autonomously.264 In other words, the EC Treaty could be modified independently of an 
intergovernmental conference (IGC) and ratification procedures in the Member States.265 
Such modification might have ended the so-called “division of powers between the EC and 
its Member States” in areas of trade in services and intellectual property rights stipulated by 
the ECJ in its Opinion 1/94, and therefore might have led to an exclusive EC competence.266 
This means that the negotiations and conclusions of international trade agreements in these 
issues would not have required a unanimous decision by the Council anymore and there 
would not have been need to ratify the agreement in question by all the EU Member States. 
Thus, the often-criticized interpretation of Article 133 EC by the ECJ in its Opinion 1/94 
would have been corrected.267 
It is important to be clear on the limits imposed by the drafting of Article 133 (5) of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam on the EC competence that may be created by the Council. Firstly, 
Article 133 (5) of the Treaty of Amsterdam made reference to “international negotiations and 
agreements.” This gave the new competence only an external application, unlike the general 
competence of the EC under Article 133 EC, which is exercisable both internally and 
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externally. Secondly, the Council had not been authorized to create a general competence for 
the EC to conclude international agreements on services and intellectual property matters. 
The type of agreements in question were those designed to remove impediments to the 
supply of services by non-nationals or to ensure the protection of intellectual property rights 
that belong to non-nationals.  
However, one cannot imagine a situation where a legal basis derived from Article 133 
EC was used for concluding an agreement having as its essential objective the harmonization 
of important areas of the parties’ internal legislation.268 In this sense, as the ECJ explained in 
its Opinion 1/94, the EC Institutions may not, by concluding an agreement under Article 133 
EC, “escape the internal constraints to which they are subject in relation to procedures and to 
rules as to voting.”269 
V. The End Of A Millenium: The Nice Treaty270 
It is interesting to contrast the Amsterdam IGC negotiations with the Nice IGC 
negotiations.271 At Amsterdam, little attention was given to trade policy. In relation to 
whether it should have been the European Commission or the EU Member States to lead 
 
Tridimas, “The WTO and OECD Opinions” in Dashwood and Hillion (eds.) THE GENERAL LAW OF EC 
EXTERNAL RELATIONS (2000), p. 48 et seq. 
268 A. Dashwood, “E.C. External Relations Provision Post-Amsterdam” in A. Dashwood & C. Hillion (eds.) 
THE GENERAL LAW OF EC EXTERNAL RELATIONS, 2000, p. 281. 
269 1994 E.C.R. I-5267, para.60. 
270 A deep legal analysis of the common commercial policy according to the Nice Treaty can be found in 
Neframi, E. “La Politique Commerciale Commune selon le Traite de Nice,” Cahiers de Droit Europeen, Nos. 5-
6, 2001, pp. 605-646. 
271 Meunier, S. & Nicolaidis, K. “Who Speaks for Europe? The Delegation of Trade Authority in the European  
Union,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 37(3): 477-501, 1999; Nicolaidis, K. & Meunier, S. “Revisiting 
Trade Competence in the European Union: Amsterdam, Nice and Beyond,” in Hosli, M. & van Deemen, A. 
(eds.) Institutional Challenges in the European Union, New York, Routledge, 2002. 
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services trade negotiations, this debate took place in complete public indifference. However, 
various civil society organizations mobilized in an intelligent manner before the Nice summit 
on the same unresolved issue of services trade negotiations, with the difference that this time 
they publicized their actions in the media, especially in a document entitled “Red Alert on the 
‘133’.”272 
As noted earlier, the EC does not have exclusive competence in the areas of services, 
intellectual property rights, and investment273 in international trade negotiations. Is it because 
the Founding Fathers thought that Europe would be better off by having exclusive 
competence only in the area of goods, leaving aside the other areas? Let us remember that 
when the Treaty of Rome was created in 1957, it was for a group of six relatively 
homogeneous countries in economic terms.274 The post-World War II European leaders’ 
dream was to have an economically and politically unified Europe. However, authors such as 
Robert M. Dunn argue that “the arrival of the euro as the standard currency [...] does not 
guarantee the union’s success.”275 
In any given international negotiation, the European Commission can negotiate on 
behalf of the Member States under two types of legal framework: exclusive and mixed 
competence. Under mixed competence, Member States retain a veto power through 
ratification by their national parliaments and through unanimity voting in the EU Council. In 
the case of exclusive competence, only a qualified majority vote in the EU Council is 
theoretically necessary for ratification. Therefore, it seems that with exclusive competence 
 
272 See George, S. “Red Alert on the ‘133’,” available at http://www.attac.org/fra/list/doc/georgeen.htm (last 
visited July 14, 2006). 
273 By foreign direct investment, it is understood the transfer of foreign funds into a country to purchase a 
service or manufacturing business or to open a new factory or service company. 
274 These countries were (West) Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux (Belgium, The Netherlands and 
Luxembourg). 
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the EC speaks with one voice (being that of the Commission), whereas with mixed 
competence there is cacophony.276 In practice, the existence of exclusive competence does 
not guarantee a single voice since some Member States still exercise a veto during trade 
negotiations. 
A sensu contrario, Member States have been able to speak with a single voice in areas 
of mixed competence. In any event, even if the principle of unity of representation by the 
Commission is often pursued, Member States seek to reduce the Commission’s autonomy, 
but in areas of exclusive competence the role of the Commission is nevertheless enhanced 
since Member States do not have a say. Furthermore, there is no frozen EC common position 
when the EC’s interlocutor is a strong party such as the U.S., Japan or Canada. In other 
words, there are constant changes in the Member States’ positions. That is to say, when 
negotiations are dynamic, it is more difficult to have an EC single voice. 
The most recent amendments to the EC policy-making system show that indirectly 
there is a tendency towards exclusive EC competence with time:  
1. Before Nice, the so-called “shared competence” issues were ruled under a unanimity 
system of voting in the EU Council. After Nice, the system has become more flexible 
towards EC policy convergence. With time, one might think that the future of EC 
policies might well be exclusive EC competence; 
2. At the Intergovernmental Conference of December 2000 in Nice, it was decided that 
trade agreements relating to services or commercial aspects of intellectual property 
can, in principle, be concluded by the Council acting by qualified majority. Although 
 
275 Robert M. Dunn, One Currency, But Not One Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2002, at A 23. 
Rafael Leal-Arcas                                                                
 71
there are exceptions to this principle,277 this has decided to put an end to most "mixed 
agreements" and to open decision-making to qualified-majority voting, leaving aside 
the old system of unanimity.278 “Among the exceptions to this principle, based on the 
need for parallel internal and external rules, it should be noted that the Council cannot 
conclude agreements harmonizing national legislation in the fields of culture, 
education or human health where the Community does not have internal powers to 
harmonize. Moreover, the Treaty provides that the Council must act unanimously 
where the agreement contains provisions requiring unanimity to adopt internal rules 
or where the agreement relates to an area where the Community has not yet exercised 
its powers at the internal level. The Treaty also maintains transport as a separate 
sector.”279 
A.- History of the Nice Negotiations
When the GATT was created in 1947, the main engine of world trade was goods. Services 
hardly played a role in the international trading system. As trade in services became more 
relevant, there was a debate inside the EC on whether or not trade in services fell within the 
 
276 See Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, “EU Trade Policy: The Exclusive versus Shared Competence 
Debate,” in The State of the European Union. Risks, Reform, Resistance and Revival, Vol. 5, 327 (Maria Green 
Cowles & Michael Smith eds., 2000), at p. 330. 
277 See O’Sullivan, D., European Commission Secretary-General, “Memorandum to the Members of the 
Commission. Summary of the Treaty of Nice,” Brussels, January 18, 2001, SEC (2001) 99, pp. 1-16, at 10. 
278 See European Commission, “Intergovernmental Conference 2000. Factsheets. Qualified-Majority Voting: 
Common Commercial Policy,” available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/archives/igc2000/geninfo/fact-sheets/fact-
sheet6/index_en.htm (last visited August 1, 2004). 
279 Id. 
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common commercial policy of the EC (Article 133 EC). For three main reasons was this 
debate important: 
1. the unitary character of EC trade policy among the EU Member States;280 
2. the exclusivity of  EC competence  in the common commercial policy;281 and 
3. the decision-making implications of Article 133 EC. This Article gives responsibility 
for international negotiations to the Commission, it does not require consultation of 
the European Parliament, and decisions are adopted in the EU Council by qualified-
majority vote. 
 
It might be surprising to see that the Nice Summit agenda included the topic of 
external trade policy. Why was it the case? Mainly because the EU Council had not taken a 
decision in accordance with Article 133 (5) of the Amsterdam Treaty to extend the scope of 
the EC’s common commercial policy.282 Therefore, it seemed appropriate to include the EC’s 
common commercial policy in the Nice IGC, which had as one of its aims the extension of 
qualified-majority voting to politically sensitive areas of the EC Treaty. The case-law on the 
dynamic nature of the common commercial policy and interpretation of Article 133 EC283 
supported the extension of the EC’s common commercial policy into services.284 However, 
 
280 Leal-Arcas, R. “The Unitary Character in the External Trade Relations of the European Community”, in the 
Columbia Journal of European Law, Vol. 7.3, Fall 2001, pp. 355-383. 
281 See, in this respect, Opinion 1/75 (Re OECD Local Cost Standard) [1975] ECR 1355 & Case 41/76, Criel, 
née Donckerwolke et al. v Procureur de la Republique au Tribunal de Grande Instance, Lille et al. [1976] ECR 
1921. 
282 Krenzler, H.G. & Pitschas, C. ‘Progress or Stagnation?: The Common Commercial Policy After Nice,’ 
EUROPEAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS REV., 6, 291-313, 2001, at p. 292. 
283 Opinion 1/78 (Re Draft International Agreement on Natural Rubber) [1979] ECR 2871. 
284 Mengozzi, “Trade in Services and Commercial Policy,” in Maresceau, M. (ed.) The European Community’s 
Commercial Policy after 1992: The Legal Dimension, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993. 
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this dynamic nature of the EC’s common commercial policy is kept within the control of the 
EU Council and is limited to intellectual property.285 
Article 133 (5) of the Amsterdam Treaty left a series of questions unanswered, one of 
which was the extent of the EC’s existing external competence in relation to services, based 
on implied as opposed to express powers.286 Since there was a need to find adequate and 
efficient negotiating mechanisms in the framework of the WTO, a reform of Article 133 EC 
was imminent at Nice. As we will see below, part of the discussion was about the extension 
of qualified-majority voting within the EU. In the words of the Commission at the time, 
“trade issues at this [Nice] IGC essentially concern the replacement of the unanimity rule by 
qualified majority.”287 
Jean-Claude Piris, Director-General of the Council Legal Service, published a note in 
May 2000 on EC external economic relations.288 Four main issues were at stake: 
1. EC participation in the WTO; 
2. EC single position in relation to third countries and the best decision-making process 
to achieve this goal; 
3. the conclusion of mixed agreements; and 
4. the establishment of the EC’s position within a joint body set up under an agreement, 
when that joint body is to adopt decisions with legal effects. 
 
285 Cremona, M. “A Policy of Bits and Pieces? The Common Commercial Policy After Nice,” The Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Vol. 4, 2001, 61-91, at 87. 
286 Neuwahl, N. “The WTO Opinion and implied external powers of the Community: a hidden agenda?” in 
Dashwood, A. & Hillion, C. (eds.) The General Law of EC External Relations, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000. 
287 EC Commission, “EU Common Commercial Policy and the Intergovernmental Conference,” MEMO/00/86, 
Brussels, 22 November 2000. 
288 Legal Adviser to the IGC, Note for the Member State Government Representatives Group on External 
Economic Relations, 10 May 2000, SN 2705/00. 
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With regard to the first issue, Piris proposed two options: 1) the revision of Article 
133 (5) EC in order to require only a qualified-majority vote, as opposed to unanimity, so 
that trade in services and intellectual property could be included into the common 
commercial policy of the EC; 2) the creation of a Protocol on participation in the WTO. The 
advantage of such a Protocol for the EU’s decision-making process would be the existence of 
qualified-majority voting, even in the field of Member States competence. The Protocol 
option was rejected by Mr Lamy, ex-EU trade commissioner. 
 Since the situation at the time only worked where there is consensus, failure to reach 
it would lead to a deadlock and to the impossibility to comply with the duty of cooperation 
expressed by the ECJ.289 With the imminent phenomenon of enlargement, paralysis would 
seem even more credible in the EU decision-making process based on unanimity, given the 
greater diversity of national interests and views. Thus, the need for reformation of the current 
situation was clear. In Piris’s words, there was a need for “clear, simple, transparent, 
effective legal rules enabling a common position to be established by a qualified majority in 
all cases.” Already the draft Protocol proposed common positions to be adopted by the 
Council, acting by qualified-majority vote; the Commission would be the “spokesman and 
sole negotiator” for the EC and its Member States in the WTO framework, presenting the 
common position agreed in the Council. Therefore, as Cremona rightly argues, “the 
complexity of the Nice amendment is a reminder of just how difficult it is to achieve 
consensus in this area [commercial policy], and also how important in practice that consensus 
is.”290 
289 Opinion 1/94, at para. 108. 
290 Cremona, M. “A Policy of Bits and Pieces? The Common Commercial Policy After Nice,” The Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Vol. 4, 2001, 61-91, at 61. 
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In this sense, in January 2000, the Commission’s Opinion291 clearly expressed that 
any change in voting procedures to Article 133 (5) EC would not be the best option. Rather, a 
better option would be the inclusion of services, intellectual property and investment into 
Article 133 EC: “The Commission would prefer a substantial amendment of the scope of 
Article 133 by extending it to services, investment and intellectual property rights.”292 
France, on the contrary, had already opposed the idea of further broadening of EC powers in 
the field of external trade during the Amsterdam Summit of 1997. 
 That said, it was in the best interest of the EC, nevertheless, to benefit from an IGC to 
improve the EC’s ability to take international actions. In this sense, the European Council of 
Feira in June 2000 decided to include the external trade policy on the agenda of the Nice 
IGC. The European Council gave green light to the Presidency Report on IGC 
negotiations.293 Here the Portuguese presidency argued that Article 133 (5) EC is part of 
those provisions where Council decision by unanimity should be replaced by qualified-
majority voting with regard to transfer of competence from national to supranational level. 
Conversely, other Member States thought that it was not necessary to deal with this same 
issue in Nice since it had already been in the Amsterdam Summit agenda. 
 In September 2000, a French Presidency note proposed three alternatives to Article 
133 EC: 
1. the inclusion of services, intellectual property rights and investment either by 
amending Article 133 (1) EC or by adding a new paragraph 5 to cover new fields 
to be defined by a Protocol; 
 
291 Commission Opinion on the IGC, 26 January 2000, COM (2000). 
292 Commission Opinion on the IGC, 26 January 2000, COM (2000) 34, 29. 
293 Brussels, 14 June 2000, CONFER 4750/00, Annex 3.5. 
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2. change of the voting procedure of Article 133 (5) EC so that the decision to 
include agreements on trade in services and intellectual property rights would be 
by qualified-majority vote as opposed to unanimity. The question was whether the 
EC’s exclusive trade competence should be broadened to include issues such as 
services and intellectual property rights, where competence is shared between the 
EC and its Member States, or whether the catalogue of exceptions to the EC’s 
exclusive trade competence (such as investment, services and intellectual property 
rights) should remain. In the end, the answer was somewhere in between these 
two positions; and lastly 
3. a new Protocol establishing the rules for a common position in the WTO by 
qualified-majority vote, without transfer of competence under Article 133 EC. 
 
In November 2000, there were two options presented in the drafts for the new Treaty: 
1) the inclusion of trade in services, investment and intellectual property rights in Article 133 
(1) EC; 2) the creation of a Protocol for the extension of Article 133 EC to the negotiation 
and conclusion of agreements on trade in services and  intellectual property rights. In 
December 2000, at the IGC, option 1 was the basis for the final text in Nice, including an 
explicit reservation of Member State powers; option 2 (the creation of a Protocol) was 
rejected. Since the Protocol on WTO participation was also dropped, there is no agreement 
on a single procedure for all WTO negotiations, whether it is for issues of exclusive EC 
competence, shared competence or Member States’ competence. 
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B.- The EC Developments in Trade Policy at Nice
During the Nice negotiations, the French presidency played the most active and important 
role: France wished to control the EC’s common commercial policy as much as possible by 
insisting that there should be a specific exception for trade in cultural and audio-visual 
services (the so-called specificite culturelle). This is one of the issues which explain the 
result of the Nice Summit as far as the EC’s foreign trade policy is concerned. Five principal 
issues were discussed in Nice: qualified-majority voting and the co-decision procedure, the 
weighting of votes in the Council,294 the composition of the Commission, the composition of 
the European Parliament, and closer cooperation. For the purposes of this article, I will only 
mention the first one of them. 
 
B.1.- Qualified-majority voting and the co-decision procedure295 
The 1957 Treaty of Rome provided for a decision to be taken by unanimity in the EU 
Council for most of the areas covered. However, a few provisions were already subject to 
qualified-majority voting296 and the Treaty of Rome itself foresaw the mechanism of 
 
294 On the position of the EU Council in the Nice IGC, see Beach, D. “The European Commission and Council 
Secretariat: How They Gained Some Influence,” in Laursen, F. (ed.) The Treaty of Nice: Actor Preferences, 
Bargaining and Institutional Choice, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, pp. 369-406. 
295 Yataganas, X.A. ‘The Treaty of Nice: The Sharing of Power and the Institutional Balance in the European 
Union- A Continental Perspective,’ Jean Monnet Working Paper 1/01, available at 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/010101-03.html (last visited November 29, 2002). 
296 In fact, there are two types of qualified majority, based on the nature of the text being voted: 1) as a general 
rule, the ceiling is fixed at the majority of the EU Member States, representing at least 3/5 of the Union’s 
population (Article I-25 of the EU Constitutional Treaty); 2) however, when the European Council or the EU 
Council do not act on the basis of a Commission proposal, or on the initiative of the Union’s Foreign Affairs 
Minister, the ceiling of the qualified majority is fixed at 2/3 of the EU Member States, representing at least 3/5 
of the population. This ceiling is susceptible to change if the declaration annexed to the Protocol on the 
weighting of votes in the European Council and EU Council states that for each accession, the ceiling laid down 
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qualified-majority voting in many cases after the end of the transitional period in 1966. An 
example of this period is the so-called France’s “empty chair,”297 when General De Gaulle 
rejected a series of Commission proposals blocking their adoption in the Council and 
refusing to move toward qualified-majority voting. This political crisis was resolved with the 
Luxembourg compromise in January 1966.298 The Council had stated in its conclusions that 
“where very important interests of one or more partners are at stake, the members of the 
Council will endeavour, within a reasonable time, to reach solutions which can be adopted by 
all […].” The immediate consequence of this event was the veto culture, which damaged 
severely the process of European integration. 
 The Single European Act of 1987, the Council practice of 1985 and Maastricht 
represent a reduction of Member State participation, by moving from unanimity to a 
qualified-majority requirement. Weiler points out in his book The Constitution of Europe that 
EC Member States are less willing today to accept ERTA-type decisions by the ECJ.299 In 
theses decisions, EC Member States, by transferring sovereignty over a given issue to the 
EC, implicitly acknowledged that the EC can exercise sovereignty over the issue at an 
international level.300 
The praxis of qualified-majority voting was seen as a necessary element for the 
successive EU enlargements. Yet, several important and politically sensitive issues remained 
subject to the unanimity rule. From Article 205 EC, we can infer that the EU Council acts by 
 
in the Protocol is established by the Council. 
297 The empty chair phenomenon describes a situation where General de Gaulle refused to participate in Council 
meetings. The veto of a single country is brought into question. 
298 On January 28, 1966, through the Luxembourg Compromise France agreed to resume its Council seat. It was 
decided that the majority vote procedure would be replaced by unanimous vote if an EC Member State 
considers that “very important interests” are at stake. 
299 Weiler, J. H. H. The Constitution of Europe. "Do the New Clothes have an Emperor?" and Other Essays on 
European Integration, Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
300 Mavroidis, P. “Lexcalibur: The House that Joe Built”, in Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 38, 
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a majority of its members, as provided by the EC Treaty. Therefore, de iure the simple 
majority is the rule, whereas qualified majority and unanimity are the exception. However, de 
facto it seems as if qualified-majority voting will be the rule, whereas unanimity and simple 
majority will be the exceptions in the Council’s decision-making process. Leaving unanimity 
aside as a common praxis in the Council is beneficial for an enlarged EU since it will become 
virtually impossible to take unanimous decisions in an EU of over 30 countries. 
 At Nice, the discussions seemed to be based on three options: 
1. qualified-majority voting as the general rule with limited exceptions listed 
exhaustively; 
2. issues to be transferred to qualified-majority voting with no exhaustive list of the 
areas excluded; and 
3. a case-by-case approach. 
 
At the Nice IGC, the Commission proposed the first option. However, the case-by-case 
approach prevailed.301 
With respect to the co-decision procedure,302 it was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty 
and then simplified by the Amsterdam Treaty. The aim was to strengthen the powers of the 
European Parliament. The co-decision procedure is only applied for internal EC legislation, 
not for international agreements. Yet, the European Parliament can give its approval in trade 
agreements. In this sense, in the case of the WTO agreement, the EP has power to assent. The 
 
2000, Number 3, p. 671. 
301 For an overview of the position of the European Parliament and European Commission at the Nice IGC, see 
Neuhold, C. “The European Parliament and the European Commission: ‘You Can’t Always Get What You 
Want,’” in Laursen, F. (ed.) The Treaty of Nice: Actor Preferences, Bargaining and Institutional Choice,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, pp. 351-67. 
302 Article 251 EC. 
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Commission alerted the fact that there is inconsistency when combining unanimity in the EU 
Council with the co-decision procedure. Thus, the Commission proposed instead the 
harmony of qualified-majority voting and the co-decision procedure. In the eyes of the 
Commission, commercial policy inter alia should come under the co-decision procedure.303 
The Commission’s Opinion on the IGC in January 2000 suggested the extension of co-
decision to the common commercial policy.304 This proposal did not see the light because the 
European Council refused to apply the principle of parallelism and, in the words of the 
Commission, this failure to increase the role of the European Parliament in EU decision-
making under Article 133 EC is “regrettable for the democratic accountability of the Union’s 
trade policy.”305 Some authors refer to this phenomenon of lack of democratic legitimacy as 
insufficient and inadequate parliamentary control.306 Nonetheless, the Treaty of Nice307 
would amend Article 300 (6) EC in order to allow the European Parliament, the Council, the 
Commission or a Member State to request an Opinion from the Court of Justice on the 
compatibility of a given agreement with the Treaty. 
 
B.2.- Changes made to Article 133 EC at Nice
During the Nice IGC, the European Commission had proposed to include in Article 133 (1) 
 
303 Yataganas, X.A. ‘The Treaty of Nice: The Sharing of Power and the Institutional Balance in the European 
Union- A Continental Perspective,’ Jean Monnet Working Paper 1/01, available at 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/010101-03.html (last visited November 29, 2002). 
304 Commission Opinion on the IGC, 26 January 2000, COM (2000) at 26 and 30. 
305 European Commission, “The reform of Article 133 by the Nice Treaty. The logic of parallelism,” in 
Frequently Asked Questions. Intergovernmental Conference discusses Article 133, December 2000, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/faqs/rev133_en.htm. 
306 Petersmann, E.-U., “The Foreign Policy Constitution of the European Union: A Kantian Perspective,” in 
Immenga, U., Moeschel, W. & Reuter, D. (eds.) Festschrift fuer Ernst-Joachim Mestmaecker, Nomos Verlag, 
1996, pp. 433-47, at 435. 
307 Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European 
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EC trade in goods, as well as services, investment and intellectual property rights.308 By 
doing so, the pre-Nice Article 133 EC would extend to these areas. This proposal, however, 
never saw the light, and instead Article 133 (5) of the Nice Treaty came into existence. As a 
consequence, we can observe significant differences between Article 133 (1-4) EC and 
Article 133 (5) EC. 
 What are, then, the implications of rejecting the European Commission’s proposal? 
There are mainly two implications: 1) investments are excluded from Article 133 EC; and 2) 
only the negotiation and conclusion (but not the implementation) of international agreements 
is covered by the amended Article 133 EC. Furthermore, Article 133 (6.3) of the Nice Treaty 
provides that the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in the field of 
transport remains being governed by the provisions of the EC Treaty on transport policy and 
Article 300 EC. This is most likely due to some bureaucratic instance of various EU Member 
States to leave transport out. 
In a nutshell, the content of the new Article 133 EC post-Nice can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. reiteration of current provisions of Article 133 (1-4) EC. For example, there is a need 
to ensure the compatibility of external agreements with internal policies and rules, 
under joint responsibility of the Council and the Commission. Another example is the 
fact that the Commission has the duty to consult the Article 133 Committee and to 
report to the same Committee on the progress of negotiations; 
 
Communities and certain related Acts, O.J. 2001, C80/01. 
308 Bourgeois, J.H.J. “The EC’s Trade Policy Powers After Nice: Painting Oneself in a Corner?” at p. 5 
(unpublished paper). 
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2. extension of qualified-majority vote (QMV) for the negotiation and conclusion of 
international agreements on trade in services and trade aspects of intellectual 
property,309 except for agreements which include provisions for which unanimity is 
required for the adoption of internal rules or which relate to a field in which the EC 
has not yet exercised the powers conferred upon it by the Treaty by adopting internal 
rules. Arguably, and I certainly believe it is the case, there has been progress in EC 
trade policy-making by going from unanimity to QMV in the so-called shared 
competence issues, thereby creating greater flexibility, as well as a trend toward an 
EU federation, at least in the case of trade policy. Therefore, the Nice 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) has taken into account the important changes 
made to the world trading system and, consequently, is in line with the WTO’s idea 
of including the GATS and the TRIPS Agreement as part of the WTO substantive 
law; 
3. joint conclusion by the EU Council (based on Article 300 EC) and the Member States 
for agreements relating to trade in cultural and audiovisual services, educational 
services, and social and human health services; 
4. application of the existing procedure for agreements on transport.310 This corroborates 
the European Court of Justice’s Opinion that transport services are not governed by 
the provisions on the common commercial policy.311; and 
 
309 European Commission, Secretary-General, “List of Provisions to which Qualified Majority Rule will 
Apply,” available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/nice_treaty/procedures_en.pdf, pp. 1-2, at 2 (last visited August 
2, 2004). 
310 See eight most recent ECJ judgments on transport on 5 November 2002: C-466/98 Commission v United 
Kingdom; C-467/98 Commission v Denmark; C-468/98 Commission v Sweden; C-469/98 Commission v
Finland; C-471/98 Commission v Belgium; C-472/98 Commission v Luxembourg; C-475/98 Commission v
Austria; C-476/98 Commission v Germany.
311 Opinion 1/94, paras. 48-53. 
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5. possibility of extending qualified-majority voting, by a unanimous EU Council 
decision (after consultation of the European Parliament), to agreements on intellectual 
property, except in certain derogations. 
 
B.3.- What remains unchanged of Article 133 EC at Nice
Three main issues remained the same at Nice: 
1. the European Parliament is formally excluded from decision-making under Article 
133 EC. However, as Herrmann claims, since the Nice IGC failed to strengthen the 
rights of the EP in relation to the common commercial policy, “at least the EP will 
now be empowered to obtain an opinion by the ECJ under Article 3000 (6) EC, a 
change that enhances the ability of the EP to protect its rights concerning 
international agreements without having to wait for the Council to take a formal 
decision about the conclusion of an agreement which could then be challenged under 
Article 230 EC;”312 
2. it is not entirely clear whether investment continues to be excluded from Article 133 
EC,  although some aspects of investment are covered by the locution “trade in 
services.” In this sense, the uncertainty on the scope of Article 133 EC is created by 
the fact that in the Nice negotiations all proposals to include an express mention of 
“direct investment” alongside “trade in services” to paragraph 5 were rejected.313 
312 Herrmann, C. W. ‘Common Commercial Policy after Nice: Sisyphus Would Have Done a Better Job.’ 
Common Market Law Review, 39: 7-29, at 28, 2002. 
313 Heliskoski, J. “The Nice Reform of Article 133 EC on the Common Commercial Policy,” Journal of 
International Commercial Law, 2002, 1(1): 1-13, at p. 5. 
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Against this view is the position of Torrent, who argues that in the GATS, investment 
is deliberately camouflaged as “commercial presence;”314 and 
3. the proposed Protocol on WTO participation was associated with a decision not to 
transfer any competence to the EC under Article 133 EC. 
 
B.4- The New Article 133 EC: More Unnecessary Confusion and Complication?
To understand the changes made to Article 133 in Nice, I shall focus on the so-called “logic 
of parallelism.”315 One valid definition of the “logic of parallelism” is the idea that the EC’s 
external powers with respect to trade in services and commercial aspects of intellectual 
property need to correspond to the division of powers between the EC and its Member States 
and to the voting procedures in the internal sphere. An example of the so-called “logic of 
parallelism” is the grant of powers in paragraph 5, subparagraph 1, of Article 133 of the Nice 
Treaty without prejudice to its paragraph 6, which provides that “an agreement may not be 
concluded by the Council if it includes provisions which would go beyond the Community’s 
internal powers.”316 
Speaking of the text adopted by the European Council in Nice, the Commission 
argues that,  
 
“by focusing on the principle of parallelism on which it is based, it [the 
text] becomes easier to understand. The guiding principle of the new 
Article 133 is to align the decision-making mechanism for trade 
negotiations on internal decision-making rules: in the area of services for 
 
314 Torrent, R. Derecho y Practica de las Relaciones Exteriores en la Union Europea (1998), p. 94. 
315 For a thoughtful study on the doctrine of parallelism, see Schuetze, R. “Parallel External Powers in the 
European Community: From ‘Cubist’ Perspectives Towards ‘Naturalist’ Constitutional Principles?,” Yearbook 
of European Law 23, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 225-74. 
316 Article 133 (6) (1) of the Nice Treaty. 
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example, it is illogical that decisions are taken by qualified majority on 
internal Market directives, but trade negotiations on the very same 
subject fall under a rule of consensus (effectively requiring 
unanimity).”317
Within the EU, there is a parallelism between external and internal powers: from 
paragraph 3 of Article 133 of the Nice Treaty, we see that the Commission and the Council 
are responsible for ensuring that “agreements negotiated are compatible with internal 
Community policies and rules.”318 Similarly, Article 300 (6) EC makes reference to Treaty-
compatibility and argues that agreements found to be incompatible with the Treaty would 
only enter into force if and after there has been a Treaty amendment. This means that the EC 
can actually negotiate and conclude agreements under Article 133 EC which requires 
amendment of secondary legislation. Thus, as Cremona rightly points out, it would make 
little sense to believe that “the Community could not negotiate any agreement that was not 
compatible with Community law as it then stands (i.e. requiring no amendment of 
Community law)”319 since this would imply a paralysis of external trade policy.  
The internal policy objectives are relevant in determining trade policy positions. We 
see this in the new paragraph 3 of Article 133 of the Nice Treaty. The new wording of 
paragraph 3 of Article 133, which requires compatibility between the agreements negotiated 
and internal Community policies and rules, is done to avoid the fear that the Community will 
negotiate in sensitive internal policy sectors. 
Parallelism is also dealt with in Article 133 (6) of the Nice Treaty, which prevents the 
Council from concluding agreements with provisions which might go beyond the 
 
317 European Commission, “The reform of Article 133 by the Nice Treaty. The logic of parallelism,” in 
Frequently Asked Questions. Intergovernmental Conference discusses Article 133, December 2000, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/faqs/rev133_en.htm. 
318 Article 133 (3) EC. 
319 Cremona, M. “A Policy of Bits and Pieces? The Common Commercial Policy After Nice,” The Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Vol. 4, 2001, 61-91, at 75-76. 
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Community’s internal powers. Article 133 (5) (2) of the Nice Treaty shows examples of 
decision-making parallelism. 
 
B.5- Article 133 EC after Nice320 
B.5.a.- Form and Substance 
 
Although the common commercial policy has traditionally been regarded as one of the areas 
of exclusive external EC competence,321 the new subparagraph 4 of paragraph 5 of Article 
133 of the Nice Treaty makes an exception to this principle by preserving the Member 
States’ right to maintain and conclude bilateral agreements with non-member countries or 
international organizations on issues where there is no common interest to justify action by 
the European Community.322 
A second characteristic to Article 133 of the Nice Treaty that has to do with the 
relationship between the Community’s powers and those of the Member States is its second 
subparagraph of paragraph 6, which uses for the first time the locution “shared competence” 
to refer to a situation where EC competence in respect of a given matter exists but is not 
exclusive. The negotiation of agreements on issues such as trade in cultural and audiovisual 
services, educational services, and social and human health services will require both a 
Community decision and the Member States’ consensus.323 Those agreements on issues 
 
320 Rollo, J. & Holmes, P. “EU Commercial Policy after Nice,” Sussex European Institute Briefing Paper No. 3. 
321 Opinion 1/75 (Re OECD Local Cost Standard) [1975] ECR 1355, pp. 1363-1364. 
322 Protocol on External Relations of the Member States with regard to the Crossing of External Borders, 
annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, OJ C 340 [1997] p. 108. 
323 Heliskoski, J. “The Nice Reform of Article 133 EC on the Common Commercial Policy,” Journal of 
International Commercial Law, 2002, 1(1): 1-13, at p. 11. 
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mentioned in Article 133 (6) (2) EC will be concluded jointly by the EC and its Member 
States as mixed agreements.324 
From a substance viewpoint, Article 133 (6) of the Nice Treaty alludes to the locution 
“shared competence.” With regard to situations of shared competence, it might be decided by 
the Council to exercise the Community’s non-exclusive competence over a given agreement, 
leaving no room for Member States’ participation. Alternatively, if there is no Community 
legislation in the field covered by the agreement, the Member States alone could conclude 
the agreement without the Community. Both of these hypotheses are examples where the 
agreement would be concluded only by the EC or by its Member States alone. A totally 
different matter is the fact that, as Heliskoski argues, “in every field of Community policy 
there is likely to be at least some Community legislation in place and, consequently, the 
Community’s participation in the agreement alongside the Member States might become 
necessary under the AETR principle.”325 That is why Heliskoski speaks of “unfortunate”326 
when referring to the way in which Article 133 of the Nice Treaty uses the locution “shared 
competence.” 
With respect to trade in services, the scope has been enlarged so that the EC’s 
competence to negotiate and conclude trade agreements related to Article 133 EC is not 
restricted to the so-called “cross-border” supply of services but covers all types of supply. 
The exceptions would be agreements in the field of transport, as has been explained above,327 
and those agreements which lead to the harmonization of the laws or regulations of the 
 
324 Heliskoski, J. Mixed Agreements as a Technique for Organizing the International Relations of the European 
Community and its Member States, Kluwer Law International, 2001. 
325 Heliskoski, J. “The Nice Reform of Article 133 EC on the Common Commercial Policy,” Journal of 
International Commercial Law, 2002, 1(1): 1-13, at p. 12, footnote 18. 
326 Heliskoski, J. “The Nice Reform of Article 133 EC on the Common Commercial Policy,” Journal of 
International Commercial Law, 2002, 1(1): 1-13, at p. 12. 
327 See headline supra “Changes made to Article 133 EC at Nice”. 
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Member States in an area which the Treaty rules out such harmonization, i.e., education,328 
vocational training,329 culture,330 and public health.331 So services other than cultural, 
audiovisual, educational, social and health services, have been brought under the scope of 
Article 133 EC with the Nice Treaty. 
As for intellectual property, paragraph (5) (1) is restrained to commercial aspects of 
intellectual property. It is thus more restricted than Article 133 (5) of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
This new provision would not enable the EC to negotiate and conclude international trade 
agreements on intellectual property rights within organizations such as WIPO. During the 
Nice negotiations, the spirit was to create a paragraph 5 with a scope similar to that of the 
TRIPS Agreement; however, such proposals were later rejected.332 
B.5.b.- Decision-making Procedures 
 
Qualified-majority voting has been a major characteristic of the EC common commercial 
policy’s decision-making process as much as has been the absence of European Parliament’s 
involvement in the common commercial policy stricto sensu. Before Nice, the conclusion of 
an agreement on issues of shared competence had to be done by unanimity, whereas 
decision-making of internal legislation was by qualified-majority vote. After Nice, and with 
EU enlargement in mind, the use of unanimity is only required in four situations: 
1. where it is required for the adoption of internal rules; 
 
328 Article 149 (4) EC. 
329 Article 150 (4) EC. 
330 Article 151 (5) EC. 
331 Article 152 (4) EC. 
332 Finnish Government Bill 93/2001, p. 42. 
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2. where powers have not yet been exercised by adoption of internal rules (Article 133 
(5)(2) of the Nice Treaty); 
3. agreements under the “cultural exception” clause of Article 133 (6) of the Nice Treaty 
must be concluded by common accord between the EC and  its Member States; and 
4. horizontal agreements. 
Thus, the whole point of Nice with respect to decision-making was to simplify the current 
situation. Already in an EU of twenty-five Member States it is difficult to have unanimity, so 
in an enlarged EU of over 25 it is virtually impossible to reach unanimity, despite the 
sensitivities some Member States may have in certain fields. Leaving unanimity aside is a 
political sacrifice that may need to be made in EU decision-making in the near future.  
 
B.5.c.- Expansion of Exclusive EC Competence? 
 
Although the scope of the common commercial policy was broadened in previous IGCs, with 
agreements relating to trade in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property 
there has been no expansion to exclusive EC competence by the Nice Treaty; instead, there 
has been the preservation of “shared competence.” In that same line of argument, Article 133 
(5) (4) of the Nice Treaty gives Member States the right to “maintain and conclude 
agreements with third countries or international organizations insofar as such agreements 
comply with Community law and other relevant  international agreements.” Thus, EC 
competence does not stop the continuation of Member States competence in these fields. 
Although this new competence will be shared, the Community will be able to act alone in 
international trade negotiations.  
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As for a different category of agreements on trade in services, a specific form of 
shared competence will continue, where joint negotiation and conclusion of agreements  by 
the Community and its Member States in specific areas will be the normal praxis, as can be 
seen in Article 133 (6) (2) of the Nice Treaty. According to the Treaty of Nice, the 
Community alone will not be able to conclude agreements in these sectors: “Agreements thus 
negotiated shall be concluded jointly by the Community and the Member States.”333 This also 
applies to Member States’ inability to conclude such agreements alone. This means that 
Member States will not lose their competence within the WTO forum.334 
That said, where external competence is implied, the scope of exclusive external 
powers may change. The ECJ, in its Opinion 1/94, held that exclusive implied powers in 
trade in services might arise in two situations: 1) where internal harmonization is complete, 
or 2) where legislation gives a specific competence to negotiate with third countries: “the 
[exclusive competence] applies […] even in the absence of any express provision authorizing 
its institutions to negotiate with non-member countries, where the Community has achieved 
complete harmonization of the rules governing access to a self-employed activity […].”335 
This means that the current situation could change if new secondary legislation gives 
the EC exclusive powers in the common commercial policy or if harmonization is complete. 
On the other hand, and contrary to this approach, the new paragraph 5 of Article 133 of the 
Nice Treaty preserves Member State competence in the conclusion of mixed trade 
 
333 Article 133 (6) (2) of the Nice Treaty. 
334 See, in contrast, the position under GATT after the transfer of common commercial policy competence to the 
EC in Cases 22-24/72 International Fruit Company [1972] ECR 1219. 
335 Opinion 1/94 at paras. 96-98. 
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agreements. This can be summarized as a duty of close cooperation in the external relations 
of the Communities in cases of shared competence.336 
C.- The Outcome of Nice: Comments and Criticism
C.1.- Greater Transparency and Simplicity?
The common denominator to all IGC negotiations until Nice was the lack of transparency 
and information. At Nice, the increasing demands for greater transparency and simplicity337 
were not met by the new version of Article 133 EC. This new Article is a bad example of 
simplification. Why is it not possible to simplify the Treaties so easily? One plausible answer 
is because at the IGCs the political compromise is far too strong. In the case of Nice, most 
EU Member States did not bring the scope of the EC’s commercial policy in line with the 
scope of international economic law as it evolved from the conclusion of the WTO 
Agreement. 
Most commentators have pronounced their disappointment toward the amendment of 
Article 133 envisaged by the Nice Treaty. The least pessimistic has been the Commission by 
admitting that “the progress made in improving the operation of EU’s trade policy is 
modest.”338 Pescatore calls it a “legal bricolage” and alerts us of the inevitable and imminent 
 
336 For a further explanation of the duty of close cooperation, see Leal-Arcas, R. “United We Stand, Divided We 
Fall- The European Community and its Member States in the WTO Forum: Towards Greater Cooperation on 
Issues of Shared Competence?,” in European Political Economy Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2003, pp. 65-79, 
at 66-69, available at http://www.ugbs.org/weru/eper/vol1/no1/leal.pdf. 
337 De Witte, B. “Simplification and Reorganization of the European Treaties,” in Common Market Law Review,
2002, pp. 1255-1287. 
338 European Commission, “The reform of Article 133 by the Nice Treaty. The logic of parallelism.” in 
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paralysis of the Community’s decisional processes which will hamper an effective defence of 
the Community’s trade interests.339 The import of unanimity into the common commercial 
policy risks the decisional paralysis announced by Pescatore; however, the import of shared 
competence threatens the uniform principles of the common commercial policy expressed in 
Article 133 (1) of the Nice Treaty. 
 If the criterion for measuring the success of the Nice Treaty has been, following 
Piris’s words, an obvious and understandable need for “clear, simple, transparent, effective 
legal rules,”340 then one could argue that Nice has failed to do its homework properly. 
Despite the interest of the Commission to extend as much as possible qualified-majority 
voting in the decision-making process for issues such as trade in services and intellectual 
property rights, Member States have attempted to reflect as much as possible the current 
situation with regard to distribution of competence in order to preserve the existing EU’s 
decision-making modus operandi.
Many commentators341 argue that the Nice Treaty has accepted the outcome of 
Opinion 1/94 of the ECJ: the new Article 133 after Nice preserves the same outcome as the 
Opinion in the sense that there continues to be shared competence in the GATS and the 
TRIPS Agreement.342 The enigma of EC trade policy on issues of trade in services and 
intellectual property rights continues to stand up: Cremona argues in this sense that a 
rethinking of the locution “uniform principles” as the basis of the EC common commercial 
 
Frequently Asked Questions. Intergovernmental Conference discusses Article 133, December 2000, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/faqs/rev133_en.htm. 
339 Pescatore, P. “Guest Editorial: Nice –Aftermath” (2001) 38 CMLRev 265. 
340 Legal Adviser to the IGC, Note for the Member State Government Representatives Group on External 
Economic Relations, 10 May 2000, SN 2705/00. 
341 See, among others, Pescatore, P. “Guest Editorial: Nice –Aftermath” (2001) 38 CMLRev 265; Krenzler, H.G. 
& Pitschas, C. ‘Progress or Stagnation?: The Common Commercial Policy After Nice,’ European Foreign 
Affairs Review 6, 2001, pp. 291-313. 
342 Article 133 (5) of the Nice Treaty. 
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policy will have to be done given the non-exclusive competence nature of services and 
intellectual property rights. To have a common definition of common interest may be more 
important and efficient in EC trade relations than uniform rules.343 
In the words of the Nice European Council, Nice was about “how to establish and 
monitor a more precise delimitation of powers between the EU and its Member States 
reflecting the principle of subsidiarity.”344 The prevailing principle of Nice was that of quid 
pro quo. In the case of the common commercial policy, France had to give concessions to 
ensure parity with Germany in the decision-making process. The main issue at stake in Nice 
was the division of responsibilities between the EU and its Member States, i.e., who does 
what, the arrangements for the exercise of those responsibilities, and the balance of power 
between Germany and France.345 
The struggles over national representation in the EC institutions are, according to 
Yataganas, “a sign of Member States’ mistrust of supranational decision-making procedures 
in general.”346 There continues to be a clear democratic deficit in EC trade policy-making: 
the European Parliament hardly plays a role. Despite the extension of its legislative 
competences, the famous democratic deficit is still present. There is a need to democratize 
the EU institutional framework. Or as it was said at the Nice Declaration on the future of the 
Union, there is a “need to improve and monitor the democratic legitimacy and transparency 
of the Union and its institutions, to bring them closer to the citizens of the Member States.” 
 
343 Cremona, M. “A Policy of Bits and Pieces? The Common Commercial Policy After Nice,” The Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Vol. 4, 2001, 61-91, at 88. 
344 http://ue.eu.int/cigdocs/en/cig2000-EN.pdf 
345 Yataganas, X.A. Conclusions, in ‘The Treaty of Nice: The Sharing of Power and the Institutional Balance in 
the European Union- A Continental Perspective,’ Jean Monnet Working Paper 1/01, available at 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/010101-03.html (last visited November 29, 2002). 
346 Id. 
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The European Parliament was the big loser in the new Article 133 EC. It was not 
given any new rights at the Nice Summit, not even a formal right of consultation, even if 
Article 133 (7) EC provides that the EP be consulted concerning the negotiation and 
conclusion of international agreements on intellectual property rights. So an informal 
information procedure remains. However, Herrmann argues that the EP must be consulted if 
an agreement within the meaning of Article 133 (6.2) EC is to be concluded.347 It seems 
contradictory to grant a right of consultation to the EP in an area where the treaty-making 
power is shared between the EC and its Member States whereas such a right to be consulted 
does not exist in an area that comes under the EC’s exclusive competence. That said, it must 
also be mentioned that the EP will be entitled to ask the ECJ to render an Opinion on the 
compatibility of an international agreement with the EC Treaty, according to Article 133 (6) 
EC. 
 As for the Council, the proposal that it would have a greater say in negotiations along 
with the Commission was not supported. This would have meant a double EC representation 
in international agreements, against one of the great advantages of Article 133 EC, i.e., that 
the EC speaks with a single voice. Had this happened, it would have enabled the EC’s 
negotiating partners to play off the EC negotiators against each other with all negative 
consequences for the EC’s capacity as an international actor. A clear example of this is the 
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which is bicephalous in nature: it is 
represented by the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and by 
the EC commissioner responsible for external relations in cross-pillar matters. 
 
347 Krenzler, H.G. & Pitschas, C. ‘Progress or Stagnation?: The Common Commercial Policy After Nice,’ 
EUROPEAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS REV., 6, 291-313, at p. 312, 2001. 
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C.2.- The Extension of qualified-majority voting and co-decision procedures
Majority voting seems to be a fair rule when aggregating the diverse interests among the EU 
Member States into a coherent common position for trade negotiations. However, anti-
globalization activists before and during the December 2000 Nice summit claimed that 
majority voting was not legitimate because, viewed from the perspective of the outcome, it 
tends to produce more liberal and less protectionist policies. That explains why many non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) were so insistent at the Nice summit that France did not 
lose its veto right on trade in cultural goods, but instead preserve in the Nice Treaty the so-
called cultural exception clause. Some decisions made by majority vote may affect a minority 
so negatively that the outcome may seem illegitimate. This justifies the preservation of the 
veto right or consensus in some areas of EC trade policy, such as agriculture, even when the 
default formal rules laid out in the treaties may state otherwise, in order to protect the right of 
minorities. However, the need to achieve consensus or unanimity may lead to unfair results. 
With the EU as an ongoing process, unanimity might pose more problems in terms of 
political legitimacy since the degree of heterogeneity among the EU Member States is 
expected to increase as future enlargements take place. This is true for agriculture (consensus 
vote) or cultural services (unanimity requirement): finding a consensus will be harder with an 
increased number of potential vetoes resulting from an enlarged EU. 
With this background in mind, the new Article 133 EC enables the EC to conclude 
international agreements on trade in services and intellectual property rights by qualified-
majority voting and without ratification by the Member States.348 Nonetheless, there is a need 
 
348 Krenzler, H.G. & Pitschas, C. ‘Progress or Stagnation?: The Common Commercial Policy After Nice,’ 
EUROPEAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS REV., 6, 291-313, 2001, at p. 310. 
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for unanimity if only one of the services sectors or intellectual property rights covered by the 
agreement comes under Article 133 (5.2) EC. Moreover, ratification by the EU Member 
States is required if one of the services sectors in question comes under Article 133 (6.2) EC. 
Consequently, only agreements on specific services sectors, such as the GATS protocols on 
telecommunications or financial services, can be concluded in accordance with the rules of 
Article 133 (1-4) EC. 
The scope of agreements on the commercial aspects of intellectual property rights is 
rather far reaching due to the dynamic relationship with the TRIPS Agreement. However, 
since the EC has not yet enacted internal rules in several areas of intellectual property rights, 
agreements on intellectual property rights where there are not yet internal EC rules, they 
must be concluded by unanimous decision within the EU Council. With respect to foreign 
direct investment, the Commission did not succeed in including it in the scope of the EC’s 
common commercial policy. 
After Nice, all EU Member States agreed that, out of the 75 cases where the EC 
Treaty still required unanimity, consensus must continue to be the rule in only 25 of those 
cases; for the remaining 50 cases, it was considered by the Portuguese and French 
presidencies that unanimity should be replaced by qualified-majority voting.349 In the end, 
qualified-majority voting was introduced in only 27 Articles out of the original 50 proposed 
by the Commission.350 
349 In this sense, the Constitutional Treaty went further by creating the so-called “transition clause,” which has 
two main objectives: firstly, it enables the EU Council to act by qualified majority, instead of unanimity, in the 
areas of Part III of the EU Constitutional Treaty. The Council can adopt, on its own initiative and unanimously, 
a European decision authorizing the EU Council to act unanimously in a specific field. When applying this 
clause, national parliaments must be informed more than four months prior to the decision’s initial 
implementation; secondly, the transition clause enables the EU Council, acting unanimously, to extend the co-
decision procedure to new areas. This clause is one of the provisions which enable the long-term adaptation of 
the Constitutional Treaty, in the same way as the flexibility clause, or the review procedure.  
350 For a list of the 27 Articles where unanimity has been changed by qualified-majority voting, see Commission 
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There were five sensitive areas in which transition to qualified-majority voting was 
important for an enlarged EU. Without intending to enter into the details of any single one of 
them, these were: 
1. the coordination of social security schemes for cross-border workers and minimum 
requirements in social policy (Articles 42 & 137 EC; opposition from the British 
government); 
2. visas, asylum and immigration issues (Article 67 EC); 
3. taxation (Article 93 EC; opposition from the British government); 
4. the services and industrial property aspects of the common commercial policy 
(Article 133 EC; strong opposition from the French government); and  
5. the financing of economic and social cohesion policy (Article 161 EC). 
 
With regard to EC trade policy, France showed its eternal problem with culture in the 
sense that the French government refused the idea of getting rid of commercial policy 
exemptions for cultural issues (the so-called specificite culturelle). The final deal was to 
allow trade in services to be decided by qualified-majority voting, but only after accepting 
exemptions for France in culture and audiovisual services. The French and other delegations 
of EU Member States negotiated long hours to come up with the new Article 133 of the Nice 
Treaty. The European Commission had campaigned over 10 years to obtain more freedom to 
lead international trade in services negotiations for the EU at the GATT/WTO. The final 
compromise was the inclusion of the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements 
on trade in services and commercial aspects of intellectual property. These agreements are 
 
of the European Communities, Secretary-General, “List of provisions to which the qualified majority rules will 
apply,” CONFER 4706/1/00 REV 1. 
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concluded by qualified-majority voting, except when they include “provisions for which 
unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules or where it relates to a field in which 
the Community has not yet exercised the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty by adopting 
internal rules.”351 Furthermore, “agreements relating to trade in cultural and audiovisual 
services, educational services, and social and human health services shall fall within the 
shared competence of the Community and its Member States.”352 
The interests of an EU Member State can be subordinated to the national interests that 
may be vital to another EU Member State. Most national policy-makers recognize that, one 
day, they could be in the difficult position of their colleagues, and are therefore happy to 
keep the veto power. It is therefore no surprise to see the current trend by a majority of EU 
Member States to expand the rule of unanimity in decision-making in the new areas of trade 
policy. This trend, however, can question democratically speaking the fairness of an 
arrangement according to which the blocking minority always gets its way (tyranny of the 
minority, following by analogy Tocqueville’s famous sentence). The alternative situation to 
unanimity is qualified majority vote. Given that the voting weight is far from proportional to 
the country’s population, it favors smaller EU countries. This brings serious doubts as to the 
qualified majority vote option. So both options show problems of democratic deficit, 
damaging thereby the legitimacy of the EU. 
It is pertinent to mention that the draft Treaty presented at the beginning of the Nice 
Summit in December 2000 included a Protocol on the participation of the EC and its Member 
States in the framework of the WTO under Article 133(4).353 This text made an effort at 
 
351 Article 133.5.2 of the Nice Treaty. 
352 Article 133.6.2 of the Nice Treaty. 
353 Draft Treaty of Nice, doc. CONFER 4816/00, of 6 December 2000. 
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better defining the roles of the EC and its Member States in areas of shared competence. Yet, 
this useful text was unfortunately not included in the final draft.354 
Co-decision will only be applicable in seven Articles355 that have changed from 
unanimity to qualified-majority voting. Unfortunately, the Nice IGC was not capable of 
extending the co-decision procedure to measures that already exist under the qualified-
majority rule, such as trade or agriculture. 
In conclusion, the Treaty of Nice only represents a small step forward in strengthening 
the EC’s capacity to act on the international sphere. Many negative aspects of the ECJ’s 
Opinion 1/94 have been codified by the new Article 133 EC. The negotiation and conclusion 
of significant international agreements, be they bilateral or multilateral, is subject to 
unanimous decision within the Council and ratification by the Member States. There was no 
solution towards obtaining a more extensive EC’s exclusive competence to reach trade in 
services, intellectual property rights and investment.  
With respect to the unanimity requirement, it enables third countries to exert influence on 
single Member States. This, in an enlarged EC of over 25 members in the future, could be 
detrimental for its capacity to act internationally. It is then clear that national sovereignty has 
gained over efficiency in foreign trade.356 The EC’s negotiating power, in comparison to that 
of the U.S. or Japan, has therefore been reduced, or at least not strengthened in a meaningful 
manner. This will not enable the EC to properly respond to the challenges of globalization 
and the world trading system. 
 
354 Provisional text of Treaty of Nice, doc. SN 533/00, of 12 December 2000. Final text SN 1247/01, of 30 
January 2001. See also the Nice Treaty web site at www.europa.eu.int/comm/nice_treaty/index_en.htm 
355 These seven Articles are Art. 13, 62, 63, 65, 157, 159 and 191 EC. 
356 See, in this respect, Maurer, A. “Qualified Majority Voting: A Joint Failed Search for Efficiency Building,” 
in Laursen, F. (ed.) The Treaty of Nice: Actor Preferences, Bargaining and Institutional Choice, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, pp. 433-457. 
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VI.- The Constitutional Treaty’s Proposals for External Trade Policy357 
In relation to challenges ahead, as the EC has started this new millennium, it has been facing 
institutional and policy changes in accordance with today’s international relations reality. 
The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty postponed major EC institutional reforms so a change is 
inevitable in the near future in order for the EC to survive and maintain credibility as an 
international actor.358 This is also the case of trade policy, even if it is one of the most 
integrated policies within the EC. Policy-makers in the EC will soon have to face an 
expanded Union of 27 to 30 Members, which will not be homogeneous since they will not 
have the same macroeconomic level and yet a way must be found to make the EU institutions 
work productively. 
After the adoption of the Nice Treaty, EU Member States felt the need to call a 
Convention on the Future of Europe, inter alia, to further extend voting by qualified majority 
in the EU Council. One of the main motivations to resume the work done at the Nice IGC 
was the risk of blocking the EU institutions. The Convention on the Future of Europe tried to 
reduce a maximum of areas where EU Member States retain their veto power in the sectors 
which concern them, such as taxation in the case of the UK or education in France. 
The first attempt to ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty has failed. It is 
somewhat paradoxical that in the period since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, at precisely the 
 
357 On the drafting history of the EU Constitutional Treaty, see Liisberg, J.B. “The EU Constitutional Treaty and 
its Distinction between Legislative and Non-legislative Acts – Oranges into Apples?,” Jean Monnet Working 
Paper 01/06, pp. 11-26. 
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time in which there were few credible alternatives to liberal democracy, there have been 
growing doubts about the capacity of the structures and institutions of liberal democracy to 
respond to contemporary problems.359 Although the EU Constitutional Treaty will most 
likely not enter into force360 before the conclusion of the Doha Development Agenda,361 it 
seems nevertheless relevant to analyze the impact of the Constitutional Treaty on the EC’s 
external trade policy.362 With respect to the input given by the Convention on the Future of 
Europe363 and, consequently, the EU Constitutional Treaty, they both try to timidly improve 
 
358 Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, “EU Trade Policy: The Exclusive versus Shared Competence 
Debate,” in The State of the European Union. Risks, Reform, Resistance and Revival, Vol. 5, 326 (Maria Green 
Cowles & Michael Smith eds., 2000). 
359 Laursen, F. “The Post-Nice Agenda: Towards a New ‘Constitutional’ Treaty?,” in Laursen, F. (ed.) The 
Treaty of Nice: Actor Preferences, Bargaining and Institutional Choice, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, pp. 
543-60. 
360 When the EU Constitutional Treaty enters into force –if it ever does- it is foreseen that the EC Treaty, the 
EU Treaty, as well as acts and Treaties which have supplemented or amended them, be repealed, as laid down 
in the general and final provisions at the end of Part III of the EU Constitutional Treaty. The EU Constitutional 
Treaty is supposed to enter into force after ratification by all EU Member States. It is also provided for that the 
Union will succeed to all the rights and obligations, whether internal or resulting from international agreements, 
which arose before the entry into force of the EU Constitutional Treaty. The case-law of the ECJ will be 
maintained as a source of Union law interpretation. As stated in Article I-6 of the EU Constitutional Treaty, the 
Constitution and law adopted by the Union’s institutions in exercising competences conferred on it will have 
primacy over the law of the Member States. 
361 Predictions are that the Doha Round negotiations will be completed by the end of 2006 in the best case 
scenario. 
362 Early analyses thereof can be found at Cremona, M. “The Draft Constitutional Treaty: External Relations 
and External Action,” Common Market Law Review, 40: 1347-1366, 2003; de Burca, G. "The EU Constitution: 
In Search of Europe's International Identity," Walter van Gerven lecture, Leuven, November 2004, where de 
Burca argues that the external relations provisions of the EU Constitutional Treaty are the most innovative and 
important parts of the constitutional reform; de Witte, B. "The Constitutional Law of External Relations," in 
Pernice, I. & Poiares Maduro, M. (eds.) A Constitution for the European Union: First Comments on the 2003-
Draft of the European Convention, pp. 95-106, Nomos, 2003, available at 
http://www.ecln.net/elements/conferences/booklisbon/dewitte.pdf (last visited February 26, 2005). 
363 The European Convention (also known as the Convention on the future of Europe) was set up in December 
2001. It had 105 members, representing the presidents or prime ministers of the EU Member States and 
candidate countries, their national parliaments, the European Parliament and the European Commission. Its 
Chairman was former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. The Convention's job was to draw up a new 
Treaty that would set out clear rules for running the European Union after enlargement. It was, in effect, to be 
the Constitution of the EU. The Convention completed its work on 10 July 2003. 
 In order to reach a compromise for all parties present, the Convention consulted diverse groups of civil 
society (citizens, social partners, NGOs, economic sectors,…) in various ways, of which the Forum on the 
Future of the Union was one. The Forum on the Future of the Union was created by the Convention Secretariat, 
with the technical assistance of the Commission, and received contributions from interested national and 
supranational organizations. Eight contact groups were set up to prepare auditions for the academic world, study 
groups, the social sector, the environment, human rights, development, regions and local authorities, culture, 
and citizens and the EU institutions. The Convention also created an online forum on the future of Europe to 
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the current situation on trade issues created by the Nice IGC. The main innovation introduced 
by the EU Constitutional Treaty is to specify the various types of competence that exist in the 
EU, which has never done in any of the previous Treaties.364 Thus, the Union's external trade 
policy will become more federal,365 but not necessarily more democratic, even if the 
European Parliament will have more powers in relation to the conclusion of international 
trade agreements. The empowerment of the European Parliament is overweighed by the fact 
that national parliaments will not part take in the ratification of trade agreements. Therefore, 
the Constitutional Treaty improves some aspects of the current EC's common commercial 
policy, but creates new (unnecessary) problems. 
 
A.- The Constitutional Treaty and International Services Trade
The EU Constitutional Treaty has given more competences in trade policy to the 
supranational level, which causes problems for national governments. In practice, the 
problems arise because there is no definition or scope of the common commercial policy in 
the EU Constitutional Treaty. Therefore, if a given agreement is on a subject of national 
regulation, then it will have to be signed as a mixed agreement, even under the EU 
Constitutional Treaty.  
 
connect with civil society. 
364 The ECJ, however, had already prefigured such a categorization in that it defines three types of competences: 
exclusive, shared, and complementary. 
365 The general rule laid down in Article I-13 of the Constitutional Treaty is that the Union has exclusive 
competence for the conclusion of an international agreement in areas defined by European legislative acts, when 
the competence is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or affects an internal Union 
act. This praxis gives a federal approach to the Union in trade agreements. 
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Part III of the Constitutional Treaty (The Policies and Functioning of the Union) deals 
in its Title V (The Union’s External Action) with the common commercial policy (Chapter 
III). With respect to the common commercial policy, Articles III-314366 and 315367 of the EU 
Constitutional Treaty deal with the common commercial policy and state that the common 
commercial policy includes “the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in 
 
366 Article III-314 of the Constitutional Treaty reads: By establishing a customs union in accordance with 
Article III-151, the Union shall contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world 
trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct investment, and the 
lowering of customs and other barriers. 
367 Article III-315 of the Constitutional Treaty reads: 
 
1. The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly with regard to changes in 
tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and the 
commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of uniformity in 
measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of 
dumping or subsidies. The common commercial policy shall be conducted in the context of the principles and 
objectives of the Union's external action.  
 
2. European laws shall establish the measures defining the framework for implementing the common 
commercial policy. 
 
3. Where agreements with one or more third countries or international organisations need to be negotiated and 
concluded, Article III-325 shall apply, subject to the special provisions of this Article.  
The Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorise it to open the necessary 
negotiations. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring that the agreements negotiated 
are compatible with internal Union policies and rules.  
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special committee appointed by the 
Council to assist the Commission in this task and within the framework of such directives as the Council may 
issue to it. The Commission shall report regularly to the special committee and to the European Parliament on 
the progress of negotiations.  
 
4. For the negotiation and conclusion of the agreements referred to in paragraph 3, the Council shall act by a 
qualified majority.  
For the negotiation and conclusion of agreements in the fields of trade in services and the commercial aspects of 
intellectual property, as well as foreign direct investment, the Council shall act unanimously where such 
agreements include provisions for which unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules.  
The Council shall also act unanimously for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements:  
(a) in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services, where these agreements risk prejudicing the Union's 
cultural and linguistic diversity;  
(b) in the field of trade in social, education and health services, where these agreements risk seriously disturbing 
the national organisation of such services and prejudicing the responsibility of Member States to deliver them.  
 
5. The negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in the field of transport shall be subject to Section 
7 of Chapter III of Title III and to Article III-325.  
 
6. The exercise of the competences conferred by this Article in the field of the common commercial policy shall 
not affect the delimitation of competences between the Union and the Member States, and shall not lead to 
harmonisation of legislative or regulatory provisions of the Member States insofar as the Constitution excludes 
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goods and services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct 
investment” (paragraph 1).368 The text in italics was added to the text of the first paragraph of 
the current version of Article 133 of the Nice Treaty.  This makes it very clear that goods, 
services, intellectual property rights and investment would be covered by the common 
commercial policy and would therefore fall within the exclusive competence of the EU. The 
transfer of areas of decision-making to the supranational level weakens the national interests 
in the various EU Member States.369 Compared to the Nice Treaty, the scope would be 
increased in two aspects: firstly, the exception concerning cultural and audiovisual services, 
educational services, and social and human health services would be removed; and secondly, 
investment would be included in the scope of the common commercial policy. 
Although the Union will gain a comprehensive external competence, covering 
thereby all fields of the world trading system, Article III-315 of the Constitutional Treaty 
does not provide the Union with full internal competence to adopt legislation to implement 
trade agreements. This means that the Union would need to coordinate with EU Member 
States before trade agreements can be concluded. Furthermore, the implementation of an 
international agreement by the Union will put political pressure on EU Member States to 
adopt that piece of legislation. Since EU Member States will only have a formal competence 
to implement international agreements, it will not leave them a large margin of discretion, 
though. Given that Article III-315 of the Constitution, as it stands, would remove any shared 
competence in EC trade policy (services and commercial aspects of intellectual property 
rights), it would exclude national parliaments from ratifying any future WTO agreements.  
Therefore, EU national parliaments would see their influence on trade policy minimized. 
 
such harmonisation. 
368 Article III-315 (1) of the Constitutional Treaty. 
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However, as we will see below, the cultural exception in services trade will remain, but in a 
different form, giving a veto power to EU Member States in specific circumstances (Article 
III-315-4(a) of the EU Constitutional Treaty). 
When analyzing the EU Constitutional Treaty, we note that there are areas where the 
Union may take coordinating, complementary or supporting action, i.e., public health, culture 
or education.370 This seems to be in direct confrontation with the commitments of the 
Constitutional Treaty in international trade policy (Articles III-314 and 315).  
 In trade policy, the distinction between qualified majority371 and unanimity in the 
Council remains in the Constitutional Treaty, depending on the area of trade policy. The 
voting requirements of decision-making in the EU Council appear in Article III-315 (4) of 
 
369 Weiler, J.H.H., Un’Europa Cristiana. Un Saggio Esplorativo, Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli, 2003, p. 173. 
370 See Article I-17 of the Constitutional Treaty, which reads: 
 
The Union shall have competence to carry out supporting, coordinating or complementary action. The areas of 
such action shall, at European level, be: 
(a) protection and improvement of human health; 
(b) industry; 
(c) culture; 
(d) tourism; 
(e) education, youth, sport and vocational training; 
(f) civil protection; 
(g) administrative cooperation. 
 
See also Article III-278 (1) of the Constitutional Treaty, which reads: 
 
1.   A high level of human health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all the 
Union's policies and activities. 
Action by the Union, which shall complement national policies, shall be directed towards improving public 
health, preventing human illness and diseases, and obviating sources of danger to physical and mental health. 
Such action shall cover: 
(a) the fight against the major health scourges, by promoting research into their causes, their transmission 
and their prevention, as well as health information and education; 
(b) monitoring, early warning of and combating serious cross-border threats to health. 
The Union shall complement the Member States' action in reducing drug-related health damage, including 
information and prevention. 
371 Article I-25 (1) of the Constitutional Treaty defines qualified majority: 
1. A qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55 % of the members of the Council, comprising at least 
fifteen of them and representing Member States comprising at least 65 % of the population of the Union.  
A blocking minority must include at least four Council members, failing which the qualified majority shall be 
deemed attained. 
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the Constitutional Treaty.372 The idea of the Convention was to provide for the use of 
qualified majority voting as a rule. However, the Convention version of Article III-315 did 
not specifically mention it. This was rectified by adding a subparagraph in Article III-315 
(4): “for the negotiation and conclusion of the agreements referred to in paragraph 3, the 
Council shall act by qualified majority.” This seems to suggest that only the negotiation and 
conclusion of international agreements shall be subject to the majority rule, but not the 
adoption of unilateral actions and the implementation of agreements. Nevertheless, majority 
voting is already in the Nice Treaty the general rule for the exercise of powers in the field of 
commercial policy.373 Thus, the proposed provision should be interpreted in such a way that 
majority voting applies as a general rule, subject to the exceptions provided for in 
subparagraphs 2 and 3 of Article III-315 (4). That said, a trade agreement which includes 
issues that require unanimity and qualified majority will be concluded by unanimous vote in 
the EU Council according to the pastis374 principle.375 
372 Article III-315 (4) of the Constitutional Treaty reads: 
For the negotiation and conclusion of the agreements referred to in paragraph 3, the Council shall act by a 
qualified majority. 
For the negotiation and conclusion of agreements in the fields of trade in services and the commercial aspects of 
intellectual property, as well as foreign direct investment, the Council shall act unanimously where such 
agreements include provisions for which unanimity is required for the adoption of internal rules.  
The Council shall also act unanimously for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements:  
(a) in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services, where these agreements risk prejudicing the Union's 
cultural and linguistic diversity;  
(b) in the field of trade in social, education and health services, where these agreements risk seriously disturbing 
the national organisation of such services and prejudicing the responsibility of Member States to deliver them.  
373 Article 133 (4) EC: “in exercising the powers conferred upon it by this Article, the Council shall act by 
qualified majority.” 
374 Pastis is an anise-flavored liqueur and aperitif from France, typically containing 40-45% alcohol by volume, 
although there exist alcohol-free varieties. Pastis is normally diluted with water before drinking (generally 5 
volumes of water for 1 volume of pastis). The resulting decrease in alcohol percentage causes some of the 
constituents to become insoluble, which changes the liqueur's appearance from dark transparent yellow to milky 
soft yellow. 
375 According to Lamy, “…under the Pastis principle, a little drop of unanimity can taint the entire glass of 
QMV [qualified majority vote] water,” argued in a speech given in Brussels, “The Convention and trade policy: 
concrete steps to enhance the EU’s international profile,” available at http:// 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/archives/commission_1999_2004/lamy/speeches_articles/spla146_en.htm (last 
visited January 8, 2006). 
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More competences have been given to the EU in trade matters with the EU 
Constitutional Treaty. So does the EU Constitutional Treaty provide protection against 
liberalization when national interests are at stake? When analyzing the EU Constitutional 
Treaty, it might be argued that the following Articles protect the rights of the Member States 
to determine policy on health, education, and cultural/audiovisual services: Articles I-17, III-
278 on public health, III-280 on culture, III-282 on education, III-315-4 of the common 
commercial policy on cultural and audiovisual services, and III-315-5 of the common 
commercial policy on the delineation of the competences of Member States as against those 
of the EU. However, these Articles offer little legal protection against the provisions of 
Article I-13-1(e),376 which gives the Union the exclusive right to determine the EU’s 
common commercial policy, and Article III-315-1 of the common commercial policy, which 
includes the right to make “trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services.” 
This element of the common commercial policy allows the Commission, after a 
qualified majority vote in the Council of Ministers, to make deals in the GATS and the WTO 
Agreement on what the Commission itself defines as the commercial aspects of these 
services. The commercial aspects of these services are not defined in the EU Constitutional 
Treaty or elsewhere. The implication of this is that an EU Member State would have to go to 
the European Court of Justice to challenge the Commission, arguing a defense that would 
 
376 Article I-13 of the Constitutional Treaty reads: 
 
1.   The Union shall have exclusive competence in the following areas: 
(a) customs union; 
(b) the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market; 
(c) monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro; 
(d) the conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy; 
(e) common commercial policy. 
 
2.   The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement when its 
conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its 
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have to show that the Commission was opening trade in non-commercial aspects of these 
services. This would be a very difficult legal argument to make, since many parts of these 
services can be broken into individual functions and contracted out. Examples of this can be 
seen in Ireland and the UK. In practice, the above-mentioned protection Articles are but a 
fig-leaf covering the overriding drive toward uniform liberalization of trade in services 
contained in the common commercial policy. If those who cite these Articles are serious 
about protecting health, education, and cultural/audiovisual services from 
commercialization, they should at least press for the retention of the unanimity requirement 
in the Council of Ministers on decisions to open trade in these services.  
With regard to culture and audiovisual services, Article III-315-4(a) of the EU 
Constitutional Treaty gives a veto on changes in the common commercial policy only in the 
“conclusion of agreements in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services, where 
these agreements risk prejudicing the Union’s cultural and linguistic diversity.” How such 
risk is defined, when it is defined, and by whom it is defined, is open to interpretation. Would 
a general opening up of the University sector, or of the primary school sector (as is 
happening in the UK), to unlimited competition pose a threat to cultural and linguistic 
diversity? For instance, in the case of Ireland, would the same levels of support to 
linguistically specific radio and TV –like TG4377 and projects it supports– also have to be 
given to private commercial channels like TV3378? How would defenders of linguistic 
diversity establish, in advance -rather than when deals have been made and the damage is 
already done- that certain trade agreements pose risks to culture? Who decides what 
 
internal competence, or insofar as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope. 
377 TG4 is an Irish television channel aimed at Irish language speakers and established as a wholly owned 
subsidiary by Radio Telefis Eireann on October 31, 1996. It was known as Teilifís na Gaeilge or TnaG before a 
rebranding campaign in 1999. 
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constitutes a risk is not defined in the EU Constitutional Treaty, so those who might see their 
culture as being at risk will not have veto powers. Certainly, EU Member States will continue 
to participate in the EU’s trade policy whenever there is a national regulation sector that the 
European Commission neither controls nor knows about when it comes to national 
preoccupations. In practice, the European Court of Justice will determine which services 
should be protected and which should be commercialized. 
 
B.- The Union’s Exclusive Competence in Trade Policy
Part I, Title III (Articles I-11 to I-18) of the Constitutional Treaty379 deals with the division of 
competences between the Union and the Member States.  It presents a threefold 
classification: exclusive competence/shared competence/supporting action.380 However, 
Title III does not seek to allocate competences in the way that a federal constitution might.381 
It is debatable how far Title III fulfils the demands of the Laeken European Council.  The 
 
378 TV3 Ireland is the sole commercial terrestrial television channel in the Republic of Ireland.  
379 Official Journal of the European Union C 310, Volume 47, 16 December 2004, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:SOM:EN:HTML (last visited December 23, 
2004). 
380 In relation to the exclusive competences of the Union, the EU can legislate alone and adopt legally binding 
acts in areas of exclusive competence (or authorize the Member States to do so). In areas of competences shared 
between the EU and its Member States, both can intervene. The areas of support, coordination or 
complimentary action open to the Union’s competence are: industry; protection and improvement of human 
health; education, vocational training, youth and sport; tourism; administrative cooperation; culture; and civil 
protection. In these areas, the legally binding acts adopted by the Union (law, framework law, regulation and 
decision) on the basis of provisions specific to these areas, may not entail harmonization of Member States’ 
laws or regulations. The Constitutional Treaty also recognizes the Union’s competence for the definition and 
establishment of a common foreign and security policy, including the progressive definition of a common 
defense policy. However, the Constitutional Treaty does not give details about Member States’ competences, in 
other words, areas in which the Union cannot intervene. That said, however, it is clear that “the rest” of 
competences which are omitted is Member States’ competences. 
381 See the German experience of a clear division of competences between the Federal level and the Laender 
level in Title VII of the Fundamental Law for the Federal Republic of Germany of May 23rd 1949, especially 
Articles 70-75. 
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basic threefold classification may be controversial, not the least the definition of exclusive 
competence.382 
Part I, Title III of the Constitutional Treaty (The Union’s competences) accepts the fact 
that it would be futile to attempt to compile an exhaustive catalogue of Union competences.  
Rather it adopts a two-sided approach: firstly, it entails the restatement and strengthening of 
the fundamental principles that organize the relationship between Union and Member State 
powers; and, secondly, defining with greater precision than at present the different kinds of 
competence available to the Union. Since external trade policy is an exclusive competence in 
the eyes of the EU Constitutional Treaty, let us focus on exclusive competence, which is 
defined in Article I-13 of the Constitutional Treaty. 
 
• Article I-13 
 
Article I-13 seeks to describe and define those areas where the Union has exclusive 
competence.  This new Article may be controversial, especially for the relationship between 
the Union and the Member States, but also for the involvement of national parliaments in the 
control of Union legislation.383 It deals with internal competence384 and external 
 
382 Article I-13 of the Constitutional Treaty. 
383 In fact, the Protocol on the role of the EU’s national parliaments attempts to clarify relations between 
national representatives and the EU institutions. The protocol states that, when the European Council uses the 
procedure laid down in Article I-24 (4)(2) –meaning that when a Council Decision opens a new area to vote at 
qualified majority- the national parliaments must be notified at least four months prior to the first vote in that 
area. The Constitutional Treaty also clarifies and organizes the national parliament’s information mechanisms, 
which for a long time were informal or falling under the Amsterdam Protocol. The EU institutions are obliged 
to forward documents. For example, the Commission sends all its consultation documents, its annual legislative 
program or legislative proposals. It also contains a constitutional recognition of the Conference of bodies 
specialized in EC affairs, which is the link between national parliaments and the European Parliament. 
384 Article I-13 (1). 
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competence.385 These are two separate but related subjects: it is possible for the Union to 
have exclusive external competence in an area where the Union and its Member States have 
shared internal competence under the Treaty.386 In other words, issues of shared competence 
may potentially become exclusive EU competence.387 
The Union is said to have exclusive competence to establish “the competition rules 
necessary for the functioning of the internal market,” as well as in the areas of customs 
union, common commercial policy, monetary policy for the Member States which have 
adopted the Euro, and fisheries conservation.388 The list in paragraph 1 of the areas of the 
Constitution in which the Union has exclusive competence goes beyond the present situation, 
as it includes the entire common commercial policy. Since Article I-13 does not define the 
scope of the common commercial policy, it is only by reading the relevant Article in Part III 
of the Constitutional Treaty that one discovers that the EU’s exclusive competence is being 
extended compared to the Nice Treaty. This means that Article 133 (6), subparagraph (2) of 
the Nice Treaty should be deleted, unless we give a different definition to the common 
 
385 Article I-13 (2). 
386 According to Article I-14 of the Constitutional Treaty, the Union has shared competence with the Member 
States on issues of common safety concerns in public health matters, as well as in the following issues: the 
internal market; areas of freedom, security and justice; agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of 
marine biological resources; transport and trans-European networks; energy; social policy for aspects defined in 
Part III of the Constitutional Treaty; economic, social and territorial cohesion; common safety concerns in 
public health matters, for the aspects defined in Part III; the environment; and consumer protection. The 
Constitutional Treaty also includes two other areas: 1) research, technological development and space, for 
which the Union has competence to take actions without stopping Member States from doing so; and 2) in the 
areas of development cooperation and humanitarian aid, the Union can coordinate a common policy. However, 
the Union can only support, coordinate or complement Member States’ action in the area of civil defense. 
Taxation remains one of the Member States’ competences, even though the VAT rate and base are harmonized 
at the European level. Also, administrative cooperation is recognized as a common interest question in Article 
III-285 of the Constitutional Treaty, for which the Union can support efforts made by Member States to 
improve their administrative capacity to establish Union law. No Member State is obliged to use this support. 
387 House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Union, “The Future of Europe: Constitutional Treaty–
Draft Articles 1-16,” Session 2002-03, 9th Report, 25 February 2003, p. 19. 
388 Article I-13 (1) of the Constitutional Treaty. 
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commercial policy, far from the current one.389 The EU Constitutional Treaty will repeal the 
existing treaties entirely, if it enters into force, and therefore will deal with this problem. 
Antoniadis, however, has a more skeptical approach on the Constitutional 
Convention’s proposals in this matter.  According to him, the designation of the common 
commercial policy as an exclusive Union competence does not insulate the system from 
external threats, and thus perpetuates the constitutional conflicts between the EC and its 
Member States in trade policy with regard to services trade and the commercial aspects of 
intellectual property rights.390 Why is this the case? Because EU Member States still retain 
competence to legislate over matters pertaining to the internal market. These measures are 
destined to have a trade impact and, more importantly, may be incompatible with the WTO 
Agreements. For example, let us think of a case involving national patent law which offers 
limited protection, thereby violating the TRIPS Agreement. Or a situation in which the law 
provides restrictions to the establishment of third country service providers, violating thereby 
the GATS. 
 Another reason that explains why the designation of the common commercial policy 
as an exclusive Union competence only perpetuates the constitutional conflicts between the 
 
389 Article 133 (6) of the Nice Treaty reads: 
 An agreement may not be concluded by the Council if it includes provisions which would go beyond 
the Community’s internal powers, in particular by leading to harmonization of the laws or regulations of the 
Member States in an area for which this Treaty rules out such harmonization. 
 
In this regard, by way of derogation form the first subparagraph of paragraph 5, agreements relating to trade in 
cultural and audiovisual services, educational services, and social and human health services, shall fall within 
the shared competence of the Community and its Member States. Consequently, in addition to a Community 
decision taken in accordance with the relevant provisions of Article 300, the negotiation of such agreements 
shall require the common accord of the Member States. Agreements thus negotiated shall be concluded jointly 
by the Community and the Member States. 
 
The negotiation and conclusion of international agreements in the field of transport shall continue to be 
governed by the provisions of Title V and Article 300. 
390 Antoniadis, A. “The Participation of the European Community in the World Trade Organization: An 
External Look at European Union Constitution-Building,” in Tridimas, T. & Nebbia, P. European Union Law 
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EC and its Member States in trade policy with regard to services trade and the commercial 
aspects of intellectual property rights is the fact that EU Member States remain members of 
the WTO of their own right. This means that any other WTO member may request the 
establishment of a WTO Panel against any given EU Member State, and not against the EC 
(despite the exclusivity of the Union in the common commercial policy).391 If that particular 
EU Member State is found in violation of WTO law, it must repeal its legislation. In some 
cases, it may then not have the competence to do so domestically; in other cases, in doing so, 
it may violate EC law, and be found between conflicting legal obligations. 
The Convention on the Future of Europe gave birth to the Constitutional Treaty. The 
tasks of the Convention were set by the Laeken Declaration,392 which asked the Convention 
to consider “how the division of competence can be made more transparent,” “whether there 
needs to be any reorganization of competence” as well as “how to ensure a redefined division 
of competence” and to ensure European dynamism at the same time. After analyzing the new 
definition of the scope of EU trade policy by the Constitutional Treaty, more work may be 
needed to secure an adequate level of transparency required by the Laeken Declaration. As 
for the right balance between the maintenance of any “redefined division of competence” and 
ensuring that “the European dynamic does not come to a halt,” one has to look at Article I-18 
of the Constitutional Treaty,393 entitled “Flexibility clause.”394 
for the 21st Century: Rethinking the New Legal Order, Vol. I, Hart Publishing, 2004, pp. 321-344, at 337. 
391 However, dispute settlement body practice in the WTO dictates that WTO Member States tend to bring 
actions against the EC, not against individual EU countries, even in areas of shared competence. 
392 Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union of 15 December 2001, available at http://european-
convention.eu.int/pdf/LKNEN.pdf (last visited June 30, 2005). 
393 Article I-18 of the Constitutional Treaty reads: 
 
1.   If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies defined in Part III, to 
attain one of the objectives set out in the Constitution, and the Constitution has not provided the necessary 
powers, the Council of Ministers, acting unanimously on a proposal from the European Commission and after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures.2.   Using the procedure 
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VII. Conclusions 
 
With the EU Constitutional Treaty, major changes will arrive. However, one could say that, 
before the EU Constitutional Treaty, the more it all changed with Article 133 EC, the more it 
continued to be the same thing. Changes have been made but one wonders whether these 
suffice in qualitative and quantitative terms. On the other hand, stagnation continues to be 
present: there is somehow a revival of the ERTA principle and France does not want to give 
exclusive competence to the EC in cultural services, just to mention a few examples. Even 
with Article I-13 (1)(e) of the Constitutional Treaty, by which the common commercial 
policy will become exclusive Union competence, experience tells us that France, among 
some countries, will reject it on grounds of audiovisual services, health and the so-called 
specificite culturelle.
Much of the confusion in the common commercial policy has to do with the fact that 
there is no clear policy framework in the EC Treaty itself. If the EC puts its acts together 
externally, it might help it toward joining internally. If the EU wishes to achieve a main role 
in global governance, changes need to be made. Following Lamy’s ideas,  
 
for monitoring the subsidiarity principle referred to in Article I-11(3), the European Commission shall draw 
national Parliaments' attention to proposals based on this Article.3.   Measures based on this Article shall not 
entail harmonisation of Member States' laws or regulations in cases where the Constitution excludes such 
harmonisation. 
394 Flexibility clause (Article I-18 of the Constitutional Treaty) is the procedure which gives the Union new 
competences in areas unspecified by the Constitutional Treaty. If the Commission deems it necessary to conduct 
a new action in order to reach the Union’s objectives, it makes a proposal to that effect to the EU Council, 
which acts unanimously after obtaining the approval of the Parliament. With respect to the control procedure of 
the subsidiarity principle, the EU Council may assign the necessary competences to the Union. The new 
competences cannot, however, entail harmonization of Member States’ laws or regulations in cases where the 
EU Constitutional Treaty excludes such harmonization. 
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“the EU needs to speak at global level not just with a single voice, but 
through a single mouth: the Commission should have competence, as in 
trade, to negotiate on all matters pertaining to the management of 
globalization (e.g., environment, transport, energy negotiations, 
commodity organizations, OECD, FATF, WHO, FAO, etc.), and this 
under the full control as well as scrutiny of both the European Parliament 
and Member States. 
 
[...] Qualified majority voting in the Council should apply to questions of 
global economic governance. 
 
[...] We need to enshrine, in the Treaties, a method for a gradual 
integration of the three pillars of the EU and a gradual transfer of  
intergovernmentally managed subject matters to the Community 
method.”395 
Full Community competence in almost all trade matters has enabled the EC to 
develop a higher profile in international trade questions. Perhaps this can be a lesson to take 
into account for the remaining trade matters under non-exclusive Community competence. 
The role of the Member States’ national Parliaments and the European Parliament has to 
grow: they need to be consulted, given that there continues to be a democratic deficit in the 
negotiation and conclusion of EC international trade agreements.  
Going from unanimity to qualified-majority voting for the negotiation and conclusion 
of international agreements on services and commercial aspects of intellectual property (with 
exceptions) has already been identified as a reduction of sovereignty. On the other hand, in 
an enlarged EU of over 25 countries, any proposal requiring unanimity will be dead by 
definition since it will be almost impossible to find consensus. Statistically, enlargement will 
increase the risk of a Member State using its veto to prevent the Community from adopting a 
common position.  This collective weakness may work to the advantage of the Community's 
trading partners. 
 
395 Lamy, P. “Europe’s Role in Global Governance: The Way Ahead,” Speech given at Humboldt University, 
Berlin, 6 May 2002, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/index_en.htm (last visited May 24, 2003). 
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There are today many situations in which national interests can be pursued only 
through the EU level.  The main exercise of the first fathers of Europe until Giscard and 
Schmidt was to discern whether there is a national interest, no national solution and the only 
solution that can reasonably satisfy the national interest is a common solution. As for the 
future, I believe that there is no solid European architecture if the Commission is not at its 
center. Perhaps one compromising alternative to the current situation might be to have 
exclusive EC competence in trade matters, with clear exceptions of when and how these 
should apply, given that the current status quo does not seem to be a good option. 
